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4Preface
The following report is based on an interdisciplinary
research study undertaken to investigate the social, eco-
nomic, and cultural aspects of reindeer herding in north-
western Alaska. The project was funded by the National
Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, and car-
ried out by staff of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks.
The primary purpose of the research project was to gather
data on the past and present reindeer herding practices
of the region, but also to seek information on herding and
land uses, the future potential of this essentially Native
industry, and its impacts on the people and economy of
the area. Such a study was deemed essential — to assess
the potential impacts of any policy changes or land man-
agement decisions which might stem from pending legis-
lation to create new national interest lands in the region.
This report responds to those needs as outlined in the
contract between the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, and
the National Park Service. The entire history of reindeer
herding in the region is treated in the report, as well as
the social, cultural, and economic aspects of the industry,
at present and given changes in certain of the variables
identified as crucial in its continued operation.
There are many significant socioeconomic aspects of
reindeer herding; these are addressed in Chapters VI, VII,
VIII, and IX of this report. The sociocultural analysis of
reindeer herding (Chapter VI) examines the relationship
between the social structure of the village and the rein-
deer herd owner who is a member of that village. For
Eskimo villagers, ties of kinship and friendship have
obligatory behaviors connected with them. In this regard,
the herd—ownerÕs role in the village, his status, his au-
thority, and his role as an agent of cultural change, an
employer, and a politician are all examined. Conceptu-
ally different from the sociocultural analysis, but inti-
mately allied with it, is the economic analysis (Chapters
VII and VIII) of the reindeer industry. The economic field
data and related social data bearing on the economy were
analyzed using relevant economic theory.
Firm and consumer activity was explored to provide
insight into economic decision making regarding reindeer.
Chapter IX investigates the effects of changing land own-
ership or management of reindeer grazing lands or rein-
deer herding. Potential conflicts between reindeer herd-
ing and subsistence, wildlife, fire—control, aircraft, and
all terrain vehicles are identified and possible mitigating
Table 24. Value of Reindeer Production — Alaska, 1972—1977
Table 25. Value of Reindeer product sales — Seward Peninsula, 1975—1977
Table 26. Costs — 600 Reindeer
Table 27. Costs — 1300 Reindeer
Table 28. Costs — 2400 Reindeer
Table 29 Costs— 4000 Reindeer
Table 30. Reindeer Herd Revenues
Table 31. Net Herder Income
Table 32. Potential Meat Production for Sale from Seward Peninsula Reindeer Herds
measures provided. The picture of reindeer herding which
emerges from this study is one based on: 1) the biology
and ecology of the reindeer, to include the limits and pos-
sibilities which these imply for Native herders and fed-
eral agencies; 2) the historical continuity of reindeer herd-
ing since its introduction to mainland Alaska in 1892; 3)
the interplay of restraints on reindeer herding in the cul-
tural milieu of contemporary village life; 4) the influence
of the market economy on both the herder and consumer
of reindeer; and 5) the activities of local, state, and Fed-
eral governments, particularly as they relate to reindeer
herding and the ownership and management of grazing
land.
Except for Chapter IX, the material in this study is
based on research which ended in late 1977 and should
provide an accurate picture of reindeer herding through
that year. Where possible, material published after 1977
has been included in an attempt to update the analysis.
Chapter IX was completed in 1980 and covers most of the
major issues dealing with reindeer herding and land man-
agement between 1978 and 1980.
Many individuals and organizations have contributed
in both tangible and intangible ways to the completion of
this research. We especially thank the reindeer herders
of the Seward Peninsula and the surrounding region who
willingly gave of their time and knowledge to the research.
We single out both Dan Karmum, Coordinator of the Re-
indeer Herders Association, and Clifford Weyiouanna,
President of the Reindeer Herders Association, who were
particularly helpful. The staffs of the Institute of Arctic
Biology, Agricultural Experiment Station, and Anthropol-
ogy Program of the University of Alaska contributed in
many ways. Thanks to Bill Workman and Jack Luick of
the Agricultural Experiment Station and Institute of Arc-
tic Biology, respectively, University of Alaska for review-
ing several chapters. The personnel of several agencies
also assisted the researchers during the execution of this
research. These agencies include the Bureau of Land Man-
agement, National Park Service, United States Fish &
Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Finan-
cial support for the publication of this study was provided
by the Alaska Humanities Forum; Agricultural Experi-
ment Station, University of Alaska; National Park Ser-
vice; and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
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Introduction
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971
(ANCSA), Public Law 92—203, directed the Secre-
tary of the Interior to withdraw up to 80 million acres
of public lands under Section 17 d(2) of the Act. These
lands were to be considered as possible additions
to, or for the creation of units in, the National Park,
National Wildlife Refuge, National Forest, and Na-
tional Wild and Scenic River Systems. Agencies of
the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture pre-
pared recommendations for d(2) proposals. Four of
the proposed areas were in northwestern Alaska
where reindeer herding has been an important fea-
ture of the economy of the people for many years.
Under d(2) legislation proposed by Morris Udall
(H.R. 39), a Chukchi—Imuruk National Monument
on the Seward Peninsula and a Cape Krusenstern
National Monument at Cape Krusenstern, to be
managed by the National Park Service, were pro-
posed. A Noatak National Preserve, to be managed
by the National Park Service, with assistance on
request from the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service in the administration of wildlife resources,
was proposed for a large portion of the Noatak River
basin. A Selawik National Wildlife Refuge was pro-
posed above the village of Selawik in the Selawik
River basin. In northwestern Alaska, enactment of
any or all of these proposals would have a profound
effect on the reindeer—herding industryÕs current
status and future. Accordingly, the National Park
Service contracted with the University of Alaska,
Fairbanks, to conduct research on the socioeconomic
status of reindeer herding in northwestern Alaska
and provide basic data for the management of rein-
deer grazing. This report contains the results of that
research.
Research was concentrated on the four northwest
Alaska proposal areas as described in H.R. 39 (in-
troduced January 4, 1977). The investigators recog-
nize that these proposals were changed as a conse-
quence of d(2) hearings in the Congress of the United
States. Keeping track of all the changes and counter—
proposals was not possible in all cases during the
course of research; thus, for the purposes of this re-
port, the four areas as originally defined were em-
phasized. In total area, the four proposals included
some twelve million acres of land. These proposal
areas and adjoining regions supported vast numbers
of reindeer in the past but currently only the Seward
Peninsula has large numbers of reindeer (see Fig-
ure 1). In this report we concentrate on the contem-
porary activities on the Seward Peninsula, empha-
sizing the historical aspects of reindeer herding
throughout northwestern Alaska as well.
As work was being completed on this report, the
96th Congress finally passed d(2) legislation after
years of struggle. The four areas used as a basis for
this study remained essentially the same in the bill
passed by the Congress and signed by the President
on December 2, 1980. One significant change, how-
ever, was the replacement of the proposed Chukchi—
Imuruk National Monument on the Seward Penin-
sula with the Bering Land Bridge National Preserve.
The first stage in the research program was to
identify all the available literature on the social, eco-
nomic, historic, and cultural aspects of reindeer
herding in northwestern Alaska. An annotated bib-
liography of these sources was prepared (Stern,
1977) as part of this research project. A review of
this literature leads to the suggestion that reindeer
herding has not contributed its full potential to the
economy of rural Alaska for a number of reasons,
examined herein. Despite the tremendous number
of published articles, books, and reports, and a
wealth of unpublished materials that are available,
no comprehensive historical summary and analysis
of the reindeer industry in Alaska exists. Such a
summary and analysis is provided here.
During the second stage in the research program,
extended periods of resident field research were con-
ducted by the investigators. Richard O. Stern un-
dertook an extended period of resident research in
the Seward Peninsula region from December, 1976,
until the beginning of September, 1977. At various
times, the other investigators undertook field re-
search with the reindeer herders for periods lasting
up to six weeks at a time. The fieldwork portion of
the research concentrated on collecting data on sig-
nificant variables which were identified by the re-
searchers during the examination of the written
sources; in addition, we evaluated the contribution
which could be gained from securing these data.
Chapter II
Reindeer biology and
ecology
Our primary concern is with the socioeconomic
aspects of reindeer herding, therefore the discussion
below concerning reindeer and ecology will be only
a general one, and is presented in order to place the
human interactions with reindeer in their proper
biological perspective. Reindeer biology and ecology
have been researched extensively, but few biologists
would state that a perfect understanding of all as-
pects of reindeer biology, ethology, and ecology ex-
ists. The relationship of reindeer to their range, feed-
ing preferences and tolerances, the function of ant-
ler in feeding adaptations, the ecology of fire in range
6regeneration and succession, and the growth dynam-
ics of reindeer under various feeding regimes are
but a few of the problems which remain to be inves-
tigated. Current research efforts are being directed
towards the resolution of some of these questions. A
number of useful sources exist which present in more
detail the information which is abstracted here
(Luick et al., 1975; Pegau, 1968, 1970a, 1970b;
Skoog, 1968; Zhigunov, 1968; Espmark, 1964a,
1964b, 1971; Stern, 1977; Courtwright, 1959; and
Klein, 1970, 1971).
Reindeer biology and life cycle
Reindeer are the domestic or semidomestic form
of the animal Rangifer tarandus spp. In North
America, reindeer in the wild are usually called cari-
bou. In Siberia and Scandinavia, the term ÒreindeerÓ
usually refers to animals kept under human control
(i.e. domesticated), while Òwild reindeerÓ is the term
used to distinguish those animals which roam
unherded in the wild. The Saame (Lapp) term for
such wild, unmarked reindeer is peurat (Ingold, 1976).
Following Skoog (1968), domesticated reindeer will be
referred to in this chapter as Òreindeer,Ó and the wild
reindeer will be referred to as Òcaribou.Ó There are rela-
tively few differences in behavior and morphology that
allow one to distinguish between reindeer and cari-
bou. A general trend toward smaller size in rein-
deer may be viewed as part of the overall trend to-
ward smaller animal size in domesticated animals.
An alternative explanation is that the trend results
from human attempts to maximize herd size by con-
trolling their movements, protecting them from the
natural selection forces of predators, disease, and
parasites, as well as manipulating the genetics of
reproduction through husbandry techniques to en-
hance survival. Pelage also varies between reindeer
and caribou, with reindeer tending to be lighter in
color  spotted more often than caribou.
The natural life span of reindeer varies from ten
to fifteen years. Cows are usually fertile by their
second year, some becoming so by sixteen months.
Sexual maturity in bulls is likewise reached by the
second year. Cows remain fertile up to ten years.
After the tenth year, successful pregnancies decrease
as the cow becomes less able to forage successfully
during winter and spring pregnancy. Some bulls can
lose their potency after a few years while others re-
main fertile for at least ten years. A single bull can
impregnate twenty or more cows during the rutting
season. Bull—to—cow ratio is one of the most impor-
tant factors in herd management.
7For convenience in describing the yearly cycle of
activities and events in a reindeer herd, we will be-
gin in the early spring as the herd is beginning its
movement to the calving grounds. Pregnant cows
move instinctively to the same calving grounds year
after year from their winter ranges. In caribou, this
spring migration of up to tens of thousands of ani-
mals has generated the popular conception of long
annual treks by the animals. In general, reindeer
migrate less than caribou. In mid—April, calving
begins and continues through May. A single calf is
born to most cows every spring. Late winter and
spring are critical times for the reindeer, the long
winter having depleted the animalÕs health and body
fat reserves. Calving may still occur during sub—zero
temperatures. Predators such as wolves, bears,
foxes, and ravens may kill many animals or frighten
and scatter the herds. An early rainfall with a sud-
den drop in temperature may cause ice conditions
on top of the snow that reindeer cannot break
through to reach the plants below. Soft snow makes
travelling difficult for the animals. After birth and
as summer approaches, the newborn calves and their
mothers tend to separate briefly from the herd, dur-
ing which time the calf apparently learns to recog-
nize its mother. The hot summer months on the tun-
dra bring on swarms of warble flies, mosquitoes,
blackflies, and other flying insects which harass the
herds. At this time, the reindeer move to high, windy
places such as ridge—tops, or to the cooler, breezier
shores of lakes or the ocean to seek relief.
During the summer, antlers are regrown, having
been dropped during the winter by bulls and in the
spring by steers, barren females, and yearlings.
Pregnant females usually retain their antlers until
after parturition (Espmark, 1971). By July, the new
antler is fully developed, although the internal mass
of spongy tissue does not fully harden until fall. In
July, the antlers are covered by a soft, furry mate-
rial which resembles velvet, thus giving rise to the
term Òvelvet antlerÓ for this stage in their develop-
ment. The velvet on the antlers dies and is rubbed
off during late summer and fall. The winter coat of
the reindeer also tends to be shed during late spring
and early summer. Underlying the old winter coat
is a new growth of shorter, thick black hair. This
hair grows during the summer months while the re-
indeer feed on nutritious summer forage plants and
achieves their greatest weight gains.
As fall approaches, the reindeer tend to move in-
land toward more sheltered areas. As rutting sea-
son approaches, the groups of reindeer that have
scattered throughout the yearly cycle tend to re-
group. In northwest Alaska, rut begins in Septem-
ber and lasts into October, occurring when the ant-
lers of the males have grown to their largest size.
Reindeer are the most difficult to handle at this time
of year. The bulls gather ÒharemsÓ of cows around
them, while castrated males tend to form groups by
themselves (Espmark, 1964a). However, during the
winter, bulls and steers tend to group together to
graze while the cows with their calves graze together.
Favorite wintering areas tend to be in open forest
with loose snow and on the windswept slopes of hills
where ample forage is available.
Forage requirements and carrying
capacity
Reindeer (and caribou) eat various lichens during
the winter and early spring. In summer, various
grasses, marsh plants, and the leaves of birch and
willow become included in the diet. Mushrooms and
occasionally small mammals and bird eggs are eaten
(Skoog, 1968). Lichens are extremely brittle when
dry in the summer, and they can be easily damaged
when reindeer walk on them. When lichen ranges
are overgrazed or burned, the regeneration process
may require 20 to 40 years or longer. Thus, the avail-
ability of food resources can vary seasonally and
regionally for reindeer, a condition that can also
extend over a long period of time. The relationship
between reindeer and their food resources is a criti-
cal factor in herd survival. The relationship between
reindeer growth, nutrition, reproduction, and mor-
tality is still imperfectly understood.
The carrying capacity of reindeer ranges is cur-
rently thought to be determined by the amount and
quality of available winter—range lichens. These
winter ranges are limited compared with summer
ranges. The lichens that dominate these ranges can
grow extremely slowly, as noted by Pegau (1968,
1970a, 1970b), and are thought to be more suscep-
tible to overgrazing vis a vis summer forage. When
lichens are overgrazed, burned, trampled, or other-
wise damaged, regrowth can take decades.
Antler growth and function
Reindeer are social animals, and within the herd
are a number of hierarchically ordered groups. In-
dividual animals tend to recognize others within
their own group. Reindeer are unique among the
Cervidae (deer) family in that both males and fe-
males grow antlers. These antlers are postulated to
play a key role in the status of an individual ani-
mal. Body size, age, strength, sex, and season are
also factors. During the winter, the various age—sex
classes shed their antlers at different times with
pregnant females the last to drop their antlers.
Dominant animals tend to control access to the best
grazing locations, and in winter, when animals have
to paw through 40 to 80 cm (17 to 34 inches) of snow
to reach forage, a dominant animal using its ant-
lers and body action can displace a subordinate one
8at the feeding craters. Antler retention by pregnant
females during late winter, a time of forage scarcity,
may thus be an important adaptive feature and a
significant factor in the dominance hierarchy, since
it allows them access to the best available forage
(Espmark, 1964b). The possible biological effects of
antler harvesting by man are being investigated by
the Institute of Arctic Biology, University of Alaska
(Luick, 1977). Of particular concern is the impact of
such harvesting on bullsÕ performance during the
breeding season and on the recognition of their moth-
ers by calves (Espmark, 1971).
Reindeer ecology
Reindeer—herd management requires a knowledge
of both reindeer behavior and needs, as well as a
knowledge of the location, distribution, abundance,
and use of the various reindeer foods on any par-
ticular range. A useful distinction exists between
herding and husbandry (Paine, 1964, 1972). Herd-
ing includes all the knowledge outlined above, plus
the ability, judgment, and experience to move the
animals safely to the proper range at the right time
of the day or season. Husbandry on the other hand
includes another set of skills concerned with rein-
deer reproduction and herd increase. The herd owner
uses all these skills together to execute a plan or
implicit set of goals in herd management. As a hus-
bander, the owner views the herd as a capital asset,
one which can be nurtured towards future security
and which represents wealth. Decisions which the
herder/ owner must make in the husbandry context
include: how many bulls to castrate to raise as mar-
ketable steers; how many steers, bulls, old cows to
slaughter; optimal bull—to—cow ratios necessary to
assure herd increase; calving mortality; elimination
of diseased stock; and range conditions. The owner/
herder must also consider a number of other envi-
ronmental, economic, and social considerations and
factors. Throughout this report, management will
be used to refer to both of these allied concepts of
herding and husbandry.
Referring to the Kautokeino Lapps of northern
Norway, Paine (1972) suggests that husbandry de-
cisions can be thought of as:
Alternative allocations of reindeer capital:
a) Minimal necessary allocation of male animals
as draft animals: castration;
b) Selective allocation of animals to the realiza-
tion of cultural values, in particular the provision of
outer clothing where premium is placed on color and
other qualities of the skins: slaughter (both males
and females); and
c) Allocation of animals to the realization of liquid capi-
tal, i.e. money: retention of maximum number of females
as breeding animals and also of a select number of stud
bulls; marketing of male animals. (Paine, 1972).
In cultures which have long traditions of reindeer
herding, such as those of the Lapps or the Chukchi,
there is a distinct age separation among herders in
the herding and husbandry branches of knowledge.
Almost every man is a herder of greater or lesser
ability. Only some men manage to develop their
herds through the application of husbandry knowl-
edge and skills so that their herds grow. Young men
and boys rapidly acquire herding knowledge and
abilities through experience and informal instruc-
tion. Women and girls can also acquire such knowl-
edge and skills. The skills in husbandry, however,
rest with older men who have acquired their own
herds and built them up over time. As their vigor to
herd animals declines, their social status, political
power, and decision—making abilities increase. Leeds
(1965) has drawn attention to the almost Òembar-
rassing neatness of fitÓ between Chukchi social in-
stitutions and the ecological demands placed upon
a mobile, reindeer—herding society.
On the Seward Peninsula, the reindeer herd own-
ers do make use of their knowledge of the biology
and ecology of reindeer to manage their herds. For
example, the knowledge that different age—sex
classes of animals tend to group together at various
times of the year is used to decide when and how
much effort will be required to round up animals
for the purposes of corralling, butchering, and cas-
trating. Groups of animals may also be brought to-
gether or dispersed under the ownersÕ supervision
according to plans for rotational grazing of particu-
lar areas of range. With the current extensive herd-
ing practices on Seward Peninsula, groups of bulls
often roam unmarked but not unaccounted for by
herders. These bulls no doubt service females dur-
ing the rut, allowing the herd owners to maintain
lower bull—to cow ratios in their tended and fully
counted herds. An examination of the seasonal round
of the reindeer owners of Seward Peninsula demon-
strates further how they utilize biological and eco-
logical knowledge.
Generalized yearly herding activity
Throughout this report, great emphasis is placed
on variability in herd management practices. Con-
sequently, a generalized yearly round of contempo-
rary herding activities does not really apply to the
particular activities of any one herd owner. Indi-
vidual herding and husbandry decisions are influ-
enced by idiosyncratic factors, such as availability
of other income and/or personnel to assist, and by
exigencies of particular herds. Herding decisions are
also influenced by factors beyond the individualÕs
control, such as weather, availability of fuel, and
availability of a buyer and his laborers for the sum-
mer handling/velvet—antler cutting. Be that as it
may, a general round of activities is presented for
9the purpose of illustrating the activities and associ-
ated problems faced by the herd owner during the
course of the year.
Herd owners are primarily concerned with gener-
ating enough income in order to secure food for them-
selves and their families. Herding is usually com-
bined with other activities during the course of the
year to produce such income. These other activities
include: subsistence hunting, fishing, and gather-
ing; entrepreneurial enterprises such as stores and
housing rentals; and wage labor.
Herding activities are therefore scheduled to mini-
mize conflicts with employment, subsistence activi-
ties, seasonal variations in weather, and necessary
labor. Every herd owner and his family participates
in some subsistence hunting, fishing, and gather-
ing activity to a greater or lesser degree. Often, re-
indeer—herding/husbandry tasks are combined with
subsistence—related activities, as for example dur-
ing late summer butcherings when the family will
pick berries and fish while the herd owner attends
to locating and butchering the animals. During win-
ter—herding activities, the herders may hunt for
ptarmigan, rabbits, and furbearers, or set traps and
snares for small game and predators. In the spring,
following months of winter isolation indoors, when
warmer weather and longer daylight hours combine
to make outdoor living extremely attractive, herd
owners are torn between going hunting and looking
after their herds. A compromise is often reached, as
the meat and oil furnished by seal, walrus, whale,
and beluga hunting is a culturally important part
of the diet. No family likes to rely solely on reindeer
meat or store—bought foods when the Ònative foodsÓ
(nikipiak) are available from the land and sea. The
general round of activities associated with herding
is provided in Table 1.
As shown in the table, as soon as freeze—up oc-
curs (when fresh and salt water bodies are frozen
solidly enough to travel on) and there is solid snow
cover, the herderÕs mobility increases. At the same
time herder mobility is increasing, the reindeer are
sometimes restricted in their movements because
of the snow and the difficulty encountered in mov-
ing across ice. Some herd owners travel by snow
machine on a regular basis to check their herds
throughout the winter. During the winter months,
a herd owner may hire one or two men to stay more
or less constantly with his reindeer. These herders
live in cabins located throughout the herd ownerÕs
range, or occasionally they simply camp out of doors.
One herd, which has a rotational grazing plan and
is also the largest herd on Seward Peninsula, is
tended by full—time herders on a continual basis
during the winter. These herders are supplied regu-
larly by airplane by another one of the herders who
is an airplane owner/pilot. Another herd owner who
has recently acquired a small plane intends to use
it to scout for his herd and then radio its location to
his herders.
Often, two handlings take place during the win-
ter months, from October to April. One handling may
occur in the early winter, sometime between Octo-
ber and December. The other is a late—winter han-
dling in February or March. The availability of la-
bor, the number of animals to be slaughtered, the
weather, and the herd ownerÕs own work—schedule
are factors which determine whether or not to round
up completely or just to butcher during such han-
dlings. Depending on the reasons for the handling,
the entire herd may not be rounded up or corralled.
If the primary purpose of the handling is to mark
deer for identification, then the entire herd needs
to be rounded up, put through the corral, and
branded by ear marks. Each herd owner has his own
ear mark pattern to identify his animals. If the main
purpose is to butcher a certain number of animals for
market, however, a complete roundup is not necessary.
Table 1. Generalized reindeer herding and seasonal round of activities.
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Biological Spring Fall
 events migration migration
Calving Rut
Seasonal Ravens Insects Caribou migrations
 hazards Bears and hunters
Foxes
Wolves
Environmental Crusting Breakup Freezeup
 hazards snow
Herding Slaughter** Antler (Slaughter) Slaughter**
 activity cutting Prime hides Meat
marketing, hides
** Indicates primary slaughtering times
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The herd owner knows how many animals he has
and how many he wants to slaughter for the mar-
ket. A group may be located, driven by snow ma-
chines to either near the village or a herd ownerÕs
camp, and slaughtered on the snow—covered ground.
 The primary reason for the early—winter han-
dlings is to slaughter animals for the market. It is
at this time of year that the animals are in prime
condition for marketing their meat. In the late—win-
ter handling, the herd owner may be concerned with
knowing how many animals he can afford to butcher
for the market, and thus may simply put the ani-
mals through the corral in order to count and mark
them, and make such a determination. Hides are in
the best condition in early winter for bedding, and
in late winter for mukluk pieces and craft sewing.
In the spring (May—June), soft snow conditions,
overflow water on the rivers, and the coming of
breakup greatly reduces the herderÕs mobility. Snow
machines are not so efficient under such conditions.
At the same time, the reindeer are inclined to travel
farther, moving from the winter grazing areas to the
traditional calving grounds.
The calving season, which lasts from about April
15 to June 1, is the most critical time of the year for
the herd owner. The calving success of his herd will
determine his course of action for the next year, and
will affect his plans for butchering, herding, and
husbandry. Subzero spring temperatures, predators,
bad weather, and icing are all hazards to the new
born calf. Most herd owners try to be present with
the herd as much as possible during this period, but
spring is also a time of intensification of subsistence—
related activities.
For a newly established herd, the first two calv-
ing seasons are the most difficult for the herd owner.
Prior to actual calving, females will instinctively try
to migrate to their traditional calving grounds. These
are between 10 and 50 miles apart on Seward Pen-
insula ranges. If the new herd owner can hold his
animals on their new range at this critical period,
the females will come to accept it as their new calv-
ing ground after a couple of years. The historical
record is full of stories of newly established herds
which left their assigned ranges and returned to the
customary calving grounds.
During the summer, the reindeer tend to move
along the coast or lakes, where a breeze provides
some relief from the insects and heat. Herd owners
take advantage of this movement toward coastal lo-
cations by utilizing corrals along coasts and rivers
which are easily accessible by power boats.
Reindeer herding sometimes conflicts with the
subsistence activities of northwest Alaskan Eskimos.
For example, in the spring, seal hunting, waterfowl
hunting, and, after break—up, fishing are all impor-
tant activities. Beluga (white whale) and seal hunt-
ing continue into late June. By early July, most of
the sea ice is gone; and commercial salmon fishing
and subsistence fishing in the Kotzebue Sound area
and southern Seward Peninsula occupy many
peopleÕs time in July and August. Berry—picking trips
are also common throughout the late summer. Some
villagers store hundreds of pounds of salmonberries,
blueberries, crowberries, and other edible plants to eat
during the winter months. (The traditional yearly round
of subsistence activity, based on the Kangyikmiut,
Buckland River, area, is provided in Table 2.)
In the last decade, the summer handlings have
taken on a new importance for the herd owners. The
sale of velvet antlers to Oriental buyers provides a
quick source of cash income. To harvest the antler,
the herd owners round up their animals in late June
and early July, well after the calving season. In the
past couple of years, one major antler buyer has
supplied a small helicopter and labor to assist in
the roundups. Travel across the wet, uneven tundra
is difficult at this time of year. Some all—terrain ve-
hicles are used by some of the herd owners; how-
ever, the machinesÕ reliability are not as good as
desired. In the summer of 1977, most summer round-
ups to bring the reindeer into the corrals have been
done on foot after the antler buyerÕs helicopter lo-
cated and drove the herds to the mouth of the cor-
ral. In addition to the antler cutting during sum-
mer roundups, some castrating, marking, and butch-
ering takes place. After the summer handling, the
herds may not be seen again for one or two months
or until August or September. Most herd owners do
deep track of their herdÕs location during the summer,
Table 2. Traditional subsistence cycle (Buckland River area).
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Fishing Fishing
Caribou hunting Caribou hunting
Activity Beluga
hunting
Berrying
Upriver (fishing) Upriver (fishing)
Location Downriver (caribou corral)
Escholtz
Bay
(adapted from Lucier 1954, In: Ray 1964)
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relying on reports from charter pilots flying between
villages, their own observations while on subsistence—
related travels, and reports of other villagers who have
seen some animals during their own travels. De-
pending on the owner, market needs, and available
labor, a late—summer butchering may take place.
The hides are prime in the late summer/early fall
for clothing, and the animal fat, a culturally desir-
able part of the animal, is most copious just before
the cold winter months.
Over the last ten years, the Reindeer Herders As-
sociation has taken over many coordinating func-
tions from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). An
association representative usually attends every
handling and keeps tallies of the various ownersÕ
animals. In addition, supplies may be brought by
the association representative for the construction
and repair of corrals and cabins necessary for herd
management. The logistics and communications of
roundups have been made easier with the installa-
tion of usually reliable phone systems in the villages
and the increasing use of citizensÕ band (CB) radios
between villages, camps, boats, and snow machines.
Today, the major activities for the reindeer owner
over the course of the year involve calving, summer
velvet—antler sales, winter corralings to count and
mark animals, and winter and sometimes a summer,
butchering for marketing reindeer meat. In general,
the reindeer are handled three to four times a year,
while at the same time the herd owner may find him-
self in conflict with his other economic activities.
Chapter III
Introduction of reindeer
herding in Alaska
General historical summary
Reindeer herding in Alaska has gone through three
major stages of development. During the first stage,
from 1892 to 1914, the industry was introduced to
mainland Alaska and experienced its early growth.
At this time, the ownership of reindeer was largely
confined to the government, missions, individual
Lapps, and Eskimos. Beginning in 1914, the non—
Native ownership of reindeer increased and a pe-
riod of commercial exploitation of reindeer began
which would last until 1939. Since 1940, ownership
of reindeer has been restricted to Alaskan Natives, com-
mercial exploitation has been relatively unimportant
up to the last ten years or so, and government efforts
have been directed at establishing a self—sustaining
Native enterprise (Lantis, 1950; Olson, 1969).
Since the 19th century, the Eskimos of northwest-
ern Alaska have been exposed to a number of Euro—
American influences. These resulted from contacts
with whalers, missionaries, government employees,
and non—Native settlers who introduced changes in
the lives of the people in the form of new technology
and new ideas. Significant changes in the traditional
hunting cycle, settlement pattern, social organiza-
tion, and population size and distribution of all Es-
kimo groups in northwest Alaska were initiated
during the period from 1850 to 1890 (Burch, 1975;
Ray, 1975). In the years following the passage of the
Organic Act of 1884, there was a marked increase
in the number of whites entering the Territory of
Alaska. While the Organic Act had provided for a
civil government in Alaska, the remote Territory
experienced minimal administrative attention dur-
ing its earlier years due to inadequate appropria-
tions for such service and its remoteness from the
continental United States. In addition to the Ameri-
can whalers and those of other nations along the
western coast, Revenue Service personnel, govern-
ment teachers of the Bureau of Education, and mis-
sionaries also found their way into northwestern
Alaska during this period. In addition, traders, min-
ers, and others made their way to northwestern
Alaska for varying lengths of time before (and af-
ter) reindeer were first brought to Alaska in 1891
and located on the islands of Amnaknak and
Unalaska. The increased pressure on the natural
food resources of the Eskimos by these newcomers
has often been cited as the rationale for importing
the reindeer into Alaska.
Reindeer were first imported from Siberia by the
Reverend Sheldon Jackson, General Agent for Edu-
cation in Alaska, in 1891 on a trial basis for the
avowed purpose of providing a stable food supply
for the Native inhabitants. The Bureau of Educa-
tion was initially charged with distributing the re-
indeer among the Natives of northwestern Alaska.
The first yearÕs successful importation of reindeer
demonstrated that obtaining and shipping them
from Siberia was feasible and in 1892 reindeer were
first shipped to mainland Alaska. Congressional ap-
propriations were then obtained for subsequent
years. Some $158,000 was spent on the importation,
purchase, and administration of reindeer between
1893 and 1903.
During the decade 1892 to 1902, the United States
Government imported some 1,280 reindeer into
Alaska from Siberia. By the time the Czarist gov-
ernment forbade any more exports in 1902, there
were some 5,148 reindeer in Alaska, resulting from
the importations and natural increase. The Rever-
end Sheldon Jackson pursued a policy of placing the
reindeer into the hands of the mission churches, for
their use and subsequent distributions to the Na-
tives. Lapps were brought from Scandinavia to teach
reindeer herding to the Alaskan Eskimos, and by
the early 1900s they owned a large proportion of
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the reindeer. A 1906 investigation by the Depart-
ment of the Interior resulted in JacksonÕs leaving
office and a different Bureau of Education policy re-
garding reindeer ownership and distribution. One
of the central goals of the new policy was to place more
reindeer directly into the hands of Native owners.
By 1916, there were over 1,200 Eskimo herd own-
ers in Alaska; however, the average herd size
amounted to less than 50 reindeer per owner. Range
problems were also beginning to appear and many
small herds mingled and strayed. Native ownership
of reindeer actually began to increase shortly after
the gold—mining industry boom was over on the
Seward Peninsula. For the most part, the Lapps and
the mission churches, and not the Eskimos them-
selves, profited most from the sale of reindeer to min-
ing camps and prospectors and from the freighting
of the minersÕ outfits. By 1920, the local markets
had decreased substantially and, with them, the fi-
nancial rewards of herding. Observers also report a
deterioration of range quality by this time due to
over—grazing. The coastal strip
ten or so miles wide and the ar-
eas nearest the villages were
badly deteriorated (Lantis, 1950).
In the 1920s, extensive white
ownership of reindeer, particu-
larly by the Lomens who were in-
volved in various enterprises,
caused some economic conflicts
and many range disputes with
Natives. Reindeer ownership and
accounting had become major con-
cerns of the Bureau of Education
by 1929. In that year, reindeer ad-
ministration in Alaska was placed
in the hands of the GovernorÕs Of-
fice. Between 1920 and 1929, the
Lomens exported considerable
amounts of reindeer meat to mar-
kets in the continental United
States, a practice that ended with
the start of the Great Depression,
as did the plans for implementing
major administrative changes
within the Reindeer Service.
The situation deteriorated rap-
idly between 1929 and 1937. While
the Lomens lobbied actively for fa-
vorable range regulations, market-
ing privileges, and the settlement
of disputes in reindeer matters, the
depression caused them to lose
their export market. Decreasing fur
prices and lower incomes from trap-
ping, combined with excess num-
bers of Native—owned reindeer,
drove the local demand for reindeer down. By 1937,
reindeer were slaughtered but not purchased, range
deterioration was a clear problem, disease and
predators were taking large numbers of animals, and
Native interest in herding declined. Responsibility
for the Reindeer Service was transferred to the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs in 1937. Herds continued to in-
crease through the early 1930s. In 1932, an estimated
640,000 reindeer existed in Alaska, a figure that was
to decrease to 250,000 over the next eight years. By
1950, only an estimated 25,000 reindeer remained.
The Reindeer Act of 1937 was the culmination of
efforts to resolve the problems with reindeer which
had developed over the preceding decade. The act
restricted ownership to Natives, provided for gov-
ernment aid, and authorized appropriations for the
purchase of all reindeer and improvements owned
by non—Natives. The actual purchase was completed
in 1940. During both World War II and the postwar
recovery period, little attention was paid to the de-
clining industry and remote people in northwest
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Alaska. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, herds were
reestablished throughout Alaska, this time with carefully
selected and experienced reindeer men in charge.
All the herds east of Kotzebue Sound failed by
1966, with caribou largely being held responsible for
the failures. However, from 1960 to the present, there
has been considerable interest in the successful de-
velopment of a Native reindeer industry. Numerous
studies have indicated its economic and ecological
feasibility. Unfortunately, this new view of reindeer
as a commercial resource has not been easy to trans-
late into successful operations.
In early 1977, there were fifteen reindeer herds
grouped together in northwestern Alaska. All but the
Shaktoolik herd were confined to the Seward Penin-
sula. This herd and those at Stebbins, and on St.
Lawrence, Nunivak, Hagemeister. and Kodiak Is-
lands, and the scattered herds on the Aleutian Is-
lands under the management of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, are not generally considered in this
report. On the Seward Peninsula, total numbers of
reindeer were estimated to be less than 20,000. Herd
size ranged from 100 or less to some 4,000 head.
As J. Sidney Rood, one—time General Reindeer
Superintendent, said, Òthe roots of present problems
lie in the past;Ó (1937) and so it is that the current
status of the reindeer industry is the result of natu-
ral and social forces which have been operating for
a long time. Figure 2, Northwestern Alaska Geogra-
phy, is presented to show the location of major settle-
ments, rivers, and other geographic features referred
to throughout the remainder of this report.
Conditions prior to the introduction
of reindeer
For thousands of years, the Eskimo peoples of
Alaska have lived on the resources of the land, sea,
and air. In northwestern Alaska, a relatively stable
source of food in the form of sea mammals and cari-
bou allowed the Native inhabitants of the region to
live in semipermanent villages along the coast and
rivers. Some groups depended on a mixed economy
of fish, caribou, and sea mammals. This diet was
supplemented by whatever other items were season-
ally available: berries in the fall and late summer,
bear when it could be taken, small mammals such
as rabbit, and waterfowl. Wherever the people lived
or moved to hunt, trap, fish, and harvest, they made
use of the resources available to them. When food
was plenty, they lived abundantly and happily; in
times of scarcity, they ranged far and wide, or made
use of alternative resources when and if they became
available. Well—established trade routes moved prod-
ucts from the interior regions (caribou skins, fish,
wooden bowls, and jade) to the coast in exchange for
the products of the sea (ugruk skins for umiat covers,
rope, blubber, meat, and muktuk). Siberian trade
items (reindeer hides, especially spotted fawn skins),
and, later, European trade goods (metal, cloth, to-
bacco, rifles) became an integral part of this trade
network of goods.
Prior to the introduction of reindeer into Alaska,
cultural contact was extensive. During the period
from 1848 to 1854, American whalers pushed north-
ward into the Chukchi Sea and Arctic Ocean, pur-
suing the products of baleen whaling: oil for lamps,
and baleen for corset stays, skirt hoops, and buggy
whips. As the number of whalers increased, after
1875, hunting and trading for furs, baleen, and wal-
rus ivory also increased in importance to ensure a
profitable trip. The Pacific Steam Whaling Company
established shore stations at Point Barrow (1884)
and Point Hope (1887). Port Clarence (near Teller)
became a major resupply point (Ray, 1975). Tech-
niques for overwintering in the Arctic were quickly
developed, with the crew living on board or on shore
nearby while the ship was locked in the Arctic ice
for eight months of the year. Establishing winter
quarters enabled them to start the following whal-
ing season much earlier than before, and some ships,
operating in this way, stayed out from their home
ports in New England or San Francisco for as long
as five years. During the long winter months, the
whalers traded with the Natives; hired men to hunt
for them; and amused themselves with games, li-
quor, and Native women (Bockstoce, 1977a, 1977b).
Trade in metal products such as pans, nails, and
tools, and in staples such as flour, coffee, tea, to-
bacco, and liquor (which was illegal), became firmly
established during the 1850s to 1890s, a period that
has been referred to as the Òearly transitional pe-
riodÓ by Burch (1975). Trade in repeating rifles,
which also was supposed to be illegal in the later
nineteenth century (1880s), increased, as the gov-
ernment was largely unsuccessful in deterring it
using only the Revenue Cutter Service. Sailors also
brought measles and venereal diseases. In general,
the presence of such diseases signaled the start of
major disruptions of the aboriginal kinship and so-
cial systems.
According to some authorities, the Native popula-
tions were reduced by about 50% between 1850 and
1880 (Foote and Williamson, 1966; Burch, 1975;
Hall, 1977). Ray suggests, however, that the popu-
lation did not decrease (1964, 1975), and actually
asserts that the Native population in the Bering
Straits region increased substantially by the turn
of the century. Despite RayÕs interpretation, it is gen-
erally accepted that by the twentieth century the
Eskimo population of the region was on the increase,
and is still continuing today with the advent of mod-
ern medical care to the villages and a high birth rate
(Alonso and Rust, 1976; Rogers, 1971; Hippler, 1969).
Since the original importation of reindeer to mainland
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Alaska in 1892, anthropologists, historians, and
other scholars have debated the validity of Sheldon
JacksonÕs assertions that the Eskimos were in such
desperate plight for food as he claimed. Bockstoce,
Foote, and others have convincingly demonstrated
the decline in marine mammal resources on the
northwest Alaskan coast between 1850 and 1890
(Bockstoce, 1977a; Foote, 1965). During the period
from 1850 to the turn of the century, the caribou,
which was the primary land resource utilized by
Eskimos, was also decreasing (Skoog, 1968; Burch,
1972). The reasons for this decline are not altogether
clear. It appears that the caribou population which
inhabited the Seward Peninsula may have been an
overflow population of the western Arctic caribou
herd from their center of habitation in the central
Brooks Range. A number of biologists have observed
that caribou populations of the world undergo cy-
clical population fluctuations that are relatively in-
dependent of the effects of human predation (Skoog,
1968; Burch, 1972). While it is commonly stated that
firearms were largely responsible for the decline of
caribou on the Seward Peninsula between 1850 and
1900, an alternative interpretation suggests that
the decline in numbers was largely due to natural
causes. This interpretation better fits the data (Skoog,
1968; Burch, 1972; Ray, 1975).
By 1880 there were very few caribou left on the
Seward Peninsula, and by 1890 there were few ani-
mals that could be found at all except near the Òcen-
ter of habitationÓ of the western Arctic caribou herd
in the central Brooks Range (Skoog, 1968). Some-
time after 1930, caribou began to return to areas
along the Chukchi Sea and the Noatak and Kobuk
River drainages. Residents of Kivalina and Noatak
villages again began to harvest caribou for the first
time in several decades. The caribou that have re-
populated this area have been credited with luring
away many of the reindeer from the reindeer herds
located near these villages.
Between 1970 and 1977 the western Arctic cari-
bou herd declined from an estimated 240,000 ani-
mals to around 60,000. The resulting Òcaribou cri-
sisÓ in northwestern Alaska today is a recurring situ-
ation that, prehistorically, could have been met in
one of two ways. When a predator population is to-
tally dependent on a single prey species, and that
prey declines in numbers and/or density, the preda-
tors can either: 1) utilize alternative food resources
or strategies; 2) reduce their numbers correspond-
ingly by death and/or emigration; or 3) some combi-
nation of these (Odum, 1971). The caribou—hunting
human populations have faced this situation
throughout their occupation of interior northwest-
ern Alaska. Characteristically, they have shifted
their hunting emphasis to other regions (emigration)
and utilized alternative food resources (strategy
change) by fishing or exploiting mammals other than
caribou (Campbell, 1968; Spencer, 1959; Hall, 1975;
Hickey, 1976). This is a gross oversimplification of
the specific historical instances of hunter/gatherer
subsistence strategies. A more elegant treatment of
this problem would have to take into account a num-
ber of other variables: resource abundance, distri-
bution, and availability; settlement location; and
human demography, to name but a few (Jochim, 1976).
In this report, a comparison of the northwestern
Alaska interior Eskimo groups and the caribou—
hunting groups of the Seward Peninsula is reveal-
ing. While such a comparison must be very general
and based completely on secondary sources, it can
be demonstrated that caribou were the mainstay of
both groups and that changes in caribou distribu-
tion and abundance did cause changes in the sub-
sistence strategies of the groups. The Seward Pen-
insula groups were less drastically affected by the
caribouÕs abandonment of the peninsula because
they had more alternative food resources to exploit
such as beluga, fish, and seals (Ray, 1964). In con-
trast, interior northwest Alaska was virtually aban-
doned during the half a century from 1890 to 1940
when the caribou were low in numbers.
According to Burch (1975), the boundary between
his early and intermediate transitional periods var-
ies from place to place. The year 1890 serves as a
convenient marking point with the establishment
of schools, missions, and reindeer herds as events
which signal the change. The actual changes which
took place during his Òearly transitional periodÓ
(1850—1890) may be summarized briefly. Despite dis-
agreements about the order of magnitude (and even
the direction of the change, Ray, 1964, 1975), it is
generally agreed that the Eskimo population of
northwestern Alaska had both declined in numbers
and changed their subsistence patterns as well as
settlement locations during the period. The marine
and terrestrial food resources of the region had also
declined, essentially from overhunting by and for
whites to supply a commercial market and from natu-
ral causes such as diseases and predation. The use of
firearms by Natives was probably a minor factor.
By the time reindeer were brought to the Seward
Peninsula in 1892, several effects had resulted from
the contact with Euro—Americans (Burch, 1972;
Skoog, 1968). Foreign diseases already had been
introduced. Traditional food resources had been de-
pleted. Bowhead whales and walrus were reduced
in number. Caribou were no longer present on the
Seward Peninsula. Firearms were known and uti-
lized, but played little part in the elimination of cari-
bou from Seward Peninsula. Alcohol and its use was
known. Contacts with white technology had been
taking place for several decades, at least on a spo-
radic basis. Between 1819 and 1880, Foote attributes
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the greater detrimental effects on the Native popu-
lation to Òthe spread of foreign diseases and the re-
duction of food sources. The introduction of firearms,
alcohol, and new ideas appears to have been of sec-
ondary importanceÓ (Foote, 1964).
In BurchÕs early transitional period, from 1850 to
1890, he sees serious disruptions to Eskimo life stem-
ming from contagious diseases and the introduction
of liquor through white contact Òexacerbated by the
drastic decline of the caribou populationÓ (Burch,
1975). The population was both reduced in numbers
and displaced in location compared to the precontact
period. These demographic changes forced a num-
ber of changes in the social organization of north-
western Alaska Eskimo society. As Burch (1975) pro-
vides an adequate discussion of these changes, it
will not be necessary to repeat them here.
Reindeer introduction
When the Reverend Sheldon Jackson first toured
the arctic region of Alaska, he was dismayed by the
conditions he saw. The conditions were basically as
have been described above, but Jackson failed to
place them in historical perspective or in a cultural
position relative to the southeast Alaskan Indians
with whom he was used to working. The
semisubterranean houses of the Eskimos appeared
wet and cold. Little did he realize the excellent pro-
tection they offered during the long arctic winters.
The declining resource base alarmed him, as did the
declining self—respect and cultural viability of the
northwestern Alaskan Eskimos. To ÒsaveÓ the Eski-
mos from starvation and to promote industrial edu-
cation, he proposed to bring reindeer from Siberia
to Alaska. He also proposed to bring Siberian rein-
deer herders to teach the Alaskan Eskimos how to
herd reindeer. Through this scheme he believed he
could save the EskimosÕ stomachs and dignity at the
same time (Ray, 1965; Ward, 1955, 1956).
While Jackson initially failed to secure Congres-
sional funding for his project, he did succeed in rais-
ing $2,146 through public subscriptions, mostly in
small amounts donated by philanthropic churchgo-
ers. This money was used in 1891 to buy 16 rein-
deer in Siberia and locate them on Amaknak and
Unalaska Islands. Following the success of this pur-
chasing and transportation scheme, the Bureau of
Education agreed to administer the money for the
remainder of the project. On July 4, 1892, 171 rein-
deer were brought from Siberia and located at the
newly created Teller Reindeer Station. Teller Rein-
deer Station at Port Clarence originally had been a
school for the Eskimos of the area, but with the intro-
duction of reindeer it was designated the reindeer
training station for the Eskimo herders. Following the
first yearÕs overall success in purchasing and ship-
ping reindeer from Siberia to Alaska, Congress
agreed to appropriate money for additional impor-
tations and for administrating the program there-
after. Over the next ten years, 1,280 reindeer were
brought to Alaska, until 1902, when the Russian
Czar forbade all further exports of reindeer from
Russia. Unfortunately, the Siberians whom Jackson
had thought would be able to train the Alaskan Es-
kimos proved to be reluctant teachers. No one
seemed to have considered that traditionally the Si-
berians and Alaskans had been bitter enemies. In
addition to language barriers, it was difficult to per-
suade the Siberians to divulge their animal herding
and husbandry knowledge. In the summer of 1894,
William Kjellmann, a Norwegian—American teacher
employed by the Bureau of Education, was in-
structed by Jackson to bring Lapp herders and their
families from Norway to teach reindeer herding. In
the summer of 1894, Lapps with their families ar-
rived at the Teller Station. They were promised, as
partial payment for their services, what reindeer
they required for food and clothing. This was in di-
rect contradiction to Native use of reindeer, for up
to this time no Eskimo had been permitted to slaugh-
ter reindeer for food.
The increases that occurred in reindeer numbers
during the first two years of the industry were ap-
parently more fortuitous than the result of good
herding practices. Herds were kept close to the Teller
Reindeer Station and after two years of grazing, the
vegetation within a three mile radius of the station
had been completely depleted. Such overgrazing had
taken place that new grazing areas had to be found.
Despite this overgrazing, the mild winters aided the
herds to increase steadily without heavy calf losses
in the spring. In August, 1894, the Congregational
Mission at Wales, under the charge of William T.
Lopp, received a gift of 100 reindeer from Jackson
in accordance with JacksonÕs plan to furnish rein-
deer to the missions. The Lapps who had come to
teach the Eskimos basic husbandry and herding of
reindeer were also given permission to utilize any
animals they wanted. They were also paid salaries
of 1,200 kroner a year. As no Eskimo owned a suc-
cessfully operating herd at this time, the gift of re-
indeer to the mission and the presence of the Lapps
with their preferential use of reindeer led the Eski-
mos to conclude that they were not going to benefit
from the reindeer industry.
Kjellmann resigned as third superintendent of the
Teller Station in the summer of 1895 over disagree-
ments with Captain Healy of the Bear, although his
official reason for resigning was his wifeÕs health
(Ray, 1975). Kjellmann had been a capable admin-
istrator with keen insight into the problems which
were developing with the reindeer situation. He did
return to the Teller Reindeer Station in 1896 as su-
perintendent.
16
Early development
In 1896 there were 1,175 reindeer in Alaska, dis-
tributed in four herds spread out between Wales and
Golovin Bay. One of these was the government herd
at Teller Reindeer Station, while the other three
were mission herds at Wales and at Golovin. To al-
leviate suspicion that no Eskimos would ever get
their own herds, Jackson loaned 100 reindeer in
January of 1895 to Charley Antisarlook, an Eskimo
reindeer apprentice. With the 15 reindeer he had
earned as an apprentice, Charley moved his newly
acquired herd to the Synrock River. By the end of
two calving seasons, his herd had increased to 217
head. Four years after the introduction of reindeer
into Alaska, only one herd was in Eskimo hands,
and few Eskimos had even tasted reindeer meat
(Ray, 1965). By 1896, the mission herd at Wales had
increased to 168 animals, while the herds at Golovin
Bay belonging to the Swedish Covenant and the
Episcopal Missions numbered some 130 head. The
remainder of the reindeer, some 650 animals, were
located at the Teller Reindeer Station. In 1900, the
Lutheran Mission at Teller, under the charge of T.
L. Brevig, was loaned 100 deer. Brevig had been re-
cruited to come to Alaska from Norway because he
could speak Saame (Lappish) and minister to the
Lapps. In addition, he also spoke English and Nor-
wegian, and he quickly mastered Eskimo (Brevig,
1944). The numbers of reindeer in Alaska loaned to
missions up to the year 1902 are provided in Table
3. Lapps and other non—Native owned 860 reindeer;
the missions owned 1,635; a total of 2,591 were
owned by 43 Eskimos.
A drive of reindeer to Barrow in 1898 for the relief
of whalers stranded there, followed by
another aborted drive up the Yukon to
Circle for the relief of miners in the
same year, served to distribute rein-
deer over a large part of Alaska.
Kjellmann had made a second trip to
Norway in 1897 to recruit families to
come to Alaska to teach reindeer herd-
ing to the Eskimos. While he was in
Norway, news came that miners in the
gold fields up the Yukon River were in
danger of starving. Congress was per-
suaded to authorize $200,000 to bring
over Lapps and 539 reindeer steers
which were then to be driven from
Haines to Circle. As this meshed per-
fectly with JacksonÕs original plans to
bring Lapps to Alaska as reindeer in-
structors, he went to Norway to inter-
cept Kjellmann. In the fall of 1897, 113
Lapplanders, Finns, and Norwegians,
representing 63 herders, signed con-
tracts to come to Alaska.
The acquired reindeer were shipped by railroad
from the east coast to Seattle, by boat northward to
Haines, and then driven to Circle by Hedley E.
Redmyer and a crew of six men, including five Lapps.
By April 15, 1898, 362 animals had died. When the
ÒreliefÓ finally arrived in Circle on February 28, 1899,
only 114 animals had survived the journey
(Redmyer, 1951). AntisarlookÕs 100 loan deer were
taken back and shipped to St. Michael, there to be
sent up the Yukon River. At St. Michael, it was de-
cided that they would not survive such a trip, but
the deer were not returned to Antisarlook. Instead,
more reindeer were borrowed from Antisarlook and
the mission herd at Wales to be driven north to save
ÒstarvingÓ whalers at Barrow (Ray, 1965, 1975).
The second drive evolved when reports came from
Barrow that four whaling ships had been crushed
in early winter ice east of Barrow. Five other ships
had also been forced to winter in emergency quar-
ters as well. Vessels that had escaped the ice pack
brought word that insufficient food supplies existed
at Barrow for all the men trapped there for the win-
ter. Lieutenant D.H. Jarvis, Lieutenant E.P.
Bertholf, and Surgeon S.J. Call of the Revenue Cut-
ter Bear set out from Nelson Island to borrow all
the LappÕs deer at Wales and the remainder of
AntisarlookÕs herd to provide the whalers with food.
Seven Eskimo herders and apprentices were hired
to help with the drive. Between January 19 and
March 19, 1898, 448 reindeer were driven the 1,200
kilometers (750 miles) between Wales and Point Bar-
row, with only 382 reindeer surviving the trip. Once
at Barrow, it was discovered that most of the Òstarv-
ingÓ whalers were actually quite well supplied with
Table 3. Reindeer belonging to missions in Alaska, 1892—1902.
When When No. In herd
Mission Station Herds Location loaned due loaned 1902
Cape Prince of Wales Aug. gift 118 224
(Congregational Mission) 1894
Golovin Bay Jan. 1901 50 264
(Swedish Evangelical Mission) 1896
(Protestant Espiscopal Mission) Jan. 1901 50 89
1896
Point Barrow (Presbyterian) Sept. 1903 100 238
1898
Gambell, St. Lawrence Island July 1905 70 150
(Presbyterian) 1900
Teller Sept. 1905 100 221
(Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran) 1900
Nulato (Roman Catholic) Mar. 1906 100 151
1901
Bethel (Moravian) Feb. 1906 88 188
1901
Carmel (Nushugak River) Feb. 1906 88 188
(Moravian) 1901
Kotzebue Sept. 1906 95 160
(California Yearly Meeting—Friends) 1901
(Source: Jackson, 1903.)
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food, thanks to the fine organizational efforts of
Charles Brower and others (Bockstoce, 1977b). Of
the reindeer actually reaching Barrow, only 180 were
actually slaughtered for food. The remainder of the
animals were to form the nucleus of the herd started
at Point Barrow under the direction of the Presbyte-
rian Mission. In this way, reindeer herds were dis-
tributed from St. Michael to Point Barrow. But instead
of benefitting, elevating, and assisting the Eskimos
to become self supporting, Caucasians were aided.
In the decade following these Òrescues,Ó reindeer
were also distributed throughout northwestern
Alaska through additional loans to missions, loans
to independent Lapps who had served their appren-
ticeship and wished to start their own herds, and
loans to individual Natives who wished to run their
own local herds. The 1,635 reindeer owned by Alas-
kan missions in 1902 contrasts with 2,591 owned
by 43 Eskimos and the 922 reindeer owned by the
government and other non—Natives. The average
herd size for the 43 Eskimo owners of reindeer in
1902 was approximately 60 rein-
deer, ranging in actual herds of
from 4 to 269 head. Most authori-
ties agree that a herd of reindeer
needs to be at least 1,000 to 2,000
head to be economically viable
(Lantis, 1950; Olson, 1969;
Zhuginov, 1968). Nearly 50 per
cent of the total 4,148 reindeer in
Alaska by 1902 were in non—Na-
tive hands. This situation was not
what the original project had
called for. It was met with dissat-
isfaction in Washington, and spe-
cial agent Frank C. Churchill was
sent to investigate AlaskaÕs
schools and reindeer program in
1905 (Churchill, 1906). The dissat-
isfaction with the schools resulted
from JacksonÕs policy of keeping
education and religious training
together in teacher recruitment
and daily instruction. JacksonÕs
opponents wished to see a more
secular educational system in
Alaska.
Figure 3 (Reindeer in Alaska) is
presented to show the distribution
and duration of reindeer herding in
various areas of northwestern
Alaska. An examination of Table 4
shows that by about 1910, reindeer
were distributed throughout north-
west Alaska, from Bethel on the
Kuskokwim River delta to Barrow.
Another event of some signifi-
cance in the history of reindeer herding came with
the Nome Gold Rush, which was accompanied by a
tremendous immigration of non—Natives to the
Seward Peninsula. During the Gold Rush, reindeer
were used as draught animals, a practice that con-
tinued for some years. Animals were either hired
out to miners for freighting (the particular approach
of the Lapp owners) or animals were sold outright
to the miners. Reindeer meat was also sold to the
populace of the booming towns. Because of a lim-
ited supply of reindeer meat, some meat was im-
ported from Siberia during the winter of 1899—1900
to feed the 2,500 people then at Nome as well. In
1900, a measles and pneumonia epidemic swept the
region. Many Natives and non—Natives alike died,
including herder Charley Antisarlook and his two
brothers. His wife Mary inherited the herd.
During the first decade of the twentieth century,
several problems in reindeer herding emerged. Some
of these problems were resolved, while others
emerged to continue into the 1920s. Problems with
18
reindeer thefts and range damage plagued some
owners. Government policy towards reindeer own-
ership changed after ChurchillÕs 1906 investigation.
Inadequate supervision of herd growth contributed
to general range overstocking. Differential treat-
ment of Lapp and Eskimo owners caused bitterness
between the two groups. Lastly, the acquisition of
reindeer and ranges by the Lomen family, beginning
in 1914, ushered in new problems concerning Na-
tive and non—Native ownership (e.g., marketing) and
another new direction for government policy on re-
indeer herding.
After the initial gold strike boom at Nome, many
prospectors remained to explore the
coast and interior of Seward Penin-
sula for precious metals. Reindeer
teams continued to deliver mail and
freight, but not all went well for the
Native reindeer owners. As men-
tioned above, Charley Antisarlook
died in a measles epidemic in 1900.
His widow, Mary, took her few re-
maining reindeer (those that had not
been borrowed to save the whalers at
Barrow) from Synrock to Unalakleet
because theft and range fires made it
difficult to continue herding them on
the Seward Peninsula. The slowdown
of economic growth of Seward Penin-
sula caused additional problems for
Native owners. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the government policy, as for-
mulated by Sheldon Jackson, was not
truly protective of Native interests in
reindeer. Jackson had believed that
reindeer would ensure the continu-
ance of the missionary stations to
which Eskimos could then flock, ceas-
ing their nomadic way of life, seen by
some to include Òbegging and immo-
rality,Ó and congregating around the
missions, which would have assured
food supplies and spiritual aid (Jack-
son 1903). It is readily apparent that
in JacksonÕs mind, reindeer repre-
sented a means by which he could attain his mis-
sionary goals and to ensure the permanence of mis-
sion stations as opposed to providing a direct ben-
efit for Natives.
Reindeer had increased so significantly during the
first 15 years in Alaska that by 1906 administering
them became a serious problem (Table 5). Although
the originally stated goal of the program had been
to provide food as well as a source of skins and in-
dustry for the Eskimos, by 1905 various Lapps, mis-
sions, and the government still owned more rein-
deer than did the Natives (Table 5). In addition, the
apprenticeship method of training had not been
 Table 4. Reindeer in Alaska, 1892—1915. Distribution and date
of establishment of the herds.
Stations and Herds Date Stations and Herds Date
Teller 1892 Noatak 1910
Wales No. 1 (Mission) 1894 Shishmaref No. 3 1910
Golovin No. 1 (Mission) 1896 Tubutulik 1910
Barrow No. 1 1898 Bethel No. 2 (Kilohalin) 1911
Bethel No. 7 (Mission) 1901 Buckland No. 1 1911
Kotzebue No. 1 1901 Cape Douglas No. 1 (Okbaok) 1911
Bethel No. 5 (Taluksak) 1902 Deering No. 2 (Goodhope R.) 1911
Deering No. 1 (Lane R.) 1905 Unalakleet No. 2 (South R.) 1911
Kivalina No. 1 (South R.) 1905 Wales No. 2 (Ootennas) 1911
Shishmaref No. 1 1905 Bethel No. 3 (Kivigluk) 1912
Icy Cape 1906 Igloo No. 2 1912
Bethel No. 4 (Nukluak) 1907 Spruce Creek 1912
Council 1907 Bethel No. l (Akoolakotak) 1913
Egavik 1907 Bethel No. 6 (Oungogtulit) 1913
Golsovia No. 1 1907 Cape Espenberg 1913
Igloo No. 1 1907 Deering No. 3 (Kugruk R.) 1913
Shaktoolik 1907 Iglotalik No. 2 (Bonanza) 1913
Shungnak 1907 Nome 1913
Sinuk 1907 Buckland No. 2 (Sokweena) 1914
Wainwright 1907 Cape Douglas No. 2 (Dunnak) 1914
Golovin No. 2 1908 Golsovia No. 2 (Pitnuktalik) 1914
Kivalina No. 2 (North R.)1908 Igloo No. 3 1914
Mountain Village 1908 Wales No. 4 (Cape York) 1914
Point Hope 1908 Kotzebue No. 3 (Lomen/Lapp) 1914
Wales No. 3 (Kozuks) 1908 Bethel No. 8 (Kalkak) 1915
Barrow No. 2 1909 Igloo No. 4 1915
Selawik 1909 Kivalina No. 3 1915
Shishmaref No. 2 1909 Kivalina No. 4
1915glotalik No. 1 1910 Shishmaref No. 4 1915
Kotzebue No. 2 1910 Shishmaref No. 5 (Keok) 1915
Table 5 Ownership of reindeer in Alaska, compared: 1905, 1911, and 1915.
Percentage owned of
Number of owners total reindeer Number of reindeer
Owners 1905 1911 1915 1905 1911 1915 1905 1911 1915
Natives 85 460 1,140 41% 60% 66% 4,859 20,071 46,683
Government N/A N/A N/A 24% 11% 5% 2,500 3,951 3 ,408
Missions N/A N/A N/A 11% 14% 10% 1,163 4,664 6,890
Lapps/other N/A N/A N/A 16% 15% 19% 1,712 4,944 13,262
  non—Natives
Total reindeer 10,234 33,629 70,243
(Sources: Churchill, 1906; U.S. Bureau of Education, 1912, 1917).
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successful as the conditions of apprenticeship con-
tinually changed from year to year (Ray, 1975). With-
out clearly discernible rewards to be gained from
becoming involved with reindeer, it was difficult to
persuade young men to enter the apprenticeship pro-
gram. Some of those who did become so involved
appear to have been socially marginal as well as very
young (Ray, 1975). It was not until the pattern of
ownership changed following ChurchillÕs 1905 inves-
tigation that herding became a viable pursuit. Fol-
lowing the change in ownership patterns, herding
knowledge passed from father, as a private herd
owner, to son as a matter of practical instruction and
on—the—job learning. This pattern suited Eskimo edu-
cational approaches far better than did a formalized
contractual apprenticeship system.
The different contracts made by Sheldon Jackson
with missions and Eskimos clearly show the differ-
ent privileges given to the Lapps (RG 75, entry 812
ÒContractsÓ National Archives Building). In an agree-
ment between the U.S. Bureau of Education and the
FriendÕs Church at Kotzebue, dated September 1,
1902, the FriendÕs Mission, Sheldon JacksonÑ
agree(d) to pay the salary for 5 years of
an experienced Lapp to teach the native boys
herding, not to exceed 5 years, and also to
furnish said Lapp with clothing and rations
for the first year...and further agreed to fur-
nish shelter, clothing and rations to the Lapp
herder. (Churchill, 1906).
An agreement of the same date with a Native
herder was not so generous. At variance with the
above contract, no food or clothing were to be pro-
vided for the Native, nor could he dispose of ani-
mals except with the permission of the mission and
the Bureau of Education. In addition, the agreement
with the Native was for 17 years, as opposed to five
for Lapps. Further restrictions were placed on the
Native with regard to slaughtering and inheritance.
A Native could slaughter male reindeer for his fam-
ily, but only with the permission of the local super-
intendent. Upon the death of a herder, half the herd
reverted to the government or the mission.
For the first 15 years, both in Alaska and Wash-
ington, controversy existed over the goals and the
control of the reindeer program. Generally, the dis-
agreements focused on the religious versus the secu-
lar control of education in the Territory, rather than
on reindeer herding per se. Under JacksonÕs policy,
all teachers were required to be members of a church.
In his capacity as general agent, he was able to en-
force this policy. He was also able to obtain govern-
ment support for the missionary activities by con-
tracting with the missions to run Òcontract schoolsÓ.
Through his efforts, church and education were
strongly interrelated during the early Territorial
years of Alaska. Since the reindeer supervisors at
the local level were all also the educational teach-
ers, Native reindeer herders were forced into vari-
ous degrees of contact with religion and education.
Jackson was not without support for this policy. The
Moravian missions and the Swedish Evangelical
mission schools were among JacksonÕs firmest support-
ers, as was the Presbyterian church (Hinckley, 1966).
Special Agent Frank C. ChurchillÕs investigation
of Alaskan schools and the reindeer service repre-
sents a turning point in the government policy to-
ward both. Churchill was an Indian Agent, an expe-
rienced investigator, and a firm believer in the con-
cept of separating secular educational and govern-
ment activities from missionary proselytizing. Al-
though he was charged with investigating the con-
ditions of education in Alaska, his recommendations
concerning the reindeer industry are most impor-
tant in the present context. E.A. Hitchcock, Secre-
tary of the Interior under Theodore Roosevelt,
charged Churchill with investigating all aspects of
the operation of the reindeer program, including the
status and condition of the herds, and making rec-
ommendations regarding Ò...whether or not either
the loaning of reindeer to the missions maintaining
schools, or the loaning of the same to the Natives as
a method of industrial education should be contin-
ued or abandonedÓ (Churchill, 1906).
Based on his investigations made during the sum-
mer of 1905, Churchill submitted an initial report
to the Secretary of the Interior on December 11,
1905. Subsequently, three supplemental reports
were submitted. Following ChurchillÕs report and
recommendations, Sheldon Jackson was asked to re-
sign. The long battle between the supporters of com-
bined missions and schools and the supporters of
separate church and state activities, with most gov-
ernment officials in the latter camp, ended with
JacksonÕs resignation (Ray, 1975). While Jackson did
resign, he did not completely leave educational af-
fairs in Alaska until 1908.
For someone like Churchill, who believed in care-
ful separation of church and state, the ambiguous
ownership status of government, mission, and pri-
vate reindeer must have been distressing. His rec-
ommendations to straighten out the situation were
unambiguous:
Until (the ownership of reindeer can be de-
termined) ...I am unable to determine with
sufficient certainty (what rules should be put
into force) to warrant positive recommenda-
tions in certain particulars, but I beg leave
to refer to the general trend of this report,
throughout which the general policy of getting
the animals into the hands of the natives as
fast as their capacity for caring for them can
be developed has been made prominent.
(Churchill, 1906).
20
The proposed rules and regulations governing the
Alaska reindeer service which Churchill had been
asked to comment upon were put into effect on June
10, 1907, and December 7, 1908. The rules were an
attempt to manage the ever—increasing numbers of
reindeer and to stop the involvement of the missions
in herding activity. Female reindeer were especially
restricted from sale, transfer, and slaughter while
they remained in Native herds. On the other hand,
the herds of the Lapps, the missions, and the non—
Native owners were not subject to these same rules.
This group was actually encouraged to act to further
their own self—interests, more often than not in open
conflict with Native interests and government  policy.
By 1914, over 20 years after reindeer were first
brought to Alaska, JacksonÕs original goals for Na-
tives had virtually been fulfilled. ChurchillÕs inves-
tigations had been instrumental in forcing large—
scale transfers of reindeer into Native hands. (Com-
pare ownership figures for 1915 and 1905, Table 5.)
The natural increases in reindeer numbers now
made reindeer available to most northwest Alaskan
Eskimos who wanted them. Beyond satisfying the
local needs, a surplus of stock existed for export.
Starting in 1909, arrangements were made with the
Department of Agriculture for the export of reindeer
meat, hides, and antlers through the Bureau of Edu-
cation. In October of 1911, about 125 carcasses were
shipped from Nome to Seattle. This represented the
first sale and export of reindeer meat by Eskimo
herders. Prices in Seattle ranged from 25 to 75 cents
a pound for the 18,750 pounds of meat exported (U.S.
Bureau of Education, 1912).
Overall, the local superintendents of the Bureau
of Education (the village school teachers) were very
successful in placing reindeer into Native hands. As
can be seen in Table 5, by 1915 the ownership pat-
tern of reindeer in Alaska was considerably altered
as compared with the pattern of 1905. Within the
program, however, were the seeds of many new
problemsÑproblems a dispersed ownership policy
could not prevent. By placing as many reindeer in
Native herds as possible, the Bureau of Education
was setting the stage for the natural selection of
better herders/owners to succeed, thus creating for
a few years a Òreindeer aristocracy,Ó the possible de-
velopment of which Churchill had foreseen (1906).
During the following period, characterized by rein-
deer fairs and adequate local markets for Native
owned deer, wealthy herd owners were highly re-
spected and envied. Secondly, by encouraging the
production of as many animals as possible without
first securing adequate export markets, the Bureau
created an economic vacuum that was quickly filled
by non—Native owners, who were not restricted in
the disposal of their deer by Bureau of Education
rules, as has been pointed out above.
Chapter IV
Non—Native ownership of
reindeer: 1914—1940
As we have seen, non—Native ownership of rein-
deer was not unknown prior to 1914. The missions
which had been given herds between 1894 and 1902
constituted an earlier precedent, as did Lapp own-
ership of reindeer received in payment for their ser-
vices as teachers and herders. Large scale Lapp own-
ership of reindeer began when their contracts with
the government expired in 1901. With their privately
owned herds, they dispersed by 1911 from the
Seward Peninsula area to new grazing grounds lo-
cated at Unalakleet, Eaton Tanana, Golovin,
Kotzebue, and Bethel (U.S. Bureau of Education,
1912). The advantages of new grazing areas led to
substantial increases in their herds.
Many Eskimos owned and tended deer by 1914;
however, many of the owners had so few deer that
their herds could not be considered viable economic
production units. The 1917 Report of the Work of
the Bureau of Education for Alaska shows 1,568
Natives owned reindeer; of this number, active herd-
ers and owners totaled 1,398. The 67,448 reindeer
(69% of the 98,582 reindeer in this territory) in 98
Native herds represent an average herd size of only
688 reindeer. The average number of reindeer owned
by any one individual was about 48. With such small
private herds, there was little chance that many of
them could be utilized as productive herds in a com-
mercial marketing system. Such a system needs a
minimum of 1,000 animals in the herd, and 2,000 to
3,000 are preferable (Lantis, 1950; Olsen, 1969;
Zhigunov, 1968). In its effort to get reindeer into the
hands of as many Natives as possible, the govern-
ment was actually contributing to the downfall of
the enterprise. Between 1914 and 1922, Lomen and
Company acquired reindeer and ranges which com-
peted with the NativesÕ interests. Therefore, the two
forces then at work contributing to problems of the
reindeer industry were: small Native—owned herds
and competition between the Native herders and the
non—Native owners.
Average herd size for 1917 for the Native owners
masks a great variability in the number of animals
actually owned by individuals. Both small and large
herds could be found; and both large and small herds
belonging to many individuals often occupied the
same range. The roundup and marking reports for
Deering, for example, show that in the years 1905
to 1915, three herds were established. The first herd,
Deering No. 1, was established in 1905 by Eskimos
who had earned reindeer working for the Wales mis-
sion herd. In 1910, 498 reindeer were being run in
the Deering No. 1 herd distributed as follows: 294
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reindeer owned by six Native herders, 53 reindeer
belonging to six Native owners, and six reindeer
owned by one apprentice who worked for the mis-
sion. The total reindeer owned by the 13 Natives
and the mission numbered 498, hardly a substan-
tial increase from the 343 reindeer originally brought
from Wales by three Native apprentices to Deering
in 1905. Even those 343 original reindeer were not
equally owned by the three apprentices; one owned
318, one 21, and the third but four. The Deering No.
2 herd was started near the Goodhope River in 1911;
the No. 3 herd, started in 1913, was kept in the
Kugruk River area; while the No. 1 herd was kept
in the Lane River region. Table 6 shows the distri-
bution of ownership of these three herds as of 1915
(U.S. Bureau of Education, 1917; Churchill, 1906).
Table 6 also indicates that no Lapps owned rein-
deer in the Deering area, nor were there any govern-
ment or mission apprentices by 1915. In the three
herds of the Deering area, 12 herders owned 1,548
reindeer, and herders cared for an additional 545 re-
indeer owned by 3 other individuals. A total of 2,516
reindeer were herded in the Deering area and provided
the basis for reindeer meat, hides, and by—products
for DeeringÕs population, which included a number of
non—Native miners who lived and worked in the
Inmachuk River and surrounding region. The Native
population of the Deering area had been substantially
reduced in 1914 when a number of families left the
area under the leadership of the FriendÕs mission-
ary and moved to the newly established village of
Noorvik in the lower Kobuk River delta.
Lomen & Company
Private white ownership of reindeer exclusively
for business purposes began in 1914 with the pur-
chase by the Lomen brothers of the Alfred Nilima
herd of Kotzebue. The Lomen family operated Lomen
and Company in Nome, an organization of various
business interests dating from the 1900 Gold Rush.
The holdings of the company included a drug store,
a photography studio, a freighting and lightering
enterprise, and a reindeer operation. The patriarch
of the organization was Gudbrand Lomen, a Nor-
wegian—American who was also the Federal District
Court Judge for the Second Judicial District in
Nome. His sons, Carl, Alfred, and Ralph, managed
the company affairs from Nome, New York, and Se-
attle offices. Between 1914 and 1921, the company
purchased some 8,700 reindeer, which were to be-
come the nuclei of herds established at Buckland,
Egavik, Kotzebue, and Teller. In addition, cold—stor-
age plants to handle reindeer were constructed at
Egavik, Elephant Point, and Golovin, and one was
purchased at Nome.
Lomen and Company was organized in 1914 to
handle the newly purchased reindeer and to man-
age what the Lomens expected would be a rapidly
developing industry. When the Lomens purchased
their first reindeer, they had the financial backing
of Jafet Lindeberg, a Norwegian miner who had be-
come wealthy during the early days of the Nome
Gold Rush. Alfred Nilima was able to sell 1,200 deer
to the company because of increases he had enjoyed
from his herd. Two additional herds (one at Golovin,
Table 6. Ownership and distribution of reindeer in Deering Village, 1915.
Deering no. 1 Deering no. 2 Deering no. 3
(establ. 1905) (establ. 1911) (establ. 1913) Totals
Non—Native ownership
Mission reindeer 112 112
Government reindeer 30 30
Native ownership
Herders number 5 4 3 12
Reindeer 771 431 346 1,548
Owners number 5 15 13 33
Reindeer 37 225 283 545
Apprentices working for the herders and
  other Native owners
Native owners  Number 2 5 3 10
                          Reindeer 64 169 48 281
Total Natives 12 24 19 55
Total reindeer owned by Natives 872 825 677 2,374
Sled reindeer (included in total reindeer)
Trained 15 18 14 47
Being trained 5 1 5 11
Total reindeer in herd 872 967 677 2,516
 (Source: U.S. Bureau of Education, 1917).
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the other at Teller) were purchased from the Swed-
ish Evangelical Society in 1916. With the continual
purchase of non—Native and mission—owned herds,
by 1929 the total purchases of reindeer by the
Lomens amounted to 14,083 animals (Lomen Fam-
ily Collection, n.d.).
When government investigations of the reindeer
industry began in the 1930s, one of their primary
goals was to identify the legality of non—Native own-
ership of reindeer, primarily that of the Lomens.
Reindeer Service and Bureau of Education employ-
ees such as William Lopp fought with the Lomens
and other white owners for years over the legality
of their ownership of reindeer. In 1921, United
States Attorney Fred Harrison of Nome wrote to the
Attorney General regarding the Teller herd sales:
ÒThe Government would be unable to prove that it
had any property right in the deerÓ (Quoted in a
letter from Ernest Walker Sawyer to Secretary of
the Interior Wilbur, May 3, 1930).
LindebergÕs support of the Lomens ended in 1921
when he suffered financial reverses as president of
the MinerÕs and MerchantÕs Bank in Nome. The clos-
ing of a Tacoma bank forced him to end his backing
of the LomensÕ various enterprises. Following the
loss of LindebergÕs support, Carl Lomen set out to
raise capital for the businesses.
Lomen Reindeer and Trading Corporation was or-
ganized in 1923 with holdings of 30,000 to 40,000
reindeer and an authorized capital stock of
$1,500,000 in their initial organization. Upon buy-
ing out Lomen and Company, Lomen Reindeer and
Trading Company issued $2.00 in stock for every
$1.00 share held in Lomen and Company (Warren
Report, 1935).
In an effort to repay past debts, promote the rein-
deer business, and place it on a sound financial foot-
ing, the Lomens attempted to secure capital through
company reorganization and the insurance of new
ownership shares. The Lomen Reindeer Corpora-
tion, changed in 1933 to the Northwestern Livestock
Corporation, was organized in March, 1927. Stock
was issued and used to gain limited financial re-
sources as well as repaying a $316,290 loan made
to the Lomens several years earlier by A.H.
Burroughs and Leonard and Arthur Baldwin. Even
with this success, the Lomens were never able to
secure enough capital to overcome the problems fac-
ing the reindeer business. During his trips to New
York to raise capital, Carl Lomen opened sales of-
fices there and Seattle.
Promotional campaigns for reindeer were con-
ducted by Carl Lomen with such success that he
became known during this period as the Òreindeer
kingÓ of Alaska (Lomen, 1954). Between 1930 and
1933, several subsidiaries were formed under the
Lomen Reindeer Corporation. The Alaska Livestock
and Packing Company, the Lomen Commercial Com-
pany, and the Nunivak Development Company were
all created in 1930. Part of the stock holdings of the
parent Lomen Reindeer Corporation in Alaska Live-
stock and Packing Company were sold in small
blocks to west—coast residents. The family hope was
to create awareness of and a market for reindeer of
which by 1930 they had more than enough, but for
which their had no major market outlet. Alaska Live-
stock and Packing Company was created to operate
the herds and the packing house aspects of the rein-
deer business. A store was also purchased in Candle
in 1931. The Dexter herd at Golovin was purchased
in 1929.
While the Lomens maintained that their policy was
to export reindeer meat to the continental United
States and to leave the local markets to the Native
owners, this did not resolve problems between them
and the Native herders. The history of meat sales
which began in 1918 is provided in Table 7. Although
export sales warded off a direct confrontation for
years, conflict was ultimately unavoidable. When
miners and their supportive merchants began to
move out of the Seward Peninsula in the 1910s, the
reindeer herds were larger than ever and still in-
creasing. Throughout the 1920s, the number of Na-
tive—owned reindeer continued to increase, but the
marketing potential for reindeer decreased as the
local markets declined. Meanwhile, the Lomen Re-
indeer and Trading Corporation expanded to include
ocean freighting services, trading posts, and light-
erage and commercial slaughtering services.
In order for the Lomens to achieve vertical inte-
gration, a series of other steps were taken. The En-
terprise Steamship Company was organized with a
capital stock of $5,000, and the coastal vessels
Nokatak and Silver Wave (I) were acquired. The El-
ephant Point Natural Cold Storage Plant was con-
Table 7. Yearly reindeer meat sales by the
Lomens, 1914—1937.
Number of Number of
Year carcasses Year carcasses
1914 no data 1926 ca. 3,600
1915 no data 1927 9,000
1916 no data 1928 12,000
1917 no data 1919 14,500
1918 624 1930 14,368
1919 no data 1931 602
1920 no data 1932 1,943
1921 no data 1933 3,200
1922 no data 1934 no data
1923 no data 1935 no data
1924 1,109 1936 no data
1925 3,600 1937 no data
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structed on Escholtz Bay to hold carcasses before
shipment to markets in the 48 contiguous states. At
Teller, another corral and processing plant were con-
structed. When the Silver Wave (I) was wrecked in
ice off Cape Espenberg in the fall of 1924, she was
replaced quickly by the Silver Wave (II), a sixty foot,
twin—screw motor vessel. The Enterprise Steamship
Company was reorganized and renamed the Arctic
Transport Company between 1927 and 1929. The
M.S. Sierra, a 2,000—ton ship, was purchased, as
were the 240—foot Arthur J. Baldwin and the
Donaldson. Only four years after Lomen and Com-
pany acquired reindeer, their activities were re-
viewed by the Bureau of Education, as noted in the
reports for 1917—1918. The Bureau felt that they
had done three things which promised well for the
industry:
1) They developed an outside market, mostly in
Minneapolis, shipping ca. 624 carcasses;
2) They were buying steers on the hoof for ship-
ment to the states; and at $10 a head, large local
Native owners were anxious to sell, thus leaving a
bigger local market for smaller herds; and,
3) They conducted large drives of steers from
herds across Seward Peninsula to demonstrate its
feasibility. (U.S. Bureau of Education, 1919).
At that time, Superintendent Walter C. Shields
wrote that he did not believe many problems would
develop as long as white reindeer owners continued
their current policy. Any friction between white and
Native owners was more likely to come over the is-
sue of grazing grounds.
The Governor of Alaska, John F. A. Strong, had a
rather different attitude, which was expressed in
the same report.
Perhaps the attitude of the Bureau of
Education is somewhat at variance with my
own, but I believe that where the reindeer
industry can be encouraged among the whites
without detriment to the Natives, every as-
sistance should be offered, for it is only
through the white owners and shippers that
it will be possible to add to the food supply of
the country at large. (U.S. Bureau of Educa-
tion, 1919).
In these differences of opinion between Governor
Strong and Superintendent Shields can be seen the
roots for a conflict between supporters of reindeer
as a Native industry for the benefit of the Alaskan
Eskimos and supporters of the reindeer industry as
a commercial enterprise, as represented by the
LomensÕ involvement in the production and marketing
of reindeer products.
The Lomen familyÕs involvement in reindeer up
to 1940 is a significant episode in the history of re-
indeer operations. Leaving aside the legal questions
which were eventually raised about the ownership
of reindeer, the use of ranges, and grazing rights, it
is clear that the Lomens acquired both deer and
range between 1914 and 1923. They attempted to
establish markets for the sale of reindeer meat. Their
efforts were concentrated at developing markets
outside of Alaska as the local market was already
served adequately by the Native herds. In establish-
ing these markets, they attempted to gain a verti-
cal integration of the reindeer industry by control-
ling the supply, storage, and distribution of reindeer
products. To some extent they also attempted to cre-
ate their own market demand for the meat in the
continental United States. While this appears on the
surface to be simply a case of an effort to establish a
successful business operation, there is more to the
LomensÕ involvement with reindeer. The activities
surrounding their efforts were, more often than not,
at the expense of the Eskimos for whom the govern-
ment had introduced reindeer in the first place. In-
terpretations of their involvement have been debated
for many years.
The 1917 report submitted by Superintendent
Shields listed seven recommendations for the rein-
deer industry in Alaska. He observed that warble—
fly damage in the herds appeared to be increasing,
and recommended: 1) expert supervision for the
herds; 2) Native supervision, especially as chief herd-
ers; 3) importation of 200 Siberian bulls to improve
the breeding stock; 4) settlement of grazing rights
disputes; 5) funds to support The Eskimo (newspa-
per), which served as a communications link between
the Native reindeer herders; 6) continuation of the
reindeer fairs for at least three more years; and
lastly, 7) that the Chief of the Alaska Division of the
Bureau of Education should make a winter visit to
Alaska to aid the reindeer industry (U.S. Bureau of
Education, 1918).
The 1917 report was to be Walter C. ShieldsÕ last,
for he died in the influenza epidemic of December,
1918/January, 1919. Shields was a well—traveled
man, capable with both a dog—team and reindeer,
and well respected by the Natives on Seward Pen-
insula. ShieldsÕ death dealt a blow to the reindeer
industry and the Native interests. His organiza-
tional abilities and the respect the Eskimos had
placed in him were irreplaceable.
Epidemics, company herds, and fairs
The influenza (Spanish flu) epidemic of 1918/1919
was disastrous for the Eskimo reindeer herders. In
some villages, five out of seven people died. MaryÕs
Igloo had a population of some 300 to 400 people
prior to the flu, while after the epidemic the popula-
tion of the village numbered only 90 to 100 persons.
The reindeer herders at two of the four camps sur-
rounding the village were saved by their isolation,
but only two people in one of the camps survived
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(Oquilluk, 1973). The flu spread along the coast from
southern Alaska via Unalakleet, Colovin, and Nome,
and was carried to Wales by the mail carrier. When
the news of the impending disaster reached
Shishmaref, before any one infected arrived, the vil-
lage council decided to deny entry to the village to
anyone until the flu had run its course. A barricade
was erected southwest of the village and no one was
permitted to cross it. In this way, the flu was pre-
vented from reaching any further north than
Shishmaref (Oquilluk, 197 3; Keithahn , 1963).
 Once the influenza had run its course, it left many
problems behind. In addition to losing the estimated
900 people who died on the Seward Peninsula, the
remaining population was psychologically marked
by the experience. The epidemic reduced the num-
ber of experienced reindeer herders, as well as the
pool of men on which to draw for future training.
Some observers of the industry, such as Shields, had
suggested that herding and management needed
improvement in some areas even before the flu (U.S.
Bureau of Education, 1918). Significant problems
were also left in the wake of the epidemic regarding
the estates of deceased Native reindeer owners.
Could reindeer acquired by inheritance be legally
sold? Could whites inherit reindeer? It was not un-
til the various reindeer investigations of the 1930s
that a SolicitorÕs Opinion was obtained on these mat-
ters. In the intervening decade, the reindeer not only
increased in numbers, but more and more were
placed into the hands of non—Native owners.
During this period, conflicts between the demands
of school and the demands of the increasing rein-
deer herds also appeared. Charles N. Replogle, the
teacher and Friends missionary at Noorvik, reported
that nearly every family in that newly established
village (formed in 1914 largely by immigration from
the Deering and Candle area) owned reindeer and
were not without their problems. ÒIn all the work
and progress of the business there has been and re-
mains yet the problem of the herderÕs familyÓ (U.S.
Bureau of Education, 1918). Among the family prob-
lems were the parentsÕ desires to have their chil-
dren with them to help with the reindeer, to have
their children learn the business which also meant
during the winter when school was usually in ses-
sion, and the perceived need to be a specialist in
herding in order to succeed. Replogle noted, too, that
the help of a wife was essential in reindeer camps,
and that the rotation of families between the herds
and the village had helped to ease the problem of
long absences for the schoolchildren. While much
individual variation in skills had existed among
adult Eskimos in the past, most had been general-
ists in the sense that they knew a variety of skills
well enough to be able to make a living. Reindeer herd-
ing, however, was meant to be a full—time occupation
as the Bureau of Education saw it for the Eskimos.
Between 1918 and 1920, William T. Lopp, Chief of
the Alaska Division of the Bureau of Education,
urged the consolidation of reindeer owned by indi-
viduals into ÒcompanyÓ or cooperatively managed
herds. It was his belief that this would bring about
better herding and management. Lopp was not the
first to suggest a company type of organization.
Charles S. Thomson, Missionary of the Congrega-
tional Church at Wales, and Dr. James H. Hamilton,
teacher at Diomede, wrote Lopp on September 16, 1911:
As a substitute for the ownership of in-
dividual deer by natives, indicated by ear
markings, we suggest that the natives be
permitted to own herds on the corporation
plan, each owning a fractional share of the
entire herd; viz., an undivided interest, ac-
cording to his investment, and receive from
time to time a pro rata share of the profits
in the form of dividends. (U.S. Bureau of
Education, 1912).
The Bureau of Education believed that reindeer
fairs could be a way to encourage cooperative man-
agement of the Native reindeer herds. At such fairs,
they suggested to the Eskimo reindeer owners that
clubs  be formed to promote better herd manage-
ment. The first Reindeer Fair was held at Igloo in
January of 1915. At this fair, speeches were made
by the various delegates: Superintendent Shields,
Carl Lomen, and others. Bureau of Education em-
ployees talked about how cooperation and kindness
would work in favor of the Eskimo herders (Bureau
of Education, 1917). Fairs held in subsequent years
at Igloo, Noatak, Noorvik, and Unalakleet provided
a meeting place for reindeer owners to organize
ÒclubsÓ or Òowners associations.Ó By and large, it ap-
pears to have been the large herd owners who most
favored the formation of associations. By virtue of
their political and economic advantage, they tended
to dominate the ÒReindeer CompaniesÓ which were
formally organized in the early 1900s. Because of
their large reindeer holdings, company—type organi-
zation favored their political and economic ambitions.
Meanwhile, the number of reindeer continued to
increase. Since the 1890s, the Bureau of Education
had been responsible for administrating the rein-
deer herds, but the Reindeer Service consisted
mostly of the Òlocal reindeer supervisorsÓ who were
also the school teachers in most villages. Double duty
was often beyond the expertise and desires of the
teachers, who found themselves entangled in disputes
over inheritances, ranges, and reindeer about which
they had no knowledge. A general reindeer superin-
tendent was supposed to oversee the work of the lo-
cal supervisors, but little guidance was given. The
regional superintendent of the Bureau of Education
tried to visit the herds, attend the handlings, and
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approve the tallies along with the local teachers, all
in addition to his principal job of administrating the
schools. The logistics of this in the 1920s, com-
pounded by limited budgets, severely impaired the
superintendentÕs ability to do any of these tasks well.
Reacting in part to the recommendations of Su-
perintendent ShieldsÕ 1917 report, the Bureau of
Education did two things in 1920 which affected
Native reindeer operations. The U.S.S. Boxer, ac-
quired from the United States Navy to bring school
supplies north to Alaska from the continental United
States, was also charged with taking reindeer car-
casses back to the contiguous United States for sale
on behalf of the Natives. The Boxer had a carrying
capacity of 500 tons and for years provided the
means by which Native herders were able to mar-
ket animals beyond their local area. In some years,
carcasses were only transshipped for Native herd-
ers and associations to meet with other steamers
heading south to continental United States markets
(U.S. Bureau of Education, 1923). Later, the
U.S.M.S. North Star, belonging to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, performed the same functions.
Also in 1920, the Bureau of Biological Survey
(BBS), in conjunction with the Bureau of Education,
began a series of experiments to cross—breed rein-
deer and caribou on Nunivak Island. Under a coop-
erative agreement between the Lomens and the
Bureau of Biological Survey, Nunivak Island was to
be used to conduct Ò...investigations, experiments
and demonstrations for the improvement of the re-
indeer industry in AlaskaÓ (U.S. Bureau of Educa-
tion, 1921). The cooperative agreement providing for
the experiment was protested by the island resi-
dents. Although the experiments were meant to im-
prove the breeding stock of all herds, island resi-
dents objected to the LomensÕ presence on Nunivak
Island. Lomen and Company claimed the island as
their rangeland. Natives claimed that the Lomen—
operated store and reindeer herd on Nunivak Island
were not being operated in the best interests of the
Natives. The later reindeer investigations of the
1930s looked into these charges and counter—
charges, but no conclusion was reached. The cross—
breeding experiments failed to benefit either the
Lomens or the Natives in the long run.
By 1922, there were approximately 259,000 rein-
deer in Alaska. Two—thirds of those reindeer were
in Native hands while the remaining third were
owned by whites, Lapps, and the government. Virtu-
ally all mission herds had been sold to the government
or non—Natives. From historical accounts, contem-
porary accounts of the period, and informantsÕ state-
ments, it appears that a number of individual Na-
tives were starting to amass large enough herds to
be able to live largely from the income of their herds.
These men had learned reindeer herding at an early
age, as apprentices or as boys helping their fathers
with the herds. They stayed out from the villages
for most of the winter with the herds, patrolling their
range and keeping their reindeer under surveillance.
They generally drove sled deer, as opposed to dog
teams, which were used more by trappers. Some in-
dividuals were successful trappers at the same time
they were successful herders.
Using the capital represented by their herds, their
familiarity with the newly introduced items of west-
ern culture, and their own initiative, herders began
developing into entrepreneurs. Several herders
started and operated their own small stores, trad-
ing reindeer for fur skins and selling what supplies
they had on hand. In one village on the Seward Pen-
insula, for example, a cooperative reindeer associa-
tion was formed August 7, 1924. At that time, the
largest herd owner was also a trader, trapper, and
owner of the only gas powered boat in the village.
Of the 59 owners of reindeer in the village at the
time, he owned the most reindeer, a total of 603,
while only five of the other herders owned more than
100 deer. The remaining owners owned between one
and 92 reindeer, for an average of only 16 per indi-
vidual. In total numbers, six people controlled 1,505
of the 2,425 total reindeer in the village (U.S. Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs, n.d.).
In 1924, with reindeer numbers steadily increas-
ing, it became apparent that changes were neces-
sary if the reindeer industry were to continue as a
viable operation. In a memorandum dated Febru-
ary 15, L.J. Palmer advised the Chief of Biological
Survey that 242,000 reindeer existed in Alaska, with
an average herd size of 2,000 head. He also stated
that herds could be expected to increase in the fu-
ture to an average of 7,500.
The need of using large grazing units
will necessitate the establishment of co—op-
erative herds among the numerous small
owners, and this will result in the forma-
tion of many co—operative associations or
livestock companies, especially among the
Eskimos. As a natural development of the
rapidly growing use of the open range, there
is certain to be established in the very near
future a grazing permit system for the con-
trol of range and regulation of the reindeer
grazing. (Palmer, 1924).
Palmer also advised that herds of mixed non—Na-
tive and Native ownership be split where feasible
and placed on separate ranges. Such separation
would prevent conflicts between Natives and non—
Natives over the ownership of herd increases and
over the use of rangeland. He also urged the adop-
tion of a ten point program of herd management,
emphasizing open herding, a ratio of 5 to 10 bulls
per 100 female deer, and ÒproperÓ selection of the
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best animals, both males and females, for breeding
purposes.
PalmerÕs advocacy of open herding was based on
his belief that it resulted in better calving percent-
ages and healthier stock. In a memorandum of De-
cember 8, 1923, he addressed this problem with data
to support his belief: . .
that the herds in the Illiamna Lake sec-
tion and the Pt. Barrow section are in poorer
condition generally than elsewhere ...it de-
velops that the herds are very closely herded
and otherwise poorly handled. Conse-
quently it is our opinion that the close herd-
ing and poor management is the chief cause
for the less successful results in these sec-
tions. (Palmer, 1923).
He was also correct when he predicted that graz-
ing permits would be established. In 1927, Congress
passed the Alaska Grazing Act, which called for the
General Land Office (now the Bureau of Land Man-
agement) to issue grazing permits for reindeer and
other livestock in Alaska. Applications for permits
were taken by the General Land Office, but the Great
Depression appears to have prevented the actual is-
suance of permits to Native associations and non—
Native herd owners alike.
By the mid—1920s, the small private holdings of
the Native owners, coupled with problems in inher-
itance and sales, the proliferation of identifying ear-
marks, and disputes over range and handlings,
caused the Bureau of Education to re—examine its
policies. One attempt at resolving some of the prob-
lems came with introduction of the joint stock—own-
ership system. Under this system, the animals be-
longing to the people of any one village were to be
herded by paid herders. Upwards of 50 people in a
village often owned reindeer in numbers varying
from one to two to several thousand animals. How-
ever, under the system of the Native Òcompany
herds,Ó management became rather more difficult
than easier because of several complicating factors.
The lack of adequate local markets and the practice
of paying for labor in meat and not wages prevented
the companies from generating enough cash to pay
expenses. There were no enforceable restrictions on
grazing or on the number of animals allowed on ranges.
Ranges at that time were well established by custom-
ary use, by occupancy, and by permit applications
pending with the General Land Office. The net re-
sult was that the herds were allowed to grow too
large to herd and manage effectively.
Additional problems, although less severe, only
compounded the difficulties. Roundups were often
incomplete and herds that were rounded up were
often of mixed ownership. An insufficient number
of males were castrated, providing insufficient num-
bers of marketable steers or leaving a number of
poor breeders in the herds. Often, men experienced
in the reindeer business had no more voice in the
management of the company herds than owners of
only a couple of reindeer who had had little or no
herding experience. Lastly, the government employ-
ees who were charged with reindeer matters had
only advisory authority. They could not order a re-
duction in herd numbers to protect the rapidly de-
teriorating ranges. The summer ranges along the
coastal strip of Seward Peninsula were being sub-
stantially overgrazed.
During the joint stock company period, companies
operated not so much like their counterparts in the
continental United States which were profit—moti-
vated organizations, but more as a vehicle for man-
aging the village herds in a fair manner. A chief
herder was selected from among all company mem-
bers to control herd operations. This individual, usu-
ally an experienced reindeer man and often one of
the largest herd owners, was placed in charge of the
day—to—day operations of the herd. Members of the
company primarily contributed labor, assisted dur-
ing handlings and corrallings, helped guard the
herd, and butchered animals from it. Families some-
times stayed out with the herders. Roundups and
corrallings, though often incomplete, remained ma-
jor social events. Payment for labor and other ser-
vices to the company was made in the form of
ÒsharesÓ added to oneÕs account. No formal stock cer-
tificates were issued; accounts were kept in ledger
books under the name of each herd co—owner. Cred-
its for labor and services, and debits for butchering
or food purchased from the village store were re-
corded for each co—owner in the ledger books. While
shares were supposed to represent reindeer, in fact
they represented only an abstraction, since shares
paid to oneÕs account for labor services and shares
paid in on the basis of percentage increases in the
herd were not distinguished. Percentage increases
were given on the basis of the total number of ani-
mals owned by individual owned. Since only the fe-
males one owned contributed to the increases, shares
should have been based on the numbers of breeding
females, not on the total number of animals, but such
was not the case.
This problem of giving percentage increases based
on total numbers of animals instead of on the number
of breeding females owned caused herds to increase
faster on the books than in reality. Shares of stock,
each representing one reindeer (regardless of sex),
quickly became inflated. As the share system
worked, in the spring of each year a percentage in-
crease was given to each herd co—owner based on
the spring calving successes. The increases were
calculated at a rate of 50 to 60% of the ownerÕs pre-
vious share total. The shares received were actually
reduced by ten per cent before they were given to
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the owner. This ten per cent represented a ÒtaxÓ
which was added to the company treasury and from
which company expenses were supposed to be met.
Such expenses as food, materials, and labor were to
be paid from this treasury account.
The flaw in the system came with calculating the
shares to be paid to herd co—owners. There was no
distinction made between male and female reindeer
owned by each shareholder. One share represented
one reindeer, regardless of that animalÕs potential
for future herd increases. In the absence of complete
yearly roundups and adequate markings of animals
as to their owners, the number of reindeer listed per
shareholder increased faster on paper than in ac-
tual herd counts. Within a few years, reconciliation
between the ledger shares owned by company mem-
bers and their actual reindeer in the herd had be-
come impossible.
In addition to the problem of determining actual
numbers of reindeer owned by each herder, there
were other difficulties that grew out of the Òcom-
panyÓ period. Theoretically, every co—owner (share-
holder or company association member) had an equal
say in the management of the company herd. Ac-
cording to informants, conflicts between large and
small herd owners did develop. The small owners
were viewed as Òtoo bossyÓ by the large owners. To
compound the problem, since the small owners had
less at stake in the management of the herd, they
apparently paid less attention to proper slaughter-
ing practices and contributed virtually no labor in
the yearly operations of the herd. By not cooperat-
ing with the larger owners, the effectiveness of the
larger owners, who had more vested interest in the
herd and the overall operation, was greatly reduced.
This lack of cooperation was detrimental to the herd
operations, for the larger owners were generally the
better herders and husbanders. The large owners
tended to have more experience, ability, and desire
to handle reindeer, whereas the small owners had
sometimes never even seen their animals. Small
owners also often butchered more than their shares
entitled them to take, or butchered without obtain-
ing butchering permits from the company officers.
The larger owners were powerless to prevent such
activities since they could invoke no formal sanc-
tions. Complaints to the Reindeer Service person-
nel and to the school teachers often went
uninvestigated due to lack of time, money, and in-
terest on the part of the government employees.
The stock associations continued for a period of
about 25 years (1925 to 1950). The effectiveness of
the stock association type of herd management
steadily declined during this period. For example,
during the early years of the Deering Reindeer Stock
Company, the herds were well tended and corralings
took place on a regular basis. During the late 1920s,
company members realized that June handlings for
the purpose of obtaining fiscal reindeer counts were
expensive and difficult to arrange because of sum-
mer travel logistics. There were also conflicts with
subsistence activities. They concluded such counts
were unnecessary when the winter handlings could
take care of all the June requirements. Constant
herding declined steadily as there was the feeling
that herding on a continual basis was not necessary
as reindeer increased without constant herding.
After the peak years in the early 1930s, herd sizes
began to decline as some herds were not handled or
herded for stretches of several years in succession.
At the time of the Depression, when there was vir-
tually no wage labor available, many herds were
simply abandoned. High percentage increases con-
tinued to be given to herd co—owners even though
the herds continued to decline throughout the 1930s.
In the late 1930s, it became increasingly apparent
to Eskimo herd owners and the Reindeer Service
alike that the stock ownership companies were not
managing the herds effectively. The Federal govern-
ment initiated a change in the policy reverting back
to the Lapp—like individual ownership of reindeer.
The effects of the company period are still being felt
today, however, particularly when old issues relat-
ing to reindeer ownership and range use are brought
up that date back to this period.
During the decade 1920 to 1930, the principal
problem facing the reindeer industry was too many
reindeer, or conversely, inadequate markets for the
numbers of reindeer available for slaughter. As men-
tioned earlier, the Lomens attempted to create mar-
kets in the continental United States through vig-
orous promotion of reindeer products. In Seattle and
California, their efforts were met with opposition
from cattle interests. Shipping problems and local or-
dinances banning reindeer meat sales in the western
states led to the downfall of A.A. Selden and Axel
GottliebÕs plans for their Eskimo Sisters Reindeer Com-
pany in Pacific Grove, California (Selden, n.d.).
In an attempt to bolster the development of a
market, a herd was established in interior Alaska
at Cantwell in 1922. Reindeer Service employee Ben
B. Mozee led a drive of 1,437 reindeer from
Goodnews Bay to the Broad Pass area. The goal of
this drive was to set up a herd near the recently
completed Alaska Railroad so that the railroad could
transport reindeer to its ice—free terminus at
Whittier. Predators, lack of constant herding, per-
sonnel changes, and losses to caribou herds contrib-
uted to the demise of the Cantwell reindeer indus-
try by 1928 (Luick, 1973).
The largest drive of reindeer in the 1930s to new
grazing grounds was a Lomen—organized drive of
3,000 head of reindeer from Seward Peninsula to the
headwaters of the Mackenzie River in the Northwest
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Territories of Canada. Field examinations by the
Porsild brothers had determined that range was
adequate and that a social and economic need for
reindeer existed in CanadaÕs north (Porsild, 1929).
Field Superintendent for the Lomen Reindeer Cor-
poration, Dan Crowley, and Chief Herder Andrew
Bahr directed the drive. Only ten per cent of the
original animals taken completed the thousand—mile
trip from the Naboktoolik corral on Escholtz Bay.
Calves born along the route during the five—year
drive did replace most of those animals lost, so that
2,375 reindeer were ultimately delivered at the
Kittigazuit corral in March, 1935. During the origi-
nal field investigations of the area, the cooperation
of the Alaska Reindeer Service and the Bureau of
Biological Survey had been secured, but the diffi-
culties which the Alaska reindeer industry was fac-
ing at the time were not appreciated. The Canadian
reindeer industry located at the Mackenzie Delta
developed along lines parallel to the Alaska indus-
try, but without ever going through a disruptive pe-
riod of non—Native competition (Stager and Denike,
1972; Miller, 1935; Scotter, 1972a, 1972b; Hill, 1967;
Lomen, 1954; Evans, 1934a, 1934b, 1934c, 1934d, 1946).
Reindeer investigations
The Great Depression which began in 1929 had
impacts on Alaska which are often overlooked by
historians of the period. As the United States sought
its way out of its economic problems under the
Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, enough com-
motion was stirred up about reindeer to bring a Fed-
eral investigating team to Alaska virtually every
year for the next ten years. Their reports and rec-
ommendations span thousands of pages, most of
which lie neglected and forgotten on the dusty
shelves of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
(Stern, 1977). Hearings in Washington into reindeer
matters were also a significant factor in the even-
tual purchase of all non—Native—owned reindeer and
properties by the Federal government in 1940. Pro-
tests by members of the Reindeer Service about
Lomen activities, letters from the Native reindeer
associations, and letters from various church and
missionary groups throughout the 1930s pressured
the Secretary of the Interior to take action.
Most protests centered on three main issues. The
Lomens were charged with unfairly taking range
lands which belonged to Native herders based on
customary use at Buckland, Teller (Igloo range), and
Golovin, as well as other ranges beyond the Seward
Peninsula. The Lomens and their agents were
charged with unfair range rules and practices, in-
cluding the marking of mavericks to the Lomen
herds, at the disadvantage of the Native herders.
Lastly, the Natives regarded the non—Native own-
ers as unlawful interlopers in an enterprise estab-
lished for their benefit.
A principal point of conflict concerned the Lomen
occupation of ranges which Natives claimed. In each
of four contested ranges on the Seward Peninsula,
the history of occupation shows that it was Lapps
(Kotzebue) or Natives and missions (Buckland,
Teller/Igloo, and Golovin) who first used these con-
tested ranges for herding. The Lomens moved on to
these ranges as their herds increased and as they
purchased reindeer from Lapps, missions, and Na-
tives. Once on the ranges, they refused to withdraw
their reindeer, and further, charged Native herd
owners a grazing fee for the use of the range which
they had formerly occupied (Chance, 1930). The Re-
indeer Committee of 1931 recommended the sepa-
ration of the herds in the Teller and Buckland ar-
eas, but by the time the Survey of the Alaska Rein-
deer Service was released in 1933, this still had not
been accomplished. The Trowbridge—Cillman Sur-
vey concluded that the separation of Lomen and Na-
tive herds on the Teller range was not necessary
because of mutual agreements, and that the sepa-
ration of herds on the Buckland range would resolve
the dispute in that area.
The Lomens were often charged with questionable
practices in the reindeer business. They were deal-
ing with Native people who seldom had any formal
education beyond a few years of elementary school.
Punishment was still received for even speaking the
Eskimo language in classrooms. At reindeer han-
dlings, Lomen company representatives claimed
unmarked reindeer (calves and mavericks) on a per-
centage basis of Lomen animals present at the han-
dling. Ernest Walker Sawyer wrote to Governor
George Parks that the net result of the application
of the percentage marking system was to reduce the
number of reindeer marked to Natives while the
number of deer marked to the Lomens increased
(Sawyer to Parks, October 3, 1930, see Appendix I).
It was perceived that through the percentage mark-
ing system, the Lomens marked to their herds far
more reindeer than they might actually have been
entitled to from their natural herd increases.
As previously noted, the Lomen companies went
through four separate corporate reorganizations
with their reindeer business. When the Lomen Re-
indeer Corporation was organized in 1927, the stock
which was issued for the company was allegedly
inflated beyond the assets held by the company, but
this was never substantiated by actual counts of the
animals on the range. Most importantly, the Natives
regarded the Lomens as unfairly competing with
them in an enterprise which had been established
for the NativeÕs benefit. The twin issues of unfair
marking practices and occupation of Eskimo claimed
ranges served, from the Native viewpoint, to justify
the charge of unfair competition.
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The letters of C.L. Andrews provide a most vivid
documentation of this period of conflict between the
Lomens and Eskimos based on his familiarity with
the region and its problems. Andrews had served as
a teacher at Kivalina and as a leader and reindeer
supervisor with the Reindeer Service on Seward
Peninsula. He had also been a Customs Agent in
Alaska from 1897 to 1909, had been with the Duke
of Abruzzi on the Mt. St. Elias Expedition of 1897, a
newspaper and magazine writer, and author of sev-
eral books based on his Alaskan experiences
(Andrews, 1926, 1935, 1938, 1939). While his view-
points on the situation must be regarded as favor-
ing the Eskimo position, his data and eloquently
written, lengthy letters of protest to the Indian Rights
Association and the Department of the Interior pre-
sented his case clearly. He saw himself protecting the
interests of a defenseless people against the:
deliberate plot (which) has been delib-
erately and persistently pursued for the
past 15 years to break the Rules and Regu-
lations of the Interior Service (sic Depart-
ment) in Alaska ...violating the spirit of the
contracts of the Missions holding reindeer
in Alaska, (in) trust for distribution to the
natives, and to appropriate lands which by
right of occupation properly belonged to the
natives. (Andrews, 1930).
The letters of Andrews and others sympathetic to
the EskimoÕs position to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior caused enough of a stir to prompt the latter to
send a special representative, Ernest Walker Saw-
yer, to investigate matters. Sawyer had been in-
volved in the management and planning for the
Alaska Railroad, so he was generally familiar with
the Territory and its problems. In October, 1930, he
reported his findings to Governor Parks (1930a).
Sawyer believed that the Lomen marking practices
were unfair to the Native herds (Sawyer, 1930b; see
also Appendix I).
Secretarial Order No. 380, signed by Secretary of
the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur in 1929, formally
placed the responsibility for reindeer matters in the
hands of Governor George Parks. This ended Bu-
reau of Education involvement with reindeer at high
administrative levels, but still left local—level mat-
ters in the teachersÕ hands. Parks himself was a po-
litical appointee and directly responsible to the Sec-
retary of the Interior. With administrative respon-
sibility for reindeer herding resting in his office,
Governor Parks set out to reorganize the bureau-
cracy responsible for reindeer in Alaska. Within six
months after administration was placed in his office,
a document supporting the estimates for appropria-
tions, an organizational chart, and a statement on
the current status of the industry were sent to E.K.
Burlew, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of
the Interior (Parks, 1930). Nineteen new positions
were proposed, to be filled over the course of five
years, including a general reindeer superintendent,
four district reindeer supervisors, and fourteen re-
indeer foremen. Operating on a budget of $122,590,
these employees would take over the duties of the
then present personnel:
...two district supervisors on full time, 3
district school superintendents on part
time, 38 Government teachers on part time,
30 Government apprentices on full time
caring for 360,000 reindeer in 73 herds ex-
tending along several thousand miles of
coastline and grazing upon an area of
100,000 square miles. (Parks, 1930).
Parks was also concerned that Government policy:
...proceed with the work until such time
as the natives are competent to manage
their own affairs, (and in all fairness to the
natives) this seems to me to be the only
policy that can be followed, then it is most
essential that the teachers of the Office of
Education be relieved of this extra work,
and an organization created which will be
able to administer the reindeer industry,
that in a period of a few years, the natives
will be able to carry on the work and the
Government withdraw from the field. As-
suming that the Government will continue
to administer the reindeer herds in an ad-
visory capacity to the natives, careful at-
tention has been given to planning for the
smallest organization possible to carry this
into effect with all possible expediency.
(Parks, 1930).
In the plan for reorganization, (Tables 8 and 9),
one sees clearly that Parks hoped to have the Na-
tives fully in control of their reindeer with the Fed-
eral role reduced to that of an advisor. Curiously,
this is the situation which exists today: the Federal
role remains an advisory one with the Bureau of
Land Management responsible for range protection
and grazing—permit assignments.
The territorial governor thus inherited a long—
standing problem from the Bureau of Education. The
Lomens and other non—Native owners of reindeer
had been the targets of objections from Eskimo re-
indeer owners and from sympathetic Bureau of Edu-
cation and Reindeer Service employees for over a
dozen years. The original sale of reindeer to the
Lomens had been taken to court where it had been
declared valid (Andrews, 1930).
While the legal statement closed the matter in the
minds of the Lomens, the Eskimos and their sup-
porters still believed that the Lomens were unfairly
competing with the Native industry. As the local mar-
kets decreased in the 1920s, the reindeer belonging
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to individual Natives and to joint stock associations
increased far beyond the local demand, and such
protests became more vocal.
 In order to determine the status of the reindeer
industry and the sources of the problem which were
causing so many protests, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior conducted Reindeer Hearings in Washington,
D.C., in February and March, 1931. The investigat-
ing committee consisted of Senator John B. Kendrick
from Wyoming, Representative Scott Leavitt from
Montana, and former Assistant Attorney General
Charles P. Sisson. (Kendrick, Leavitt and Sisson
Committee, transcript of Reindeer Committee hear-
ings, and transmittal to Secretary of the Interior, in
Elmer E. Rasmuson Library, Arctic Archives, Uni-
versity of Alaska, Fairbanks, Alaska). At the con-
clusion of the hearings, findings and recommenda-
tions were forwarded to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior and were accepted on March 30, 1931. Among
the steps recommended by the committee were the
establishment of a Reindeer Council in Alaska and
the establishment of Range Rules. In addition, the
committee recommended that roundups be held for
the purpose of establishing ownership and numbers
of reindeer on the ranges, that reindeer be trans-
ferred to separate Native and non—Native ranges,
that marketing methods be made more equitable,
and that the Reindeer Service be expanded.
Until there was an adequate supervisory force in
the Alaska Reindeer Service to handle the transfer
of reindeer from Lomen to Eskimo ranges, to super-
vise roundups, to settle ownership disputes, and to
develop marketing outlets for Native—owned rein-
deer, the recommendations of the committee could
not be put into effect. To expedite the implementa-
tion of the recommendations, three new unit man-
agers were hired in August and September, 1931,
bringing the Reindeer Service personnel to eight (in-
cluding one temporary clerk at Nome), distributed
as follows: General Reindeer Superintendent in
Table 8. Organization of the Alaska Reindeer Service in 1930.
Secretary of the Interior
Governor
General Reindeer Superintendent (Mozee)
Headquarters
Office Clerk 5 District Supervisors in Field
Seward Peninsula Northwestern Southwestern Western Central
District District District District District
Schmidt Morelander Gardner Rood Beck
(B of E)  (B of E) (B of E)
131,519 deer 157,174 deer 16,459 deer 61,762 deer 2,529 deer
11 teachers 10 teachers 7 teachers 9 teachers 1 teachers
(B of E) (B of E) (B of E) (B of E) (B of E)
(Source: Parks, 1930).
Table 9. Governor ParksÕ proposed reorganization of the Alaska Reindeer Service in 1930.
Secretary of the Interior
Governor
General Reindeer Superintendent (Mozee)
  Headquarters 4 district supervisors in field
  Office Clerk Seward Peninsula Northwestern Southwestern Western
District District District District
Nome Kotzebue Dillingham Bethel
(Schmidt) (Rood)
6 Foremen 4 Foremen 1 Foreman 3 Foremen
Wales Barrow Dillingham Pilot Station
Nome Pt. Hope Akiak
White Mtn. Kotzebue Quinhagak
Shaktoolik Deering
Unalakleet
Savoonga
131,519 deer 157,174 deer 16,459 deer 61,762 deer
  (Source: Parks, 1930).
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Nome; five unit Managers stationed at Nome, Teller,
Bethel, Candle, and Egavik; and two clerks at Nome
(one of them temporary). These eight civil servants
were expected to administer the estimated 500,000
to 800,000 reindeer and 78 Native reindeer associa-
tions with 5,878 members spread out over approxi-
mately 100,000 square miles of the territory.
Compounding the difficulties of administering so
many animals and people spread out over such a
vast area came the administrative transfer of the
Reindeer Service itself. The Reindeer Service was
transferred from the Bureau of Education of the
Alaska Territorial GovernorÕs Office of the Division
of Territories, Department of the Interior, effective
November 1, 1929. This change was part of an in-
ternal reorganization of the Bureau of Education,
itself dissolved in 1931. The Alaska Division of the
Bureau, with its responsibilities for education,
health, and welfare of Alaskan Natives, was trans-
ferred to the Office of Indian Affairs (later the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs). During a brief but, as we
shall see, crucial time lasting from February 1936
to July 1937, the Reindeer Service was within the
administration of the Office of Territories and Is-
land Possessions. Within the Division of Territories,
the Reindeer Service received strong support from
Ernest Gruening, then the Director of the Division.
On July 1, 1937, reindeer administration was trans-
ferred back to the Alaska Division, which had been
part of the Office of Indian Affairs since 1931.
The findings of the Reindeer Committee (1931) had
favored keeping the Lomens off Native ranges as
much as possible. Lomen and Company proposed to
the newly established Reindeer Council that all the
reindeer on the Seward Peninsula should be placed
under one management scheme (U.S. Department
of the Interior, 1931). Returns from the herds would
be based on the number of female reindeer owned
by the various co—managers of the herds. This sug-
gestion was turned down by the Reindeer Council.
The Reindeer Council met only a few times in 1931
and 1932. Its major achievement was the adoption
of a set of Range Rules on June 23, 1931. These rules
differed little from the ones developed previously by
the Lomens for their own herds and they served to
work for the LomensÕ benefit. The marking of calves
and mavericks to their herds was continued on the
same basis as before. The council was largely inef-
fective in dealing with the problems of the industry,
and, in fact, served as a vehicle to exacerbate some of
the already existing problems. The LomensÕ influence
with the Reindeer Council is suggested in the Range
Rules adapted by the council. When these rules are
compared with those used by the Lomen Company
prior to 1929, it seems apparent that rules pertain-
ing to markings, stray ownership, and mixing of
herds were simply carried over from the LomensÕ
own range rules to the Reindeer CouncilÕs rules.
Other interpretations are also possible, however. A
comparison of the adopted rules and the Lomen rules
is provided as Appendix II.
After only one year of existence, the Reindeer
Council was stripped of regulatory powers in 1932
but continued to function in an advisory capacity for
a brief time. The inability of the council to handle
reindeer matters effectively had two causes: the com-
position of the council and the fact that it had no
authority to enforce its decisions. The council was
composed of: the Governor of Alaska as ex—officio
chairman, the Chief of the Alaska Division of the
Office of Indian Affairs, the General Reindeer Su-
pervisor of the Alaska Reindeer Service, a represen-
tative chosen by and from Eskimo owners, and a rep-
resentative of the Lomen interests.
In addition, the council never had the support of
the herd owners nor the trust of the Reindeer Ser-
vice personnel. Native representation on the coun-
cil was limited to two men who shared only one vote.
Although the Reindeer Service had a representative
on the council with one vote, they resented the fact
that the Lomen representative on the council also
had one of the five votes. They maintained the posi-
tion that a member from a private business enter-
prise had no right to be on a government council in
an enterprise established to help Natives.
Reindeer Act of 1937
The political circumstances leading up to the pas-
sage of a Reindeer Act of 1937 were tremendously
complex. The Trowbridge Gillman report (Survey of
the Alaska Reindeer Service, 1931—1933, released
in February, 1933) was discredited by many of the
same parties who had originally questioned the Re-
indeer Committee hearings (U.S. Department of the
Interior, 1933). A large portion of the criticism came
from C.L. Andrews, who sent written protests to any-
one who would read them. A series of critical articles
also appeared in the Indian Truth magazine. It was
reported that the results of the earlier Kendrick
Committee (the 1931 Reindeer Committee) investi-
gation and its recommendations, which were sup-
posed to have been carried out by the Field Repre-
sentatives Trowbridge and Gillman, were never
implemented (Indian Truth, March, April, 1933). An
earlier article appearing in this same magazine in
February, 1932, entitled ÒEskimo Reindeer Seriously
Threatened,Ó caused many sympathetic missionary
and church groups to deluge the Secretary of the
InteriorÕs office with letters and telegram of protest
over the reindeer situation (Indian Truth, 1932).
Thousands of these letters were answered with a
form letter which told the protesters that a field party
(Trowbridge, Gillman, and Brewster) was going Òto
Alaska to aid the Governor in a fair and orderly
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re—organization and adjustment of the ownership
of the deer and expedite the making of range leases
as recommended by the Reindeer Committee...Ó
(Wilbur, 1932).
Trowbridge and Gillman managed to antagonize
every person they dealt with in the Reindeer Ser-
vice, as evidenced in their reports. Their charges
against the General Reindeer Superintendent, Ben
B. Mozee, resulted in his being transferred to the
Alaska Educational Service, a transfer he rejected,
electing instead to serve as United States Marshall
in Nome. Brewster was appointed General Reindeer
Superintendent, but the damaged relationship be-
tween the Reindeer Service and the Natives contin-
ued. Protests against him combined with ill health
forced him to retire to Montana in 1934. He was re-
placed by Paul Stafford, the Teller Unit Manager,
who served as the Acting General Reindeer Super-
intendent from 1934 to January 1936. J. Sidney
Rood, the Nome—Golovin Unit Manager, became the
Acting General Reindeer Superintendent in Janu-
ary, 1936, when Stafford was transferred to the Graz-
ing Branch, Salt Lake City.
Legal opinion on the question of disposition of re-
indeer to non—Natives through inheritance, sales,
and other means came in 1932. In response to ques-
tions posed by Field Representatives Trowbridge and
Gillman, in a letter to Governor George Parks, the
Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, E.C.
Finney, gave opinions for the following questions:
1. Is there any authority of law for employ-
ees of the Reindeer Service to settle es-
tates involving property consisting of re-
indeer and make distribution of reindeer
owned by the estate, considering the fact
that all natives of Alaska are citizens
under the law?
2 Does Section 23 of the Reindeer Regula-
tions authorize distribution of reindeer
of estates of natives considering that said
section clearly refers to ÒherdersÓ and
further, that many natives own reindeer
who have never been herders, have
bought reindeer outright, and own rein-
deer which were the result of the natu-
ral increase from those given them by the
Government, or increase from those they
purchased?
3 If the regulations are supported by law,
as to the disposition ÔÕ reindeer by the Re-
indeer Service or any other branch of or
the Interior Department, does such au-
thority cover instances where the estates
include other property and which must
be probated by the courts of Alaska?
(Trowbridge and Gillman, 1932).
Solicitor Finney replied, in part:
I am of the opinion, that question 1 must
be answered in the negative. If the reindeer
are owned by the native in his own right,
altogether free from restriction, it is not a
case where the Government should take any
part in the administration of the estate. But
if there be such restricted property, then the
case should be handled in the manner above
outlined or under such regulations as may
be adopted. But I do not think an employee
of the Reindeer Service could be authorized
to settle such estates. That function is
lodged in the Secretary of the Interior. Ques-
tion 2 is substantially answered in the an-
swer to question 1. Where the deceased
native owned the reindeer without restric-
tion there is no authority for the Depart-
ment to administer on them, that function
being appropriate for a local court. Ques-
tion 3 seems to relate to cases where both
restricted and unrestricted property is in-
volved. In such case this Department can
only deal with the restricted property, leav-
ing the free property for disposal under lo-
cal law.
Regarding the general observations by
the said field representatives (authorÕs
note—Trowbridge and Gillman) as to restric-
tions in the regulations on the sale of rein-
deer, reference is made to the authority for
such regulations in section 39, title 48, U.S.
Code... (Trowbridge and Gillman, 1932).
By establishing the technical legality of many of
the Lomen purchases of reindeer, Trowbridge and
Gillman went on to conclude that Òthe Government
should not purchase existing reindeer marketing
facilities or establish competitive agenciesÓ (U.S. De-
partment of the Interior, 1933). At this particular
time, the Lomens had no wish to sell out to the gov-
ernment. Drastically reduced market potential
would cause the Lomens to change their minds
within a few years.
It was immediately apparent when the
Trowbridge—Gillman report was released in Febru-
ary, 1933, that the recommendations contained in
the Reindeer CommitteeÕs (1931) findings and the
actions of the field representatives were very differ-
ent. Superintendent Ben B. Mozee was fired from
the Reindeer Service and replaced by Lyman
Brewster, who had been one of the investigators with
Trowbridge and Gillman. In The Reindeer Problem
in Alaska, privately printed for Mozee (1933) in
Nome, he critically evaluated the actions and rec-
ommendations made in the Survey of the Alaska Re-
indeer Service, 1931—1933. While MozeeÕs point—by—
point evaluation cannot be repeated here, MozeeÕs
bitterness at the unfair treatment which the Natives
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received in the hands of Trowbridge and Gillman is
clear (Mozee, 1933). A telegram to Ray Lyman
Wilbur summed up his feelings. In that communi-
cation, he charged that Trowbridge, Gillman, and
Brewster conducted their investigations with preju-
dice, that they failed to learn the terminology of the
reindeer business, that they failed to spend enough
time in villages to make adequate investigations,
that they failed to review the records, and that they
were intentionally vindicating the Lomens at the
expense of the Native people whom the Reindeer
Service was supposed to serve (Mozee, 1933). In re-
action to the storm of protests that followed the re-
lease of the ÒSurvey,Ó MozeeÕs dismissal, and the
continuing Lomen domination of the Seward Pen-
insula, more investigations were undertaken.
The first investigation was conducted by the Di-
vision of Education of the Office of Indian Affairs
(OIA). The Alaska Division had responsibilities for
Indian education, health, and welfare, and, prior to
1929 and again after 1937, for reindeer. W. Cameron
Ryan, Jr., Director of the Division of Education, OIA,
submitted a confidential report on the reindeer situ-
ation in Alaska to the Secretary of Interior, dated
June 7, 1933, in which he reviewed the history of re-
indeer in Alaska and made the following comments:
The fundamental issue in the reindeer
controversy can be very simply stated: Is
the Government engaged in the reindeer en-
terprise primarily for the economic and so-
cial development of the Alaskan Native, or
for the benefit of private commercial inter-
ests?. . .
There can be but one answer: The
Alaska reindeer enterprise, so far as the
GovernmentÕs work with natives through
the Department of the Interior is concerned,
should be regarded as essentially a devel-
opmental and educational enterprise pri-
marily intended for the benefit of the Na-
tives.... This fundamental principle has
been almost completely overlooked in recent
handling of reindeer matters. Those in con-
trol have given considerable attention to the
questions of herd management and market-
ing (and rightly so) but they have largely
lost sight of the original purpose for which
the reindeer industry was established. . . .
The reindeer situation has been further
complicated by the type of private business
that has been influential in it. It is impos-
sible to read the testimony of the Lomens
themselves without coming to the conclu-
sion that here is a group that were deter-
mined by hook or by crook to get possession
of Native deer; that defied and denounced
government representatives engaged in
protecting the interests of Natives; that
would go to almost any lengths to achieve
their particular brand of business success.
It is important to be fair to this group, but
it is necessary to recognize it for what it is
Ñ an aggressive, domineering, cynical out-
fit, made bitter by the partial thwarting of
many of its grandiose schemes. (Ryan, 1933,
emphasis in the original).
On June 9, 1933, Special Agent Roy Nash began a
second investigation of the reindeer industry for the
Secretary of the Interior. On January 11, 1934, his
confidential report submitted to the Secretary of the
Interior was a Òreport adverse to the Lomen Rein-
deer CorporationÓ (Nash, 1934). The report consisted
of 140 pages of narrative with hundreds of additional
pages of appendices. In general, the report vindi-
cated the people who had all along protested the ac-
tions of the Lomens, as well as the actions of the
Field Representatives Trowbridge and Gillman.
Nash submitted recommendations regarding the
General Reindeer Superintendent for Alaska on No-
vember 15, 1933, even before his investigations were
complete. Among the recommendations made, he
suggested:
I. Elimination of Mr. Brewster as General
Reindeer Superintendent because of
Native opposition.
II. Reinstatement of Tom Lopp for two years
to replace Brewster while his succes-
sor is developed from the present Unit
Managers, Stafford, Briggs, Mattick
and Kendrick. Mr. Lopp was connected
with the education of Natives in Alaska
for thirty years, part of which was spent
as Chief of the Alaska Division.
III. If this is not approved, the reinstate-
ment of former Superintendent Mozee.
IV. If neither II nor III is accepted, the pro-
motion of District Manager Briggs to
the position of General Reindeer Super-
intendent. (Nash, 1933).
In his formal report, Nash went further by stating:
Since 1915, the Lomen Reindeer Corpo-
ration (now Northwestern Livestock Co.)
has been invading ranges long occupied by
government wards; forcing Eskimos to run
their reindeer with those of the corporation;
piling up huge herding and management
costs; taking restricted Indian property to
reimburse themselves for whatever they
considered the EskimosÕ share of those costs.
The corporation must be stopped in its
tracks right now and a complete separation
of white and Native herds effected.
Recommendations:
Administrative: Approval applications
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for grazing leases by Native companies on
Teller and Buckland ranges; deny applica-
tions of corporation for same, and order
Teller region vacated within twelve months;
abolish Reindeer Council; transfer Reindeer
Service to Office of Indian Affairs; give
Nunivak Islanders reindeer.
Legal: Determine titles to reindeer; de-
mand of the corporation an accounting for
the whole period and recover for their mis-
appropriation of restricted Indian property,
by court action if necessary.
Legislative: Revise law on marks and
brands; suggest to Congress a comprehen-
sive reindeer code.
International: Request Canada to check
earmarks and numbers in each mark when
receiving reindeer at mouth of the
Mackenzie River this spring. (Nash, 1934).
Within the body of NashÕs report are careful justi-
fications for each of the recommendations given
briefly above. His insight into the reindeer contro-
versy contrasts sharply with some of the previous
investigators. With reference to abolishing the re-
indeer council, he wrote:
Experience has not indicated that the
Reindeer Council fulfills any useful func-
tion; I recommend it be abolished.
A Reindeer Service with power, rather
than a committee for acrimonious discus-
sion is indicated. With any frontier service,
a maximum of trust and a minimum of red
tape is desirableÑso the original set—up be
such as to merit trust. (Nash, 1934, empha-
sis ours).
By 1934, it was obvious to the Lomens that they
would not be able to operate their reindeer—herding
business in the absence of large—scale markets in
the continental United States. With plenty of Na-
tive— owned reindeer available locally, there was no
Alaska market for Lomen reindeer. LomensÕ finan-
cial backers, the Baldwins, offered to sell the hold-
ings of the Lomen Reindeer Company to the United
States. Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes appointed
a committee consisting of Assistant Secretary Os-
car L. Shapman, E.K. Burlew, Harry Slattery (Per-
sonal Assistant to the Secretary), Paul W. Gordon
(Director of Education for Alaska), and J. Kennard
Cheadle Òto study and consider the question of policy in-
volved in a proposed trust of certain reindeer operations
for Natives of AlaskaÓ (Chapman Committee, 1934).
The BaldwinsÕ original proposal was made Decem-
ber 27, 1933, but was rejected because a combined
Native—Lomen operation of the reindeer business
would have entailed complicated legal and finan-
cial considerations, and a complex administration.
The BaldwinsÕ second proposal, dated June 26, 1934,
was accepted in principle by the Chapman Commit-
tee. They believed that Eskimo control of market-
ing was the solution to the reindeer problem and
concluded :
It is therefore proposed that the Gov-
ernment secure for the use and benefit of
the Natives such herds, range leases, abat-
toirs, cold storage plants and range equip-
ment as seem essential to return to the Alas-
kan Eskimos control of this industry and to
release them from the present controversies
and tensions. (Chapman Committee, 1934).
The Lomens were successful in securing a loan
approval from the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration in 1933 to aid their declining operation. Gov-
ernor Parks supported the loan application, which
had mentioned the value of the LomensÕ operation
as an employer of Eskimos. The basis for the RFC
loan appears to have been a December 31, 1932,
balance sheet by the Lomen Reindeer Corporation.
The herds were valued at $4,325,000 and the prop-
erty belonging to their various other reindeer en-
terprises at $4,611,068.87. But despite RFC approval
of the $1,247,500 loan, it was never granted (Lomen,
1954). Baldwin offered to sell all these assets for
$950,000:
Accordingly, I hereby offer to cause to be
transferred to the Government or its nomi-
nee, free of all liens and encumbrances, the
following property:
1. the entire herd of reindeer on Nunivak
Island.
2. Warehouses, corrals, and other herd
equipment, store stock of merchandise,
including accounts receivable from Na-
tives, and equipment other than float-
ing equipment.
3. All the reindeer belonging to the Alaska
Livestock and Packing Company in
Alaska, wherever located.
4. All range equipment, including corral
systems, wherever located.
5. The cold storage plants located at:
Egavik, Igloo Point, Baldwin, Teller,
Golovin, and the cold storage barge
ÒTrinderÓ now located at Baldwin.
6. The abattoirs located at: Egavik,
Baldwin, Teller, Golovin, and all other
buildings used in the slaughter or dressing
of reindeer. (Chapman Committee, 1934).
Naturally, the Chapman Committee was curious
as to why nearly nine million dollars of assets would
be offered for sale for less than one million dollars.
They recommended to Secretary Ickes that
BaldwinsÕ offer be accepted in principle, pending an
auditor Õs and appraiser Õs investigation of the
Lomen holdings. In addition, the committee asked
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for authorization to negotiate for the finances re-
quired to undertake the purchase.
Louis M. Warren was charged with auditing the
records of the Northwestern Livestock Corporation.
He examined only the records kept by the company
in Seattle, and noted that they were incomplete. A
thorough examination would have required him to
travel to Nome, which he did not do. In a January,
1935, report, he estimated that the Lomens owned
250,000 reindeer, a figure arrived at Òby computa-
tion based on statistics compiled in the early years
of the industryÓ (Warren Report, 1935); in other
words, on percentage increases in the herds. There
had been no complete reindeer roundup for over five
years, despite the fact that the Reindeer Commit-
tee (1931), Trowbridge—Gillman ÒSurveyÓ (1933), and
NashÕs investigations (1934) had all recommended
that one be held to determine numbers and owner-
ship (Warren Report, 1935).
At the time of WarrenÕs audit and report, it was
apparent that the LomensÕ reindeer business might
not survive.
The condition of the Northwestern Live-
stock Corporation and subsidiary compa-
nies, while not precarious, should be of great
concern to the officers and stockholders of
this enterprise. The companies have expe-
rienced heavy losses, resulting in a deficit
of over $500,000 for the period covered by
this report.
The causes of the present unfavorable
conditions may be summarized as follows:
Insufficient volume of business.
Too low a margin of gross profit; due in
a measure to the low meat prices that ob-
tained throughout the period.
Insufficient production resulting in high
unit cost.
Heavy fixed charges due to unproduc-
tive and idle equipment.
Extraordinary losses.
Borrowing of money with consequent
interest charges in order to furnish funds
for these purposes.
In general, a protracted depression in the
reindeer industry. (Warren Report, 1935).
In addition to the financial report on the North-
western Livestock Corporation, the government un-
dertook an appraisal of all of the physical structures
owned and operated by the Lomens. Architect N.
Lester Troast surveyed the structures, prepared
blueprints of them and their physical surroundings,
and appraised their value (Troast, 1935). TroastÕs
and WarrenÕs reports constituted the basis for estimat-
ing the amount of the appropriations needed to pur-
chase the Lomen holdings within the next few years.
In the summer of 1936, the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs held hearings concerning the status
of the reindeer industry and on general conditions
in Alaska. J. Sidney Rood, who had recently been
made the Acting General Reindeer Superintendent,
prepared testimony for the Committee. In his ÒState-
ment to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Re-
garding Reindeer in AlaskaÓ (1936), Rood urged that
legislation be introduced to grant authority to the
Reindeer Service to issue grazing leases, that Na-
tive—owned reindeer be established as restricted
property, and that white ownership be eliminated
from needed ranges by fair and equitable means.
A third investigation into the condition of Eski-
mos in northwestern Alaska, which included obser-
vations and recommendations concerning the rein-
deer industry, was prepared by Field Representa-
tive Oscar H. Lipps of the Office of Indian Affairs in
1936. Lipps was charged with evaluating the social
and economic status of Natives of northwestern
Alaska to determine how the provisions of the In-
dian Reorganization Act of May 1, 1936, could be
applied to them. Lipps noted the large numbers of
reindeer in the territory, the use the Natives made
of the animals, and the economic control which the
trading posts apparently had over the Eskimos
Òthrough extending credit until the Eskimos were
so deeply in debt that they are held virtually in a
semi—economic peonage to the traders and are no
longer free agents.Ó He found in addition that the
Native stores which had been organized in the past,
sometimes as part of the joint—stock reindeer com-
panies, to be Ò.. .under—capitalized and poorly man-
aged.Ó In his recommendations regarding the appli-
cation of the IRA to Eskimo villages, Lipps suggested
that the Reindeer Service to coordinate its plans with
those of other social welfare, health, and education
programs of the Office of Indian Affairs, and to uti-
lize the teachers as local reindeer supervisors. It
would also allow organized Native groups to Ò...se-
cure loans from the revolving credit fund to finance
this important enterpriseÓ (Lipps, 1936).
The passage of the Reindeer Act on September 1,
1937, (P.L. 50, Stat 900) came only after some tre-
mendous opposition on the part of some congress-
men. The basic objection to the bill centered on the
authorization of $2,000,000 to purchase private
property in Alaska at a time when economic condi-
tions in the United States were not secure. Some
congressmen did not think that the additional monies
spent to purchase reindeer and processing equip-
ment were called for when an appropriation for
managing reindeer affairs already existed. The re-
marks of Representative Rich of Pennsylvania to the
House on August 20, 1937, were typical.
Mr. Speaker, it is a mighty fine thing to
be a Santa Claus, but Santa Claus should
come only on Christmas. We have been a
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pretty good Santa Claus to the citizens of
Alaska. We have also seen a pretty good
Santa Claus to the Eskimos of Alaska.
When we had the Interior Department ap-
propriation bill up before the House, and
when the Delegate from Alaska (Mr.
Dimond) was before the Committee, he
made a special request to take care of the
Eskimos of Alaska. In that appropriation
bill we gave $33,500 to the Reindeer Ser-
vice in Alaska. They requested that we in-
crease the amount this year by $5,000. We
made an increase in the Interior Depart-
ment appropriation bill in order that we
might furnish reindeer enough to take care
of the Eskimos in Alaska, and I thought we
had done so, according to the request of the
Department.
Let us see now what this bill actually
does. A private corporation has been formed
in Alaska. This bill provides for the pur-
chase of cold—storage plants, an abattoir, a
system of corrals for these reindeer, and a
lot of camps and camping equipment. The
bill also provides, and this is in accordance
with the statement of a representative of
this corporation himself, for the purchase
of the corporation in which is included
250,000 reindeer. This is what he told me.
I asked what the value of these reindeer is,
and he said $3 apiece. Three dollars times
250,000 is $750,000. You are going to pay
$750,000 for reindeer, and you are going to
furnish $1,250,000 to buy up a lot of this
equipment and put the Government in the
slaughterhouse business. This is what you
are going to do. (U.S. Congress. House of
Representatives, 1937).
Administrative responsibilities for reindeer were
transferred to the Alaska Division of the Office of
Indian Affairs on July 1, 1937. With the Reindeer
Service in the Office of Indian Affairs, and with the
authority of the Reindeer Act behind it, the Rein-
deer Service set about reorganizing itself into an
effective agency. From February 13, 1936, to July 1,
1937, the Reindeer Service had been operating
within the Interior Department under the Division
of Territories and Island Possessions. Paul W. Gor-
don, then Chief of the Division, had been a powerful
ally of the Reindeer Service in its efforts to extin-
guish non—Native ownership of reindeer. In a
ÒMemorandum Regarding the Reindeer Service of
the Office of Indian AffairsÓ (1937), Rood summa-
rized the situation by the end of 1937. Native—owned
reindeer totaled 364,480 (67%) and non—Native—
owned totaled 179,520 (33%), for a total estimate of
544,000. The number of reindeer supposedly on all
ranges was reported. The need for special Native
assistants with all herds to carry out constant herd-
ing was stressed, as were the needs to appoint im-
mediately a General Reindeer Superintendent, de-
velop outside markets, fill funded Reindeer Service
positions, and purchase non—Native—owned reindeer
and property as authorized by the Reindeer Act.
In order to determine the actual number of rein-
deer and the value of the improvements owned by
all non—Natives, Congress authorized a committee
to study and estimate these figures in the summer
of 1938. The Reindeer Appraisal Committee (also
referred to as the Rachford Committee) investiga-
tion report was submitted to Congress (Rachford
Committee, 1938). It was rather curious that Con-
gress appointed an independent committee to assess
numbers of reindeer rather than asking the Rein-
deer Service for the data. The Rachford Committee
worked closely with members of the Reindeer Ser-
vice in Alaska to carry out their task. Congress took
until August, 1939, to appropriate the money autho-
rized under the Reindeer Act. Instead of the
$2,000,000 authorized, only $720,000 was appropri-
ated for the purchase of non—Native owned reindeer
and facilities and $75,000 for the administrative
expenses to extinguish the non—Native equity. These
amounts grew out of the work done by the Rachford
Committee in the summer of 1938. The appraisal
committee had only been able to find approximately
180,000 head of non—Native owned reindeer com-
pared with the claims of more than 500,000 animals
made by the non—Native owners in their declara-
tions of ownership following the passage of the Re-
indeer Act. The Rachford CommitteeÕs estimate of
180,000 reindeer was apparently accurate at the
time it was made (summer 1938), but for the later
Reindeer Acquisition Unit, additional roundups were
necessary. Four dollars a head was set as the maxi-
mum average cost for the purchase of animals.
Nunivak Island reindeer were exempted from this
maximum and higher prices could be paid on
Nunivak for individual animals. Chas. G. Burdick
was appointed Special Representative of the Secre-
tary of the Interior on November 1, 1939. Burdick
was given the responsibility for carrying out the pro-
visions of the Reindeer Act. Walter J. Clark was sent
as the Fiscal Agent from the Office of Indian Affairs.
Edward C. Kelly, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General, was added to the staff in February of 1940
to handle the legal aspects of the purchasing pro-
gram and to examine property titles. One fulltime
and one part—time clerk—stenographer were also
added to the staff. From the field, Burdick reported
that negotiations with some of the non—Native own-
ers were somewhat difficult.
Each wanted as much money as possible.
With few exceptions, claims submitted in
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1958, pursuant to the act of September 1,
1937, were greatly in excess of reindeer on
the range. Points of ten or more yearsÕ
standing were brought up by various own-
ers and settled. Questions of previous mark-
ings, reindeer gathered and driven to new
ranges by the government or others with
no check on ownership or recompense to the
claimants, Native killing of white—owned re-
indeer for food, fox—bait, or dog food, drift
of reindeer from range to range, co—owner-
ship on ranges where a stray ownership sta-
tus only was enjoyed, value of reindeer,
number of reindeer, decrease in white—
owned deer where no killing was done and
increase of Native ownership in the same
herds when the Natives were killing many
deer, allowance for the spring fawn crop of
1940Ñ all were discussed, worked out and
settled as equitably as possible for both the
vendor and the Government. (Burdick, 1940).
The roundups and purchases were finally com-
pleted during the winter of 1939—1940. In contrast
to the 500,615 reindeer claimed in declarations of
ownership provided in 1938, and the 180,000 esti-
mate of the Rachford Committee in 1938, only 84,001
were actually rounded up and purchased by the gov-
ernment. The Alaska Livestock and Packing Com-
pany, claiming 260,000, sold only 25,000. The
Nunivak Development Co. (Northwestern Livestock
Co.) claimed 15,000, and actually sold 17,000. Other
claims were six to eight times higher than the num-
bers eventually found and sold. The winter of 1938—
1939 had been an especially severe one, with heavy
snowfall, intense predation, and spring storms. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that a real reduction from
500,000 animals to 84,000 actually took place. A
more satisfactory explanation is that the original
claims were exaggerated in the hope that the gov-
ernment would purchase reindeer based solely on
the numbers claimed, without conducting a roundup.
The figures provided by the Rachford Committee
would tend to support this conclusion.
For nearly $500,000, the Federal government
ended the non—Native involvement in the produc-
tion and processing of reindeer in Alaska. ÒWith our
withdrawal from the industry, we could think only
that it would be interesting, and doubtless not a little
heart rending, to sit back and watch how the Govern-
ment would deal with the problemÓ (Lomen, 1954).
BurdickÕs report (1940) of the Reindeer Acquisi-
tion Unit summarized the actual expenditures:
Appropriation  $795,000.00
Reindeer purchased  333,003.00
Improvements purchased 112,925.72
Administrative costs 45,673.48
Total actual cost of acquisition program $491,602.20
Decline in reindeer herds is probably the chief
characteristic of the 1930s. The reasons for the de-
cline in reindeer during this time and in the 1940s
are numerous. While some authorities place greater
or lesser emphasis on one or another reason, it is
most reasonable to assume that all the factors in
combination were operating to reduce the herd size.
Predation by wolves, and in a few reported cases by
coyotes, was intense on some herds (U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, n.d.). Changing migration routes
and the increasing numbers of animals in the west-
ern Arctic and other caribou herds of the territory
took away many reindeer. Since reindeer tend to join
caribou herds which move through their range, this
event was not unexpected. Informants recount that
the thousands of caribou which passed through sim-
ply swallowed up the reindeer herds as they passed.
The herds between Cape Krusenstern on the west,
the Noatak River on the east, and Wainwright on
the north were particularly impacted by caribou
during the 1930s.
In addition to predation and caribou losses, some
additional causes can be found for the decline of the
reindeer industry, such as disease, poor herd man-
agement which resulted in straying, and overgraz-
ing. The inability to fulfill reward expectations
caused many persons to abandon their herds, espe-
cially when confronted with massive losses of ani-
mals from causes that appeared to be beyond their
control. During the Great Depression, the income
from fox trapping also decreased and caused many
herders who had trapped while tending their own
(or company) herds to abandon this practice as well
as to move into established villages (Burch, 1975).
By 1936, reindeer were distributed from Barter
Island to the Yukon—Kuskokwim delta area and be-
yond. Table 10 and Figure 4 show the distribution
of reindeer in northwestern Alaska, including the
Seward Peninsula and the various ranges allocated
to the various herd owners by the United States Re-
indeer Service. Data for Figure 4 and Table 10 are
taken from an original map in the National Archives
Building (Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs), prepared by J. Sidney Rood.
Chapter V
Native ownership and
the period of
reconstruction: 1940—1977
Following the purchase of non—Native—owned re-
indeer by the United States Government in 1940,
reindeer herding moved into an entirely new phase
which lasts through the present. The policy of the
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Bureau of Indian Affairs has been to encourage the
development of individual ownership, based on a
Lapp—like model of ownership and herd management.
The reindeer industry we hope to create
for the future is this: one which is similar
to LaplandÕs, namely individual enterpris-
ers and their herder—partners, maintaining
vigilant custody of such breeding—stock as
they can manage, grazing their stock within
natural grazing units under Government
authority on a head basis. The number of
head they will attempt to manage with a
single herding crew will be 3,000 or less be-
cause they themselves will find the law of
diminishing returns operative if they at-
tempt handling more. Keeping within the
amounts of reindeer which the Government
permits herders to graze, the number and
size of herds will be lim-
ited by the rewards which
herders are able to obtain
from herd crops: supply
and demand. This will
cause some to fail, others
to thrive. Competition be-
tween herding crews will
exist; they will be actuated
by fear of losing money by
losing strays, by hope of
extra rewards for espe-
cially good management,
by pride in demonstrating
their efficiency to other
herders, by shame should
they fail. We hope to develop
the Natives to develop rein-
deer so that, little by little,
the Government can reduce
supervision to the mini-
mum needed to protect
pastures, acquaint owners
with more efficient tech-
niques, and give owners
freedom Ñ to do what they
ought with regard to the
rights of others. (Rood,
1943, original emphasis).
It is ironic to note that it has
taken up to the present time to
reach these goals. The grazing
units are now government deter-
mined and controlled through a
system of grazing permits issued
by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment. The reindeer industry now
consists largely of individual
ownership of herds. The Reindeer
Herders Association, through its contract with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, attempts to acquaint own-
ers with more efficient techniques. In all these
things, the government, both state and Federal, has
reduced its role to the minimum needed to protect
pastures.
During World War II, the reindeer industry was
largely ignored in the face of global conflict. Some
experimental clothing was manufactured, so that for
a brief time the demand for calf skins and leggings
was high. By the end of World War II, AlaskaÕs herds
were reduced to less than 100,000 animals. The gen-
eral overall effect of the war years on the Natives of
Alaska cannot be ignored either. For the first time
in their lives, many young men traveled great dis-
tances beyond their local regions. They saw the many
modern conveniences of the outside world, learned
of different living conditions elsewhere in the United
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States, and were taught new skills. As many of these
newly acquired skills could not be used in the vil-
lages, some never returned and others who did come
back were dissatisfied with the life and conditions
they found there. The increased use of airplanes and
the establishment of health facilities, radio, and all—
weather landing strips in virtually every village
caused further changes in the values of the Eski-
mos of northwestern Alaska.
As discussed previously, the administration of re-
indeer had been transferred from the Office of the
Governor of Alaska to the Alaska Division of the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs in 1937. Within the BIA, the
Division of Education had administrative responsi-
bility until March 1941, when reindeer administra-
tion was internally transferred. This time, the move
was from the Division of Education to the Division
of Extension and Industry and the Division of For-
estry and Grazing. ÒThis transfer placed adminis-
tration of the reindeer industry on the same basis
as that prevailing for the Indian range and livestock
resources on the various reservations located in the
StatesÓ (Arnold et al., 1941).
The 1940s
In the summer of 1941, L.D. Arnold, Director of
Forestry; A.C. Cooley, Director of Extension and In-
dustry; Frank B. Lenzie, Regional Forester at Spo-
kane; and John M. Cooper, Director of the Sheep
Breeding Laboratory at Fort Wingate, New Mexico,
visited Alaska to observe and report on the status
and management of reindeer in Alaska (Arnold et
al., 1941). Their report contained an itinerary of their
travel, a brief history of the reindeer industry, and
the current state of knowledge concerning reindeer
husbandry, grazing, range requirements, losses,
range management, research, and administration.
They accepted Sheldon JacksonÕs original premise
that reindeer were introduced for the benefit of the
Natives who were in dire need of food to replace the
animals lost to Euro—American whalers and the cari-
bou decline. They note that Ò. . the policy of the Gov-
ernment is to assist the Natives in the conduct of their
business on a subsistence basisÓ (Arnold et al., 1941).
Among the conclusions reached and recommen-
dations made by the investigators, great emphasis
was placed on improved herding and husbandry
methods. Based on their experiences with grazing
and range management in the lower 48, the investi-
gators believed that for the reindeer industry:
...the most effective steps that can be taken
to halt reindeer losses are: (1) Constant herd-
ing; (2) An intensive campaign for the control
of wolves; (3) Improved corral handlings; (4)
Improvement in methods of handling and
slaughter of deer; and (5) Research on range
and stock management, the control of para-
sites, and the utilization of meat, skins, and
slaughter by—products. (Arnold et al., 1941).
Two other problems facing the industry were also
addressed: association ownership and administra-
tion. It was recommended that ownership of rein-
deer by the associations be continued, Ò...but that
every effort should be made toward (a) future op-
eration that will insure an improvement in deer
management, maintenance of range, and a greater
income in terms of meat and skins to the Native
stockholdersÓ (Arnold et al., 1941). The investigating
Table 10. Reindeer herd operations in northwest
Alaska, 1936.
Northwestern District:
Barrow Unit
1. Brower Brothers Herd
2 Farthest North Reindeer Co. herds
3. Wainwright Reindeer Co. herds
4. Pt. Hope Reindeer and Trading Co. herds
5. Kivalina—Noatak Reindeer Co.
6. Kotzebue Sound Reindeer Co. herds
7. Noorvik Reindeer Co. herds
Buckland Unit
8. Selawik Reindeer and Trading Co. herds
9. Shungnak Reindeer and Trading Co. herds
10. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co.,
Kotzebue herd
11. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co. and
 Buckland Eskimo Reindeer Co. herds
12. Deering Reindeer Co. herd
13. Nuglunuktuk Reindeer Co. herd
Seward Peninsula District:
Teller Unit
14. Shishmaref Reindeer Co. herd
15. Allockeok herd
16. Cape Reindeer Assoc. herd
17 Alaska Livestock and Packing Co. and
native herd (Teller)
18. Inland Reindeer Assoc. herd
19. Igloo Reindeer Assoc. herd
Nome—Golovin Unit
20. Nome—Douglas Reindeer Assoc. herd
21. Council Native Reindeer Assoc. herd
22. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co. Golovin herds
23. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co.
Upper Koyuk herds
24. Elim Reindeer Assoc. herd Egavik Unit
25. Koyuk Reindeer Assoc. herd
26. Shaktoolik Reindeer Assoc. herd
27. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co. Egavik herd
Unalakleet Unit
28. Unalakleet Grazing Assoc. herd
Numerous additional herds were located south of the area
covered by figure 4. These herds fall beyond the geographic
scope of this report and are not illustrated.
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committee also found the administrative set—up of
the Reindeer Service: Ò...logical, and will work to ad-
vantage providing adequate facilities and person-
nel are furnished to carry it onÓ (Arnold et al., 1941).
These two problems were both resolved as an un-
planned consequence of the American entry into
World War II.
It was apparent to some people in the Reindeer
Service, even in 1942, that the stock associations
were a failure. Rood, the General Reindeer Super-
intendent, observed that the associations were ruled
by Òindifferent owners,Ó who by their large numbers
and votes could very democratically send their as-
sociations towards ruin and create disharmony be-
tween small owners and good herders.
These incompetent association—debating
societies, governed by the votes of untutored
people who knew nothing about shares, per-
centages, accounts, taxes, dividends, pa-
pers, or intricate business of any formal
type, and most of whom evinced no desire
to manage herds properly, created a disas-
trous balance of nature (when the wolves
found reindeer to be an easy prey in the
1930s). We should allow these associations
to die by hurrying conveyance of their re-
maining reindeer to whatever individual
stockholder will manage them. (Rood, 1943).
Rood also stated that the government erred in urg-
ing the formation of stock associations. In his opinion,
it was a Òre—enunciation of an earlier faulty policy of
distributing reindeer to all NativesÓ (Rood, 1943). Rood
observed that not all Natives would make good herd-
ers, and that ownership should be confined to a few
individuals and their herder—partners. Others now
share this same opinion (Olson, 1969).
Rood (1943) presented some good comments and
insights, which are worth repeating, into the prob-
lems facing the industry at the start of World War
II. Based on excerpts from letters of local school
teachers, who were also the local reindeer supervi-
sors, and RoodÕs own comments, the following prob-
lems could be listed:
1) No close herding has been done in the Bering
Unit (Seward Peninsula) for several years.
2) Absentee ownership discouraged good
herding practices. Absentee ownership of
57.5% at Wales, 44.3% at Igloo, 44% at
Deering, 16.4% at Inland Association,
23.5% at Shishmaref, and 33.3% at Teller
were reported.
3) Wolf predation took substantial numbers
of animals.
4) Good reindeer were slaughtered from all
herds as feed for dog teams.
5) Lack of year—round herding, with accom-
panying lack of interest is herd welfare,
resulted in indiscriminate killing (No. 4
above) and a failure to return butchering
permits (illegal killing).
At the start of World War II, the military activi-
ties at Nome were substantially enlarged. A good
market was therefore created locally for reindeer
meat. Both the military and civilian defense work-
ers provided the market. Merchants could not store
enough meat in their cold storage facilities to meet
the demands as such facilities had been built for
the lower prewar demand. Ironically, attempts to
round up animals for sale in this newly established
and lucrative market were largely unsuccessful. This
was due primarily to the NativeÕs more intense in-
terest in obtaining wage labor, hunting, and/or fish-
ing rather than tending to the herds. A few associa-
tion members did go out and butcher for meat sales.
As it developed, they very often made good money
from animals which were not entirely theirs. Find-
ing competent herders was also nearly impossible
as wages for longshoring and other jobs offered a
minimum of $1.00 per hour.
Increased labor expenses for herding made it dif-
ficult to attract and hold qualified herders within
the government herds as well. The General Rein-
deer Superintendent wrote to Claude M. Hirst, the
General Superintendent of the Alaska Indian Service:
In March, 1941, constant herding was com-
menced (with the Golovin Government herd
of 3,000 reindeer). The best Native herders
in the region were engaged. They quit in
June, 1941, to take advantage of opportuni-
ties for high wages at longshoring, freight-
ing and mining. Other able—bodied, energetic
Natives in this region had also procured sum-
mer and fall work at high wages. We tried to
hire Elim Natives; they were engaged by the
CAA on the Moses Point airfield at $6.50 per
day.... The only way we could hold them (the
original herders hired back in the fall) would
be to increase their pay to at least $600 per
month for the staff. (Rood, 1942).
In private industry, semiskilled laborers were able to
earn up to $540 per month. The government reindeer
herds could not afford to compete with such wages
with their budget constraints. At this time, govern-
ment herds existed at Escholtz Bay (6,000), Golovin
(3,000), Naknek (2,500—3,000), Nunivak Island
(19,650), Hooper Bay (1,500), and Egavik (1,000).
An overall management plan needed to be devel-
oped to place all government—owned reindeer into
Native hands. ÒThe GovernmentÕs aim is not to op-
erate a Government reindeer businessÓ (Rood, 1942).
Providing financing aid to interested Natives and bet-
ter management of breeding stock already in Native
hands were crucial to setting the reindeer industry on
its feet after the elimination of non—Native owners.
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Wartime inflation reduced the effective operating bud-
get of the Reindeer Service and additional funding
or administrative support was not forthcoming.
After the purchase of non—Native herds was com-
pleted in 1940, the Reindeer Service attempted to re-
organize itself and to establish the range rules and
regulations as authorized in the 1937 Reindeer Act.
The proposed rules and regulations caused much de-
bate within the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Some criti-
cized the proposed regulations as being too detailed
and not providing enough general policy guidelines for
the industry and its development. Other critics con-
tended that the proposed rules and regulations made
it too difficult for interested Natives to obtain the newly
acquired government reindeer. The central issue in the
debate focused on the direction in which the govern-
ment was going in the distribution of reindeer to Na-
tives and not so much on the appropriateness of the
rules and regulations for the management of the rein-
deer industry in Alaska. It was not until the late 1940s
that a definite policy on the lending of reindeer to quali-
fied individuals was formulated.
When the government acquired thousands of re-
indeer in 1940, the plan was to use some as model
herds and to lend the remainder to individuals who
showed an interest in and an ability in herding. A
policy of lending small herds of 300 to 800 animals
was started with the provision that the loan was to
be repaid after a number of years. From 1947 to
1953, the government ran a herd at Escholtz Bay
which served as the primary source for loan deer.
Chester Sevick, an experienced herder, was placed
in charge of this particular herd (Sevick,1973).
Starting in 1944, the Bureau of Indian Affairs be-
gan a Òrepayment in kindÓ program. Reindeer from
the Government—owned herds were lent to individu-
als who wanted to operate a reindeer herd. After a
period of years, the herd operator was required to
pay back to the government the same number of ani-
mals he had been lent to start his herd. From 1944
to 1952, 2,356 head were lent directly to Natives on
the Seward Peninsula and in the Kotzebue Sound
region. Animals were taken from the Escholtz Bay
Government Herd to start seven new herds (see
Table 11).
Seventeen small herds were started during the
1950s, but by 1960 only ten (including government
herds) contained more than 1,000 reindeer. The
herds on the periphery of the expanding caribou
populationÕs grazing areas lost more animals to the
migrating caribou than were born (compare Figures
5 and 6). Between 1947 and 1952, thousands of re-
indeer were lost: Barrow, three herds lost, 1950—51;
Wainwright, 1,100 head lost in 1947; Point Hope,
250 head lost in early 1948; Kivalina herd completely
lost, 1947; Mickey ThomasÕ herd borrowed from
Kugruk Company placed with Escholtz Bay herd
upon his death in 1950; Topkok herd lost to wolves
and over butchering 1950; Nelson Island herd lost
to wolves and over butchering in 1947; Government
Egavik herd transferred to St. Michael after wolf
losses in 1948; and Hooper Bay herd, suffering heavy
losses in 1947—1948, was moved to St. Michael in
1950 (Anon., 1953). Throughout the BIA Annual
Land Operations reports for the 1950s there were
pleas for additional money and personnel so that
the program could be made effective (U.S. Govern-
ment, BIA, 1950—1960).
Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 and Tables 12, 13, and 14
require some explanation. Not all of the herds ex-
tant in Alaska for the years 1948, 1958, and 1968,
respectively, are listed. Only those herds in the geo-
graphic region of concern relevant to this report are
listed, that is, northwest Alaska. Secondly, Figures
7 and 8 and Table 14 are limited to the Seward Pen-
insula and do not show herds at Shaktoolik or
Stebbins. Next, the column indicating the number
of years in operation may be a confusing number.
The years given are the number of years the owner/
operator has had control of that particular herd. The
herd may have existed in that village or region un-
der different ownership/management prior to gov-
ernment purchase or loan. For example, the Escholtz
Bay Government herd Ò...was started with 4,500 re-
indeer from Teresa Creek corrals from the old Lomen
herds in 1941. In 1942, an additional 1,500 head
were driven from the Deering range to the Kotzebue
range. During the first winter, the herd suffered a
loss from straying of 1,500 headÓ (Rouse et al., 1948).
Lastly, some herds have been consolidated or other-
wise recombined during the ten year intervals be-
tween the various figures. For example, the rem-
nants of the Stalker herd at Noatak/Kotzebue
formed the basis for the Government Demonstra-
tion Herd based at Nome starting in 1965. In the
fall of 1974, this herd was turned over to NANA Re-
indeer Enterprises, Inc. The NANA herd ranges on
the Baldwin Peninsula, the northern shores of
Escholtz Bay, and the Kiwalik River area, all of
which was formerly under permit to Lawrence Gray
Table 11. Herds established 1944—1952.
Date Owner Number loaned
1946 Lawrence Gray 500 head
1951 Charley Clark 850 head
1944 York Wilson and Henry Weber 1,066 head
1948 Ross Stalker  856 head
1945  Siegfried Aukongak 500 head
1950 Johnny Kakarak 500 head
1952 Andrew Skin 868 head
(Anon., 1953).
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and Charlie Clark, respectively.
Figure 5 and Table 12 illustrate the location of
reindeer herds in 1948; Figure 6 and Table 13, 1958;
and Figure 7 and Table 14, 1968. A comparison of
Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 shows the changing distribu-
tion of reindeer throughout the last 40 years. On
these maps, the areas indicated as not having herds
were not totally without reindeer at this time, par-
ticularly on the Seward Peninsula. Scattered rein-
deer belonging to the old company herds roamed un-
attended throughout the Seward Peninsula. A few
Eskimos rounded up the remnants of these scattered
herds and they were used as the nucleus for private
herd operations during the 1940s and 1950s. The
numbers in parentheses after the Òvillage or regionÓ
designation in Tables 12, 13, and 14 refer to the lo-
cations of the herds as shown in the Figures 5, 6,
and 7 for the years 1948, 1958, and 1968, respec-
tively. The boundaries of the locations are approxi-
mate and are taken from descriptions of the herdsÕ
locations given in the various Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs Land Operations reports (BIA, 1958, 1968) and
the Rouse, Mountjoy and Belcher (1948) report. The
Bureau of Land Management did not assign grazing
permits for the modern herds until 1962, although the
old General Land Office had taken applications and
issued some grazing permits for reindeer in the
1920s and 1930s under the authority of the Alaska
Grazing Act of March 4, 1927 (44 Stat. 1452).
Between 1944 and 1945, the Reindeer Service was
again reorganized. When the Service was originally
placed under the administration of the Division of
Extension and Industry and the Division of Forestry
and Grazing (1941—1944), seven administrative
units were used for the management of the reindeer
industry. These seven were reduced to three: Arctic
Unit, Bering Unit, and Yukon—Kuskokwim Unit.
This change reflected the decreasing number of ani-
mals in the territory and the declining government
support for the industry during World War II. Between
1944 and 1947, the supervisory personnel working
with reindeer were further reduced from a staff of
five (one Reindeer Supervisor and four Unit Man-
agers) to one Unit Manager.
The newly purchased government reindeer were
kept in several herds during World War II. The
Escholtz Bay herd became the nucleus for many Na-
tive loans, the first of which was made in 1944. Gov-
ernment—operated herds were also located at
Golovin, Egavik, Hooper Bay, Nunivak Island, and
St. Michael—Stebbins (a mixed government/privately
run herd) (Rouse et al., 1948). A number of herds
Table 12. Reindeer herd operations, government and private, 1948.
Village or Years in Estimated
geographic area Operator operation herd size
Nunivak Island Government 8 purchased
10,000
Hooper Bay Government 15 500
(Niles Smith, Chief Herder)
St. Michael—Stebbins Mixed government and privately owned 8 400
(Dan Boucher, Chief Herder)
Egavik (1) Government 8 220
Escholtz Bay (2) Government 8 3,750
(Chester Sevick, Chief Herder)
Golovin (3) Government loan to Siegfried Aukongak 2 1,177
Kiwalik (Candle) (4) Mickey Thomas 2 600
Kotzebue (5) Henry Weber and York Wilson 4 2,600
Selawik (6) Charlie Smith 3 1,332
Shungnak (7) Lawrence Gray 3 400
Point Hope (8) Point Hope Reindeer Co. ca. 25 250
Kivalina—Noatak (9) Kivalina—Noatak Reindeer Co. ca. 25 100
(remnant herd)
Wainwright (10) Wainwright Reindeer Assoc. ca. 25 300
Cape Halkett (11) Cape Halkett Assoc. reindeer borrowed 2 400
by Steven Reuben
Barrow (12) Albert Hopson reindeer borrowed from 2 600
Northern Frontier Assoc.
Barrow (13) Tommy Brower 44 1,250
Teller (14) Fred Topkok (Topkok Reindeer Co.) 4 650
(The numbers in parentheses refer to Figure 5). (Source: Rouse, Mountjoy, and Belcher, 1948).
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under Native control also continued to operate dur-
ing World War II. By 1948, of the seventeen herds
under various forms of management and control, six
were government owned or were newly established
loan herds, one was a mixed government/privately
owned herd, and the reminder were in private hands
(see Figure 5 and Table 12). Range conditions were
reported as generally good. Problems with wolves
were reported as less serious than they had been a
decade, or even five years earlier (Rouse et al., 1948).
Uncertainty about the best course for Government
policy caused much examination of the reindeer in-
dustry in the early 1950s. An internal memorandum
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs is worth quoting at
some length. While phrased in somewhat ethnocen-
tric terms concerning the EskimoÕs cultural behavior,
the problems identified are, to a certain extent, the
problems which continue to confound reindeer herd-
ers and resource managers in
northwest Alaska today.
In addition to the problem
of reduced supervisory person-
nel, the newly established
herds faced social and eco-
nomic difficulties as reported
in the 1953 Bureau of Indian
Affairs manuscript:
Generally it is difficult
to get new borrowers
started. They have no
money, very few items of
the equipment which is
needed, and no funds to
pay labor. Either they
must have a Nunivak
loan for butchering to
provide cash, or they
must be permitted to
butcher some of the bor-
rowed deer immediately.
They lack an adequate
sense of money manage-
ment. Money on hand is
to be spent without ad-
equate consideration of
possible needs next week
or month. Borrowers are
reluctant to take herds
into a strange grazing area
with the possibility of not
having extra help available
when needed.
Current Problems
1. It is difficult to get
the people to constantly
do a good job of herding.
This is partly due to a
carry over from management practices of an
earlier day and partially due to the problem
of getting people to change a way of life from
a hunting and fishing economy to a pastoral
economy.
2. Other jobs are more attractive, pay
higher wages, and the people can live in the
villages with their friends.
3. Good winter range is scarce. There are
areas where good winter feed is available but
generally it is far inland where herders do
not want to take herds or there is danger of
caribou taking the herd.
4. Young men are not particularly inter-
ested in reindeer. They will work for a while
at herds but are not interested in making a
lifeÕs work of reindeer.
5. The elements are difficult to combat.
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Table 13. Reindeer herd operations, government and private, 1958.
Years in Estimated
Village or region Operator operation herd size
Nunivak Island Nunivak Development Project 18 10,349
(government owned)
Stebbins Stebbins Community Assoc. 18 2,700
Unalakleet and Egavik (1) John Kotongan 4 650
Selawik and Kotzebue (2) George Keats and Lawrence Gray plus 13 2,065
government—owned Escholtz Bay reindeer herd
Golovin (3) Siegfried Aukongak 12 5,231
Candle (Kiwalik) (4) Charlie Clark 7 3,500+
Noorvik (5) Louis Commack 2 900
Selawik (6) William Sheldon 1 1,000
Selawik (7) Andrew Skin 3 1,800
Buckland (8) Paul Hadley 5 1,500
Deering (9) Edward Karmun and Elmer Thomas 0.5 1,100
Cape Espenberg (10) Harold Dimmick and Fred Goodhope, Sr. 0.5 1,562
Teller(ll) Johnny Kakaruk 8 2,250
Noatak (12) Ross and Johnson Stalker 2 1,097
 (The numbers in parentheses refer to Figure 6). (Source: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1958).
Summer herding must be on foot and the
mosquitoes are numerous. Winter cold, snow
and blizzards are to be contended with.
Permanent camps or houses cannot very well
be constructed due to the high cost and the
fact that the herds should be kept on the move.
6. Herders with children should have the
children in school. Yet a herder if he is to re-
main in camp wants his family with him. A
man without a woman in camp to cook and
keep his clothing repaired is in for a tough time.
Also, they are unable to attend church services.
7. Although they are born and raised in
the country, Natives do not like the cold, the
storms, etc., any better than anybody else.
They do not like to herd out of the immedi-
ate area where they know the country.
8. They do not care for the continuous re-
sponsibility and grind of herding. They prefer
to hunt and fish but they do this when the
weather conditions and the mood suits them.
9. Although wolves are not numerous they
do kill deer and make herding more difficult.
They are worse in the winter probably due
to scarcity of other food. (Anon., 1953).
Although an attitude of wanting to help Òrehabili-
tateÓ the reindeer industry was present in the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs in the late 1940s, a counter—
attitude existed also.
We believe there is another point that
should be given careful consideration, and
that is the need of reindeer by the Natives.
There is no question but that at the time the
reindeer herds were established, they were
badly needed by the Natives. Since that time,
however, there has been a substantial change
in the economy of the Natives, especially dur-
ing the past 5 or 6 years. The various activi-
ties of the armed forces and other agencies
of the Federal government in Alaska have
greatly increased the employment opportu-
nities of the Natives. The establishment of
airports and an efficient radio system have
greatly facilitated transportation and com-
munication. These improvements no doubt
had a material effect on the economy of the
Natives and their dependence on the wild-
life resources for subsistence and clothing.
We believe that the survey which the Gen-
eral Superintendent now proposes to conduct
in cooperation with the Fish and Wildlife
Service should determine whether the rein-
deer herds are an essential part of the
economy of the Natives of all parts of Alaska.
(Arnold, 1948).
The proposed survey was undertaken by Charles
H. Rouse, biologist, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service;
Charles R. Mountjoy, Director of Native Resources,
Alaska Native Services; and Dale M. Belcher, Assis-
tant Director of Native Resources, Alaska Native
Services (Rouse et al., 1948). Conditions seemed fa-
vorable for a revitalization of the industry. The re-
indeer survey, made jointly by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the Alaska Native Service in
1948, concluded that:
There is sufficient foundation stock with
which to build and range conditions are suf-
ficiently good to allow for some expansion.
There is a definite need for reindeer prod-
ucts and the market for these products in a
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limited amount within the Territory ap-
pears stable. Since the establishment of
new herds is dependent largely upon the
number available from Government owned
herds, it will be possible to control the num-
ber of herds and the range allotments which
they occupy. In order to prevent a recur-
rence of the too rapid development of the
reindeer herds, it appears advisable to limit
the number of herds that can be established
and also see that each operator limits his
herd to a number he can adequately care
for. This should ordinarily not be over 2,000
head. If the herds are maintained near the
principal markets along the Bering Sea and
Arctic coasts it should be possible to dis-
pose of surpluses readily and at sufficient
profit to provide a reasonably good liveli-
hood for a limited number
of families engaged in rais-
ing these animals. To facili-
tate the orderly develop-
ment of this industry, an ad-
ministrative force of the fol-
lowing personnel is recom-
mended: Assistant Director
of Native Resources, Range
Examiner, Agricultural Ex-
tension Agent, Fieldmen (2).
As the industry develops it
may be necessary to expand
this force to keep pace with
the work required. (Rouse et
al., 1948).
The 1950s
By 1953, thirteen years after the
government had acquired the
non—Native interests, some offi-
cials in the BIA felt that it would
be best for the bureau to withdraw
from its activities connected with
the reindeer industry. A conference
concluded:
1 The Reindeer Act of 1937
should be amended to allow
for greater flexibility in de-
veloping the reindeer indus-
try and not restrict it to Na-
tives only.
2. Present Government
owned reindeer on the main-
land of Alaska should be
loaned, if possible, and range
permitting, to the present
Native reindeer operators
for the purpose of building
up their herds into economic units and for loans
to carefully selected new applicants in estab-
lishing themselves in the reindeer business.
3. Loans are to be made on a cash basis
and not Òin kindÓ.
4. A program to be worked out for turning
the reindeer on Nunivak Island over to the
Native people as soon as possible.
5. Arrangements are to be made for all Gov-
ernment owned reindeer on the other islands
to be loaned to selected Natives or turned
over to the Fish and Wildlife Service, if in-
terested, otherwise sold to the highest bidders.
6. Control of the ranges to be established
and the agency responsible for it determined.
7. Director Wade on his return to
Alaska...to work out tentative legislation for
it which would enable the Bureau of Indian
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Affairs) to carry out the foregoing conclu-
sions. (U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1953b).
By and large, all of the goals outlined at the con-
clusion of the conference were achieved by 1970,
without any additional legislation, with the excep-
tion of the amendment to the Reindeer Act. Nunivak
Island reindeer were turned over to Mekoryuk Na-
tives (Bering Sea Reindeer Products) in 1970. In
1968, in a cooperative agreement with the State of
Alaska, the BIA, and the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, the latter agency undertook the supervision
of ranges.
During the 1950s an occasional flight for the pur-
pose of shooting wolves was made by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service predator control
agents. The Territorial Division of Game was basi-
cally reluctant to use public funds to assist indi-
vidual business enterprises. This attitude of view-
ing the reindeer herders as businessmen on a par
with the cattle ranchers of the continental United
States has continued to the present day within some
agencies of government.
Starting in 1959, the BIA and the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service undertook a cooperative
agreement to operate an airplane based in Kotzebue
for predator control. The predator control agent of
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service work-
ing with the Range Conservation Officer of BIA aided
the herders by shooting wolves and dropping poi-
soned bait. Herders themselves reported consider-
able predation on herds. They also shot wolves with
some regularity. Grizzly bears were also shot by the
herders, especially in the spring calving season. At
Nunivak Island, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife also aided BIAÕs Nunivak Island Develop-
ment Project through the aircraft cooperative agree-
ment. In 1965, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife did not receive an appropriation to continue
predator control in Alaska. Consequently, the BIA
undertook to fund the program. In 1966, known
losses to Seward Peninsula herds from wolves, foxes,
bears, and wolverines were estimated at 615 calves
and 440 adult reindeer. A federal ban on aerial wolf
hunting went into effect in 1971. With the excep-
tion of a short—lived, aerial hunting program in the
winter of 1976—77, predator control has been entirely
in the hands of the herders since the late 1960s. On
some ranges, predation has been a persistent prob-
lem over the last 20 years. The eastern ranges on
Seward Peninsula seem especially prone to wolf pre-
dation, possibly by wolf populations which gener-
ally prey on the western Arctic caribou herd.
During the same period from World War II to the
early 1970s, caribou returned in ever increasing
numbers to the regions of northwestern Alaska
where they had been previously unsighted for de-
cades. Ranges occupied by reindeer were increas-
ingly being traversed by the returning caribou herds.
Many reindeer were quickly lost to these migrating
herds. Because of the loose or ÒopenÓ herding which
was practiced, losses to caribou continued to be a
major cause for the herd failures throughout the
1950s and 1960s (see Tables 13, 14). By the mid—
1960s, active reindeer herds were no longer present
north or northeast of Kotzebue Sound. Losses to
caribou and wolf predation were identified as the
major causes for the decline of herds in that area.
The increased numbers of caribou created a two—
fold problem for the herders. On the one hand, the
migratory caribou tended to ÒstealÓ reindeer who
joined with the moving caribou. On the other hand,
the presence of caribou, and a year round, open hunt-
ing season with no limit on caribou take until the fall
of 1976, decreased the market potential for reindeer.
Despite the failure of many herds located between
Noatak and Barrow, the Kobuk and Selawik Rivers,
and south of Norton Sound during the 1950s, a num-
ber of newly established herds did survive. This
Table 14. Reindeer herd operations, government and private, Seward Peninsula, 1968.
Years in Estimated
Village or region Operator operation herd size
Nunivak Island (Mekoryuk) Government 28 10,200
Golovin (1) Siegfried Aukongak 22 4,500
Candle (2) Charlie Clark 17 984
Selawik (3) Lawrence Gray 23 1,250
Buckland (4) Paul Hadley 15 1,947
Deering (5) Alfred Karmun and James Moto, Jr. 5 1,914
Shishmaref (6) Fred Goodhope, Sr. 10 2,782
Teller (7) Johnny Kakaruk 18 2,957
Teller (8) Ralph Kugzruk 3 600
Nome (9) Lawrence Davis 1.5 525
Nome (10) Government Model Herd 3 643
Koyuk(ll) Archie Henry 7 517
(The numbers in parentheses refer to Figure 7). (Source: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1968).
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trial—and—error herd establishment period resulted
in the emergence of several relatively stable herds.
Most of these herds are owned by older men with
accumulated reindeer experience since their early
childhood. They and their families manage the
herds, usually as part of a diverse number of activi-
ties. With few exceptions, reindeer herding is not
the sole enterprise of herd owners. In an attempt to
make a living, subsistence hunting, fishing, and
gathering are often done in connection with herd-
ing activities. Seasonal and permanent employment
is also sought after and entrepreneurship usually
contributes to the reindeer ownerÕs household in-
come. This is not necessarily a recent pattern of
Table 15 Annual estimates of total reindeer numbers in Alaska, 1891—1977.
Year Number Source Year Number Source
1891 16 Jackson, 1902 1936 594,000 Hanson, 1952
1892 171 " 1937 544,000 Rood, 1943
1893 346 " 1938 544,647 Palmer, 1944a
1894 588 " 1939 377,712 "
1895 891 " 1940 252,550 "
1896 1,100 " 1941 206,785 "
1897 1,466 " 1942 169,000 "
1898 2,062 " 1943 128,700 "
1899 2,837 " 1944 N/A
1900 3,323 " 1945 N/A
1901 4,412 " 1946  N/A
1902 5,148 " 1947 N/A
1903 6,282 Jackson, 1903—1908; 1948 32,623 Rouse et al., 1948
1904 8,189 Skoog, 1968 1949 27,920 "
1905 10,241 " 1950 25,000 BIA Annual Reports,
1906 12,878 " 1951 27,245 1950 to 1971
1907 15,839 " 1952 26,700 "
1908 19,322 " 1953 26,200 "
1909 22,915 U.S. Bureau of Education, 1954 25,200 "
1910 27,325 1909 to 1927a 1955 28,500 "
1911 33,629 " 1956 36,200 "
1912 38,476 " 1957 39,800 "
1913 47,266 " 1958 49,300 "
1914 57,872 " 1959 43,200 "
1915 70,243 " 1960 43,500 "
1916 82,151 " 1961 39,900 "
1917 98,582 " 1962 40,000 "
1918 N/A 1963 38,600 "
1919 145,000 " 1964 38,540 "
1920 180,000 " 1965 35,269 "
1921 216,000 " 1966 37,248 "
1922 259,000 " 1967 33,150 "
1923 300,000 " 1968 30,794 "
1924 350,000 " 1969 31,038 "
1925 350,000 " 1970 30,251 "
1926 N/A 1971 N/A
1927 N/A 1972 27,399 BLM data and
1928 321,116 " 1973 N/A authorÕs notes
1929 599,825 " 1974 N/A
1930 468,000 Palmer, 1944a 1975 29,100 "
1931 510,000 " 1976 N/A
1932 641,000 Hanson, 1952 1977 24,100 "
1933 N/A
1934 N/A
1935 N/A
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household (family) organization. Among some fami-
lies who are now or used to be herd owners, there is
a history of experimenting with a variety of new op-
portunities for cash income and adopting novel meth-
ods of resource exploitation.
The 1960s—1970s
During the 1960s, the introduction of the snow
machine into northwestern Alaskan Eskimo culture
caused substantial changes in the winter activities
of people. Accompanied by other forces of accultura-
tion (widespread public health sen¥ices, increased
access to goods and services from urban Alaska and
the continental United States and increased cash—
income opportunities, to name but a few), the snow
machine has remained an outstanding symbol of the
direction and magnitude of socioeconomic change in
the Arctic. The initial acceptance of the machines
was slow, based in part on a Òwait and see if they
workÓ attitude. Once their performance and reliabil-
ity proved that their advantages outweighed their
disadvantages compared to dog traction, purchases
of new and used machines increased (Hall, 1971).
In 1965, tracked vehicles were reportedly used by
the reindeer herders for the first time, and a photo-
graph of a snow—machine pulling a sled loaded with
a live reindeer appears in the BIA Land Operations
Report (BIA, 1965). By 1969, every herd owner on
Seward Peninsula used snow machines for herding
operations, as well as other winter activities. Tech-
niques were developed to conduct winter roundups
using the new technology. Many of these paralleled
the experiences among Lapp herders in Scandinavia
in adapting the new technology and the changing
socioeconomic conditions of reindeer herding to the
requirements of the animals and the geography of
the range (Pelto, 1973; Pelto and Muller—Wille, 1972;
Pelto et al., 1968; Muller—Wille and Pelto, 1971). (See
also Chapter VI).
The 1968 cooperative agreement made the Bureau
of Land Management responsible for range assign-
ment and protection through the issuance of graz-
ing permits and monitoring of range conditions. The
BLM had already begun a program of issuing range
permits in 1962, under authority of reindeer graz-
ing regulations contained in 43 CFR. Reindeer—graz-
ing permits on the public domain were issued for
ten—year periods. BIA personnel cooperated to ex-
plain the permits to herd owners, while BLM person-
nel attempted to assess the range quality and carry-
ing capacity. Until research was done on relatively
small localities in the late 1960s (Pegau, 1968, 1970a,
1970b), no scientific data were available on reindeer
range quality for Seward Peninsula. NANA Rein-
deer CorporationÕs recent survey of its range, done
in conjunction with USDA Soil Conservation Ser-
vice and University of Alaska Geophysical Institute
personnel, is a first step in the application of mod-
ern range management techniques to reindeer herd-
ing (George et al., 1977).
Up to 1968, the BIA continued to manage the
ranching and training aspects of reindeer herding.
Since then, BIAÕs role in reindeer herding has
changed substantially. The bureau is now withdraw-
ing from an active role in reindeer herding. Its role
now is largely confined to the distribution of the few
remaining government—owned reindeer and the col-
lection and loaning of any deer which are returned
to their custody. Most importantly, they provide mon-
ies to operate the Reindeer Herders Association,
incorporated in 1971 (formerly the Northwest
Alaska Reindeer Herders Association, organized
in 1964) through a grant to Kawerak, Inc., the non-
profit social services arm of the Bering Straits Na-
tive Corporation.
At the state level, several agencies regularly in-
teract with the herd owners. The Alaska Department
of Fish and Game (ADF&G) has field offices in Nome
and Kotzebue. Game biologists and Alaska Depart-
ment of Public Safety, Wildlife Protection officers
(game wardens) are stationed in both towns. As live-
stock owners, reindeer owners are entitled under
state law to protect their herds against predators.
From World War II to 1971, the Bureau of Sports
Fisheries and Wildlife (later United States Fish and
Wildlife Service) cooperated with the BIA in a pro-
gram of predator control which included aerial hunt-
ing of wolves on Seward Peninsula and other rein-
deer ranges. Herd owners often complain about what
they view as a lack of cooperation from ADF&G to
help them with their predation problems. They ap-
parently do not realize that ADF&G is not in the
predator control business for their benefit in the
same way that the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and
Wildlife/BIA were with their predator control assistance.
The Alaska State Department of Commerce and
Economic Development has also assisted the herd
owners in the past. With its aid, a reindeer slaugh-
tering and processing facility was constructed at
Nome in 1969, and operations began there in 1970.
Several other state agencies also deal with the rein-
deer herders with some regularity. The Alaska State
Division of Agriculture gathers economic statistics
from the herds through the Reindeer Herders Asso-
ciation. Researchers from the University of Alaska
interact with the reindeer herd owners in the course
of special research, development, and experimental
projects. The Government Demonstration Herd
(Model Herd) at Nome represented one such project.
The Cantwell Reindeer Research Station was devel-
oped in 1967/68 and facilities were provided on the
University of Alaska campus at Fairbanks to pro-
vide baseline data on reindeer physiology, metabo-
lism, parasites, brucellosis control, and husbandry.
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General summary — reindeer in
Alaska
A brief recapitulation of the major themes pre-
sented in this historical treatment of reindeer herd-
ing is in order here. Four major trends or character-
istics can be found in the history of reindeer herd-
ing. It is clear from government policy, legislative
action, and appropriations, that it has been the
governmentÕs intent to provide a self—sustaining
Native industry for the benefit of Alaskan Natives
through the introduction and support of the rein-
deer industry. Secondly, the period of non—Native
involvement in reindeer herding, particularly on a
corporate basis competing with local Native inter-
ests, has been detrimental to the welfare of the Na-
tive aspect of the industry. Government action to
terminate non—Native involvement with reindeer
herding clearly recognized this fact. Thirdly, the
changes in administrative authority and govern-
ment policy have not been combined to provide any
sense of continuity in the specific policy or direction
for the reindeer program. This, combined with high
turnover in personnel and the very real difficulties
faced by village Alaskans in the areas of health, edu-
cation, and welfare, has created an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust of most government officials.
On the frontier, an individual is known by the ac-
tions he takes and the trust which he inspires over
a long period of time. The reindeer program has been
plagued by some of the worst of these problems, as
the disruptive events cited in the reports of the 1930s
investigations show. This is also reflected in the cur-
rent uncertainty by the reindeer herders over fu-
ture policy on the part of various Federal land man-
agement agencies.
Last, but not least, there has been insufficient
feedback between the research programs funded by
various state and federal agencies on reindeer biol-
ogy, ecology, and physiology, and the needs and de-
sires of the Native herders. While much research
has added substantially to our baseline knowledge
of reindeer, most has failed to improve the lot of the
reindeer herder in any significant way. This research
is a two way street. In order to make optimal use of
all of the data accumulated through research, the
herder must have an adequate education, particu-
larly if he is to make use of the research to improve
his herding and husbandry efforts. Thus, improved
reindeer handling will only come about in the con-
text of a general improvement in the education and
welfare of village Alaskans in general.
Throughout this historical treatment of reindeer
herding, reference has been made to the increasing,
and during the 1930s and 1940, the decreasing, re-
indeer herds. These changes are depicted in Table
15, which covers the total number of reindeer in
Alaska from 1891 through 1977. In Table 16, the
numbers of reindeer found on the Seward Peninsula
from 1951 through 1977 are given. At one time in
1932, 127,331 reindeer were estimated to be graz-
ing on the Seward Peninsula. Of this number, 32,523
were Lomen owned.
For the remainder of this report, the Seward Pen-
insula is defined as that area lying west of the
Inglutalik River, west of the South Fork of the
Buckland River, west of the Mangoak River, includ-
ing all of the Baldwin Peninsula. Herds based out
of Selawik are not included in the Seward Penin-
sula totals with the exception of the government—
operated herd of Escholtz Bay which ranged in the
Selawik Hills during its years of operation (1945 to
early 1950s). Herds based at Shaktoolik, Savoonga,
Stebbins, and Unalakleet are not included in the
Seward Peninsula totals.
Chapter VI
Reindeer herders and
social relationships
The network of relationships between the herd
owners, the villagers, and the merchants is a com-
plex one. The village orientation of the herd owners
is a major limiting factor in the ability of the rein-
deer industry to produce more meat than is currently
available. This village orientation is in some ways a
fortunate one from the point of view of range con-
servation because it restricts most herd owners from
seeking to expand herd size up to or beyond the car-
rying capacity of the present ranges. Although ac-
curate and timely surveys of carrying capacity are
not available for all ranges, it is generally true that
most ranges are stocked below the current estimated
carrying capacity. This less—than—capacity utiliza-
tion is the result of a number of factors, but the most
significant one which must be taken into account is
the finite production objectives of the herd owners.
This is to say that, although most herd owners would
like to increase their stock on the range, they are
not motivated to do so. They are motivated more by
the desire to increase their relatively small incomes
from herding in order to satisfy village and personal
needs with greater certainty than to fill potential
markets which may exist outside the villages. This
orientation is a common characteristic in societies
which are organized along domestic modes of pro-
duction (Sahlins, 1972).
In terms of the relations between herd owners,
the territorial perspective of the Eskimo herder is
an important factor. The village identification of a
herd owner is the label by which other people know
him and interact with him. Secondarily, his person-
ality and individual characteristics are his distin-
guishing features. The local orientation of the herd
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owners and the inability of the Reindeer Herders
Association to function aggressively are interrelated.
Because it is a recently formed, voluntary associa-
tion, and because Eskimo culture traditionally lacks
social mechanisms for permanent, nonkin—based, in-
stitutional interaction, the Reindeer HerdersÕ Asso-
ciation is not yet a strong lobbying force on behalf of
the herders. It is reasonable to expect the efficiency
of the association to increase in the future as skills
and more experience in dealing with a non—Native
bureaucracy are obtained. This is part of a general
trend of increased extra—village awareness which
is leading toward a regional approach in problem
solving and management.
Historical overview: Seward
Peninsula social organization
Villages on the Seward Peninsula today are the
products of recent economic and social pressures as
well as of a socioeconomic system that has its roots
in antiquity. In the nineteenth century, the villages
were part of a region—wide, economic and social sys-
tem. Ray (1964) argues that each village had a ter-
ritorial region associated with it; and that certain
major, large villages functioned as territorial cen-
ters. Smaller villages located within these ÒtribalÓ
territories were used on only a seasonal basis. Ma-
jor villages tended to be located at river mouths while
the smaller ones, often consisting of only a couple of
houses, were located at strategic resource—extract-
ing points. While many families lived in the larger
villages and were linked by common residence and
varying degrees of kinship, the small villages were
occupied mainly by closely related kin. The distri-
bution of Native Allotment parcels on Seward Pen-
insula reflects this pattern of common winter resi-
dence in a large village with outlying parcels of sub-
sistence—related lands. For the nineteenth century,
the units were:
Buckland River (Kangyik); Deering (Inmachuk
or Kugalik, in the nineteenth century this also
included people of the Kiwalik River);
Tapkakmiut (in the nineteenth century this
included Shishmaref or Kikkiktuk, Cape
Espenberg or Tukutat, and Goodhope River
or Pittak); Wales (Kingegan); Little Diomede
Island (Ingalik); King Island (Ukuivuk); Port
Clarence (principally Sinramiut, also in-
cluded Nook); Kauwerak; Nome (the largest
village was Ayasayuk at Cape Nome, also
included Sledge Island, or Ayak); Golovin
(Chinik); Fish River (Irathluik); and Koyuk.
(Ray, 1964) (Figure 9, and Table 17).
In the early phase of BurchÕs (1975) transitional
period (1850—1890), three major changes took place
in northwest Alaska which caused changes in the
strategies and patterns of affiliation by which a
person endeavored to acquire wealth. The first ma-
jor change was the drastic decrease in the numbers
of animals which represented wealth: the bowhead
whales, walrus, and caribou. With depleted natural
resources, most people had to turn their attention
to working simply at survival, and the accumula-
tion of wealth was not possible. Second, the reduced
numbers of people and the accompanying changes
in distribution and settlement patterns simply al-
tered the chances of successfully accumulating
wealth. Epidemics and diseases undermined the
work undertaken to organize an efficient group of
followers which every wealthy man needed to in-
sure his rise to wealth and power, and once there to
maintain it. The third major change which occurred
involved a Òshift from the accumulation of food re-
serves to trade in skins, furs, and whale bone (ba-
leen) as the primary source of wealthÓ (Burch, 1975).
Burch further notes that this shift in emphasis
placed greater importance on relationships with
partners and non—Natives and less importance on
affiliation with kinsmen.
For the intermediate phase of BurchÕs transitional
period, (1890—1940) wealthy Eskimos were virtually
Table 16. Reindeer on the Seward Peninsula,
1951—1977.
Year Total reindeer Reindeer on
in Alaska Seward Peninsula
1951 27,245 6,570
1952 26,700 7,675
1953 26,200 8,470
1954 25,200 8,997
1955 28,500 8,950
1956 36,200 10,441
1957 39,800 13,896
1958 49,300 17,208
1959 43,200 17,979
1960 43,500 18,529
1961 39,900 16,405
1962 40,000 17,940
1963 38,600 18,880
1964 38,540 20,449
1965 35,269 18,944
1966 37,248 22,168
1967 33,150 18,795
1968 30,794 16,369
1969 31,038 17,009
1970 30,251 20,292
1971 N/A N/A
1972 27,399 19,828
1973 N/A 17,397
1974 N/A N/A
1975 29,100 20,600
1976 N/A 17,425
1977 24,100 17,800
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nonexistent in Northwest Alaska.
 A few men were in the process of accumu-
lating considerable capital in the form of do-
mesticated reindeer herds during the 1920s,
and some of them might have become ex-
tremely well—to—do in time. However, for a
set of reasons too complex to go into here,
this possibility was eventually denied them.
(Burch, 1975).
The complexities relate largely to U.S. Govern-
ment policy, which was opposed to the expansion
of individually owned herds. (Burch, 1975).
While it is true that government policy in the
1920s favored the establishment of communally op-
erated herds, there was no effort to undermine the
individually owned herds. Large herd owners were
to benefit most by the creation of association herds.
They were able, at least for a short period of time
before the reindeer declined, to recruit labor from
the associations. As the herds declined in
the 1930s, not even the large owners
could offer sufficient inducements to be
able to recruit labor.
Burch (1975) points out three factors
that changed the conditions favoring
population dispersal during the Great
Depression. First, during the 1930s the
price of furs dropped drastically. Thus,
the stimulus to live in Òsmall local family
unitsÓ for the purpose of trapping was
removed. Secondly, the small, indepen-
dent, white traders who had lived in or
near the small, dispersed communities by
and large went out of business. They had been
a main source of food, supplies, and cash in-
come based on the furs that were traded with
them. Their going out of business, and the
consequent lack of such a local source of
food, supplies, and cash income, induced
many Eskimo families to move out of the
bush and into the mission/school /store
villages. Lastly, the decline in the rein-
deer herds and the disappearance of any
good reason to practice ÒcloseÓ or Òinten-
siveÓ herding motivated many herd own-
ers to locate more or less permanently
back in their villages. The Native rein-
deer companies could not afford to pay
wages to their herders, and by the mid—
1930s the Lomens and other non—Native—
owned herds could not export enough
meat (the lower 48 markets having dis-
appeared in the early 1930s) to make it
profitable for them to keep herders per-
manently on their payrolls.
In addition to changing the conditions
which stimulated population dispersals,
the depression created a number of conditions which
made relocation in villages more favorable than it
had been. The government supported many of the
schools and village stores during this period, and
they were the only ones which remained solvent. The
teacher or some other government agent located in
the villages disbursed welfare funds which became
available. Lastly, the Civilian Conservation Corps
make—work projects began in the mid—1930s. These
included shelter—cabin construction, wolf—hunting
programs, trail improvements, and road construc-
tion or improvement. These CCC projects were also
administered through the government agents lo-
cated at the mission/school villages (Burch, 1975).
During the ÒrecentÓ period, as identified by Burch,
(1940—1970), the way in which one acquires wealth
in northwest Alaska has become the same as that
which dominates Euro—American society money
buys the material possessions which represent
Table 17. Northwestern Alaska regional groupings, circa 1850.
Map Estimated 1850
number Designation population
1 Colville River 575
2 Ikpikpak River, Barrow
3 Meade River, Barrow
4 Barrow
(Barrow proper area total) 700
5 Northwest Coast 475
6 Utukok River 200
7 Point Hope 975
8 Kivalina 350
9 Upper Noatak River 450
10 Lower Noatak River 300
11 Central Brooks Range 300
12 Kobuk River 975
13 Kobuk Delta 275
14 Kotzebue 425
15 Selawik River 950
16 South Kotzebue Sound 325
16a Buckland
16b Deering
16c Candle
17 Tapquq 375
18 Wales 750
19 Diomede Island 300
20 Port Clarence 275
21 Kauwerak (Kuzitrin River) 200
22 Nome (including Sledge Island) 900
23 King Island 275
24 Fish River undetermined
25 Koyuk River undetermined
26 Shaktoolik undetermined
27 Unalakleet undetermined
(Koyukon Indian groups on the Koyukuk Kiver are not shown)
(Burch, 1975; Burch and Correll, 1972; Ray, 1964, 1975; and others).
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wealth. In order to acquire money, one must have a
job, and this in turn implies associating with nonkin
and non—Natives. It can be seen that the values and
expectations inherent in the kinship system have
changed over time in response to the changing en-
vironmental and social conditions.
In fact, by the recent period, close affilia-
tion with large numbers of kin was some-
times disastrous for people with ambition.
No matter how hard one worked, and no
matter how much money he earned, his kin
would be sure to spend it.... Here, we have
the final irony: the accumulation of wealth
for most northwest Alaska Eskimos in the
recent period meant either the absence or
the rejection of the very sort of relationships
that had been so essential to its attainment
in the traditional era. (Burch, 1975).
Factors beyond mere economic success produce
social status and prestige for an individual in Alaska
villages. These factors have changed during the pe-
riod of contract with Euro—Americans, just as they
no doubt did under changing conditions during the
prehistoric period. In the traditional period, it was
possible for some individual Eskimos to acquire
wealth which exceeded that of other Eskimos.
The means used to acquire this wealth depended
on the aspiring personÕs success in manipulating his
relationships with the ÒrightÓ people (most of whom
had to be kinsmen), his luck, and his personal quali-
ties. The accumulation of wealth through affiliation
with the ÒrightÓ people could be a complex, lifetime
process, with no guarantee of success. The flexibil-
ity of Eskimo social organization offered great lati-
tude in the strategies of affiliation which the aspir-
ing person could choose. This flexibility is revealed
in case histories and analyses which show the func-
tioning of augmentation, extension, and multiple
connections which serve to increase the number of
individuals with whom an aspiring wealthy person
could interact to reach his goals (Burch, 1975).
Contemporary social organization
The primary residence unit of the Eskimo on the
Seward Peninsula is the household. Within this con-
cept of household lie two related concerns. One cen-
ters on the physical dwelling in which the house-
hold unit lives while the other focuses on the per-
sonnel who constitute the household.
The physical dwellings vary widely. It is not uncom-
mon in villages to see sod—covered houses, log struc-
tures, frame houses, while at the same time prefabri-
cated module units, and even trailer homes are all used
as residences. Housing is a major concern of all village
residents. Alaska State Housing Authority homes are
supplied through Federal and state housing programs
with a minimal cost to  qualified applicants. Although
these houses are grossly underinsulated for winter
conditions in the Arctic, most people hope to acquire
one. Fuel costs may range from 200 to 400 dollars
(1977 figures) per month yet, the desirability of a
new house for social prestige overrides the economic
disadvantages. The addition of indoor plumbing and
running water through Public Health Service wa-
ter projects to the villages makes the new houses
even more desirable.
In the general region outside the villages, there
are an equally large number of different dwellings.
The size, location, and condition of these places (vari-
ously called Òcamps,Ó Òthe old place,Ó Òmy land,Ó or
Òmy cabinÓ) depends on their utilization. During the
yearly cycle of activities, people will travel to these
camps for periods ranging from one day to weeks or
months. In summer, a canvas tent is usually erected
over a wooden frame for eating, cooking, and sleep-
ing. A tent affords summer protection from the ele-
ments and insects and is more comfortable and
easier to regulate the temperature in than a well—
insulated winter cabin. Tents are usually made of
10— to 14—ounce white cotton canvas with four foot
walls, and are usually either 8x10 or 12x14 feet in
size. Virtually every household has at least one such
tent, often more if it is a large household.
In such camps, parents prefer to let the teenagers
have their own tent as well. It might also be well to
point out that, during the summer in villages, it is
not uncommon to see a tent pitched beside a perma-
nent dwelling. Teenagers, young adults, or visitors
more often tend to use them since their summer noc-
turnal habits may interfere with the adult house-
hold routine. At one summer reindeer handling,
eight men slept in one of the tents while couples
and children slept in two other tents. This is an in-
teresting persistence of the tradition of placing single
males and visitors under one roof. In traditional times,
this roof would have been that of the village kazgi.
The house of most Seward Peninsula Eskimos is
small by North American standards. Most houses
measure 16 to 14 by 24 to 32 feet. Older houses often
have had many alterations such as new rooms added,
heating/cooking stove locations changed, insulation
and paneling upgraded, etc. Within each house,
there is at least one large multipurpose room. It is
here that most food preparation and consumption,
equipment manufacture and repair, and visiting
takes place. At night, it may become a sleeping room.
Partitioned off from this main room by either cur-
tains or walls are the usual sleeping areas. Within
the sleeping area, a bed and often a dresser or some
sort of storage container will be found. Access to the
house is generally through a storm—shed, or porch.
The double—door system (arctic entryway) minimizes
drafts in winter. The storm—shed is also the deposi-
tory for tools, raw materials, and small equipment.
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When cold enough in winter, it serves as a safe place
to store foods. Many households which can afford a
freezer do not have room for it within the house, so
it is often placed in the storm—shed. A curtained—off
area is provided for honey—bucket facilities in older
houses, while in the newer houses there is a bath-
room complete with sink, flush toilet, and bathtub—
shower stall. Since running water is not yet avail-
able in any village except Nome and Kotzebue, the
flush toilet is superfluous, and a honey bucket nor-
mally rests in its place.
Surrounding the houses, there are various out-
buildings: outhouses, storage sheds, and sometimes
small workshops. These types of structures are typi-
cally constructed from delivered scrap lumber or any
other material that might be available. The high cost
of new lumber delivered to villages makes most vil-
lagers cautious in the use of it. New lumber and ply-
wood is used in the construction of boats and houses
before other projects. The Òwinterization projectÓ
brings many board feet of materials to the villages
at little cost. These materials are destined to go into
improvements on currently standing structures to
insulate them better and bring down the costs of
winter heating. Plans are being made for the con-
struction of, new cabins, improvements to older
houses, and other projects, to make use of this inex-
pensive building material.
The houses of reindeer—herd owners are not radi-
cally different from those of their neighbors. Al-
though people say that the reindeer herd owners are
rich, it is not possible to distinguish them on the
basis of their housing in most cases. One herd
ownerÕs home has running water from an internal
storage container in the basement that is pumped
through the shower and sink systems (but not the
toilet). His grandchildren fill the tank with ice in
winter, and from jerry jugs of water in summer. This
frame house was constructed by the herd owner and
his family in the last couple of years, but it will be
only a short matter of time until most other qualified
village residents will receive equivalent new housing.
What becomes of old dwellings when new housing
is put into a village is interesting. Categories of use
tend to disguise the variation. Storage, housing for
boarding students, teenage children, rental to teach-
ers or nonresidents who must remain in the village
for a period of time, demolition and re—cycling of
the salvagable materials, or relocation to another
site in the village are but a few uses. The general
trend in housing is to replace a few multipurpose
rooms with more single—purpose rooms. This space
utilization is derived from the dominant culture
(non—Native North America) and is not the tradi-
tional Eskimo model. Agencies which are planning
the introduction of modern housing and building
techniques would be wise to examine the experiences
of Canada and Lappland before repeating mistakes
made in other parts of the world (Ingold, 1976; Kerri,
1977; Zrudlo, 1975).
Household personnel
The concept of household referred to in the pre-
ceding section refers to Òany set of individuals liv-
ing in one houseÓ (Burch, 1975). In actuality, there
are two levels of household organization. Burch, fol-
lowing Carrasco (1963), calls these two levels Òdo-
mestic familiesÓ and Òlocal families.Ó
A domestic family is defined as a family
organization whose members occupy a
single dwelling.
A local family, by contrast, would be a fam-
ily whose members occupy different dwell-
ings, but whose members still operate in
terms of a single overriding family organi-
zation (Burch, 1975, original emphasis).
Figure 10 illustrates the difference between a do-
mestic and a local family based on field data. The
parents of (A), (B), (C), and (D) were reindeer herd
owners. (B) was born in a reindeer camp in the early
years of this century. (B) grew up with reindeer herds
and would have taken over his fatherÕs herd, but
the Great Depression and declining markets forced
him to seek employment in the mines and stores of
the mining towns. When his brother (A) started a
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herd after World War II, (B) eventually went into
partnership with him, until (A) retired, due to ill
health. (B)Õs sons were old enough to manage the
reindeer by then. Currently, (G) is in charge of han-
dling daily affairs of the herd, and it is he who sells
the meat to villagers. (B)Õs role with the herd is
largely administrative, handling records and offer-
ing advice to his sons. (B) and (G) occupy new houses,
built around the older house which (B) built after
working many years as a store clerk and miner. (B)
and (G)Õs old houses now function as a store and
storehouses, respectively. (B)Õs niece, (E), was
adopted by (B) and his wife after (B)Õs sister (D) died.
(E) no longer lives in the village. Because of the large
size of (G)Õs family and the proximity of (B) and (G)Õs
houses, two of (G)Õs children and their adopted
daughter (born to one of (G)Õs unmarried children)
usually eat and sleep in (B)Õs house. (B)Õs daughter
(I) lives in a town with her husband and children,
but usually returns to her home village during the
summer and at holidays. The unmarried son (F) lives
alone in a small house. (C), (B)Õs younger brother,
lives in the same town as (I) and her family, with
his family. Thus, there are five domestic families liv-
ing in the one village—(A), (B), (F), (G), and (H)—who
interact as one local family.
The pattern of domestic families interacting as lo-
cal families occurs throughout the Seward Penin-
sula. It is not only evident among the reindeer herd—
owning families, but can be found in the other work
groups that combine to hunt, fish, or build. On a
day—today basis, the individuals of a domestic fam-
ily group interact with their relatives, affines or
consanguines who make up other domestic family
units. The type of work to be performed, how well
individuals are getting along, and the location of
houses determines the formation and dissolution of
the work groups, whose members may or may not
be part of a local family.
 In the towns in northwestern Alaska (Barrow,
Kotzebue, Bethel, and Nome) there are signs that a
Native elite is emerging from the previously ranked
(not egalitarian) society. The members of this elite
tend to be better educated, extensively travelled, and
interact more with non—Natives than do their peers.
While they are usually bilingual, some do not even
speak Inupiat. Most of this elite tend to aspire to-
wards the dominant middle—class Euro—American
values of upward social and wide geographic mobil-
ity, with its attendant houses, cars, and material
possessions. At the village level, this elite is not yet
quite so obvious in its material manifestations. In
one village, members of two local families engaged
in reindeer herding and other businesses account
for three of the five trucks in town. The other two
belong to two brothers, each of whom operates a
store. The one, large, stake—bed truck belonging to
one of the reindeer—owning local families is used
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mostly in connection with their duties as the local
representative of the air carrier.
Village organization
The general trend during the transitional period
(1850 to the present) has been the centralization of
populations in permanent villages. Many of the vil-
lages are located where there was a precontact vil-
lage, but the ÒmodernÓ villages differ in several ways.
Whereas the large, pre—contact villages were Òper-
manentÓ in the seasonal round of the time, they were
largely unoccupied during the summer months when
the population dispersed in pursuit of summer fish,
berries, and other resources. The modern villages
are occupied year round but seasonal movements
are still made out of the village. The traditional vil-
lage existed at a particular location because it was
close to a major food resource, as fish at river mouths
or access to marine mammals (e.g., Wales). The main
reason for the existence of most modern villages is
the location there of government or the services of
government agencies, as well as missions and
churches. Trading posts, schools, and reindeer herds
came to the villages during the late nineteenth cen-
tury and the early years of the twentieth century.
The establishment of these institutions enforced the
centralizing tendency. Mining was locally important
at various times. While this picture varies greatly
in detail from village to village, in general it reflects
what has happened over the past century.
Villages are composed of households. Households
occupy houses distributed along paths and road-
ways. At an outsiderÕs first glance, the village is an
unorganized conglomeration of houses placed at ran-
dom. Nevertheless, there exists a tight socio—spa-
tial organization of houses and their occupants. The
impression of unorganization disappears once the
observer comes to know the houses and the people
who inhabit them.
Village institutions
There are a large number of institutions within
any village. All of these are necessary to operate and
maintain the various functions of the village. In a
sense, they are all overlays on the traditional social
organization of the village, since their presence is
traceable directly to the presence of Euro—Ameri-
can institutions and their requisites. Through time,
however, these overlays have been integrated into
the contemporary social organization of the village.
Through a feedback process, they have affected and
been affected by the village social organization, the
personalities of the individuals who occupy positions
of power and responsibility, and representatives of
the various agencies concerned.
In addition to reindeer herding, the following is a
partial list of new institutions present in most
Seward Peninsula villages today: the Indian Reor-
ganization Act (IRA) Council, Alaska Native Indus-
tries Cooperative Association (ANICA) store, other
stores run by private parties, school board, village
corporation, city council, regional corporation,
church and church council, Alaska Department of
Fish and Game (ADF&C) advisory board, National
Guard, health—care programs, and village police and
fire services. From this partial listing, one sees an
enormous proliferation of jobs and of administra-
tive positions, most of which have been created in
the past 15 years. The villagers who are active on
the various boards, committees, and councils tend
to be part of the educated, rising elite described pre-
viously. Through their participation in these activi-
ties, they are able to use their positions for further-
ing the welfare of their fellow villagers, as well as
furthering their own careers. This often creates con-
flicts of interest which are resolved in various ways.
Resigning from the position, or abstaining from the
decision—making are common ways. In the former
case, the individual is usually reelected or appointed
to the position, simply because there is no one else
who can or who wants to fill it. In the latter case, a
decision is usually already made prior to any for-
mal abstention from the decision making. As often
as not, the conflict of interest is simply overlooked
in the interests of expediency. Non—Natives view-
ing the operation of these supposedly ÒdemocraticÓ
institutions often react with surprise at the autocracy
with which they function. The important point is that
they do function, not that they fail to operate along
the democratic principles espoused by the observer.
It is in the operation of these institutions that one
sees the reindeer herd owners interacting with other
villagers in an extra kinship context. This is not to
say that kinship is not a factor in the operation of
the institutions, but it is not supposed to be. In this
paradox, the forum for tremendous conflict is estab-
lished. The Ògreat traditionÓ or dominant culture (in
this case, of course, Euro—American) introduces in-
stitutions which are adapted to the demands of
American society. When they are transferred in toto
to the Òlittle traditionÓ (Eskimo society), it should
not be unexpected that they will be modified to suit
the culture into which they are placed. For example,
the National Guard armory in most villages is sup-
posed to be a building used solely for the defense
training of Guardsmen and the storage of supplies.
In reality, the buildings are used for a number of
purposes. At various times, the armory may serve
as a theater, courtroom, dining hall, dormitory, or
meeting hall, all functions above and beyond the
original scope of its purpose. This is not to say that
such functions are improper; indeed, most are in line
with the National GuardÕs purpose in public services.
But anywhere else where other specialized structures
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and institutions were available, such uses of the ar-
mory would probably not be tolerated (cf Redfield
1953 for a further discussion of ÒlittleÓ and ÒgreatÓ
traditions).
When the reindeer herd owner (or members of his
local family) are present in these institutions, his
role may not be that of the village reindeer herder.
He is, as it were, wearing another hat at such times.
But the villagers are always aware that the herd
owner is not acting solely out of a motivation to fa-
cilitate the greatest good for the greatest number at
such times. He is acting both for the interests he
represents and his own. As noted above, conflicts of
interest may be resolved in a number of ways, in-
cluding being overlooked (or denied). Status in these
institutional settings is derived from factors of sex,
age, seniority, and personal charisma, as well as the
vested authority from the position which a herder
occupies. The herd ownerÕs leadership abilities may
be most severely tested in a situation that pits his
kindred and him against the other factions of vil-
lagers in one or more of the village institutions.
Thus, there is great variability in the roles which
the various reindeer herd owners play, both in their
own villages and in the regional context of the rein-
deer industry. This variability has at least three prin-
cipal sources. Some variability comes from the size
of the herd. Different herd sizes require different
amounts of time and labor to manage. Another
source of variability comes from the herd ownerÕs
own management Òstyle.Ó This, in turn, is related to
such factors as the presence of roads, which allow
some herd owners to sell live reindeer on the hoof to
buyers who then slaughter, process, and transport
the animals. Additional factors may stem from the
place of reindeer herding in the household economic
strategy, or the individual herd ownerÕs current fi-
nancial and political needs and desires. A third fac-
tor involves the size, location, and condition of the
range to which the herd owner is assigned. As we
have noted, reindeer on the Seward Peninsula tend to
drift westward (along the coast) during the summer
months as they seek relief from insects. Herds thus
tend to receive reindeer from the eastern neighbors.
In their totality, all of these factors combine to pro-
duce the behavior of the herd owner in the frame-
work of other village institutions.
Most of the non—Natives who reside permanently
in villages are attached to one or more of these in-
stitutions. With the phasing out of state—operated
schools in most villages, and the construction and
operation of Rural Education Attendance Area
(REAA) high schools in most villages, non—Native
village residents are mostly attached to the schools
and their operation. A pastor/missionary and his
family also live in most villages. Temporary residents,
or short—term visitors who remain from several weeks
to a few hours, make up the remainder of the non—
Native population. Most of these non—Natives are
specialists of one sort or another in health services,
human services, construction, or research.
As businessmen, the herd owner/operators must
interact with an increasingly larger number of non—
Natives. These include state and Federal agencies
or their representatives; businessmen in the towns
where quantities of meat may be sold, supplies pur-
chased, or services sought; and increasing numbers
of researchers (the authors of this report included)
who come to the villages and Reindeer Herder Asso-
ciation meetings for various purposes and lengths
of time. While Nelson could write in 1969 that the
two most frequent questions a newcomer to a vil-
lage could expect were ÒWhat are you here for¥Ó and
ÒWhen are you planning to leave¥,Ó a third question
arises in the post—ANCSA period. ÒWho do you rep-
resent!Ó is not an uncommonly heard question
(Nelson, 1969).
Since 1964, many of the herd owners have been
involved with a San Francisco—based Korean busi-
nessman. This individual purchases velvet antler
from the herd owners, which is then processed by
him and sold as a tonic to the oriental market. It is
this individual who has helped to develop the mar-
ket, the processing, and the procuring techniques
for Seward Peninsula velvet antler to the mutual
benefit of himself and the herders. The effects of
antler harvest are poorly understood. Some biologi-
cal questions concerning the effect of velvet—antler
harvesting on the social structure and the health
and nutrition of the herds are currently being re-
searched by the University of Alaska (Luick, 1977).
At least one herd owner feels that the use of a small
helicopter to round up the animals in late June/July
for the antler harvest is an unacceptable practice
because the reindeer are herded at a run, and the
calves may not be able to keep up with the older
reindeer or may be trampled. While the helicopter
is viewed as an increase in efficiency by antler buyers,
it is viewed as undesirable by some herd owners.
The herd owner as employer in the
village
Within the villages, which are often home to one
or more reindeer owners, the herd owners are viewed
in different ways. To some people, the herd owner
may be father, father—in—law, brother, uncle, or son.
The kinship relationship between any two people is
an important sociocultural factor in all interactions
between people in northwestern Alaska. Burch notes
the strong role which family relationships still play
in social interactions (1975). These family relation-
ships play no less an important role in those social
relationships involving reindeer herding. In the
larger, more accultured villages such as Nome,
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Kotzebue, and Barrow, where Natives have numer-
ous interactions with nonkin and non—Natives, kin-
ship relationships as a means for structuring social
organization are not as strong (or at least perhaps
not so readily observable) as in the smaller villag-
ers, kinship is still overwhelmingly the organizing
principle. Thus, the herd owner as employer, and
his social role in village life as a herd owner and leader,
are affected by his kinship ties with other villagers, as
well as by his personal attributes and abilities.
The organization of domestic families and local
families as social and work groups has been dis-
cussed. At various times during the year, reindeer
herding requires additional personnel that exceed
the number of competent and available kin that can
be called upon to help without expecting to be paid
directly. When this happens, the herd owner/opera-
tor must become an employer. In addition to the kin
who are hired, some nonkin may be engaged to aid
with roundups, marking, and butchering. At some
handlings close enough to the village to be reached
easily by snow machine or boat, there may be more
people present than are actually necessary to perform
the work. A happy, almost holiday atmosphere pre-
vails at these times, with food, coffee, and sometimes
accommodations being provided by the herder/owner.
The herd owner oversees the operations at a han-
dling. It is he who calls the earmarks and age/sex of
animals being counted through a chute. He may del-
egate this authority to a son or other qualified per-
son. With the advice and general mutual consent of
other adult males, he decides when to commence the
handling, when to take a break, and which males
are to be castrated or butchered. Often a father or
uncle who has had reindeer experience offers ad-
vice on particular animals. This person may actu-
ally do the castrating or butchering, or one of the
Òhired handsÓ may perform this task.
Specific individuals may be hired by the herd
owner at an hourly rate of $4—$6, or a daily rate of
$45, if they are good workers and fast skinners and
butchers. Food, coffee, accommodations, sometimes
fuel, and even cigarettes are included as part of the
Òsalary.Ó In lieu of cash, the worker may request
wage payments in the form of meat. Some herders
do not consider the use of meat as wages as part of
their overall herding costs. They tend to be gener-
ous when, for example, a reindeer quarter valued at
$26 (30 pounds at 85 cents per pound) is paid out
for only a few hours work. If there is not enough
meat available, the herd owner may offer to pay the
worker at some time in the future when meat is
available. In the context of patron client relations,
this serves to extend the period of time in which the
client is in the sphere of the patronÕs influence. Dur-
ing this time, the client may draw on his credit with
the patron, as happens when the herd owner also
handles retail items as a small entrepreneur. Sev-
eral herd owner/operators do run small stores.
Members of the herd ownerÕs immediate family
are important assets to him in the herding opera-
tions. During roundups, the wife and daughters may
cook and clean up after crews whose numbers can
range from two to twenty. At large holdings, addi-
tional women and girls are employed as cooks and
cleanup crews. As often as not, those women are re-
lated to the herd ownerÕs wife (sisters or cousins)
and the younger girls are friends and relatives of
his children. There is some contrast between sum-
mer and winter handlings in this regard. During the
winter/spring handlings, teenagers are most often
away at school and thus unavailable for hire. In the
summer, reindeer camp is an opportunity to get away
from the village for a short time and earn a bit of money.
The male relatives of the herd owners are often
retained not only to aid in the reindeer handlings,
but for regular checks on the herd during the win-
ter. This entails a snow machine ride to locate, bunch
up, and drive the reindeer to the point on the range
where the herder wishes to have them graze. De-
pending on the weather conditions, ease or difficulty
of locating all the animals, mechanical troubles with
the snow machines, and other factors, such a search
and roundup trip may take one to five days. During
this time, the herderÕs food, fuel, spare snowmachine
parts, and accommodations will be provided by the
herd owner. If the task takes considerably longer
than was expected, the herders are not paid Òover-
timeÓ but can expect a bonus of reindeer meat or
supplies from the herd owner, in addition to their
agreed—upon salaries. Herd owners earn a reputa-
tion for stinginess if they withhold more than their
workers think they should receive, or are consid-
ered generous if they give ÒbonusesÓ without hesi-
tation. Spencer (1959) reports that stinginess and
greediness are abhorred in Eskimo culture. It is not
uncommon to hear parents admonishing their chil-
dren ÒDonÕt be stingyÓ, when the children protest
sharing candy or some other food or toy. Generosity
is praised, and this cultural value is inculcated in
children during the socialization process.
Figure 11 presents the kinship network of one herd
owner, (E), in a Seward Peninsula village. This kin-
ship chart represents only a portion of the affinal
and consanguineal relations of the individual. With-
out presenting the actual chart of connections, this
herd owner is related to a number of other herders
besides (K), his father—in—law. (E) cooperates with
two other herd owners from another village in han-
dlings, markings, and slaughterings. The coopera-
tion is reciprocal between the three. Although (E)
has a relatively small herd, he has a number of other
enterprises in the village, including a small store
which operates out of the front room of his house,
59
the management of two houses which are rented to
the school teachers, and helping his father, (C), who
is the local commercial airlines representative in the
village. In addition to all these cash income—gener-
ating activities, (E) hunts, fishes, and has been an
ivory carver in the past. His wife, (F), maintains the
household with two children and high school stu-
dent boarders during the winter. She also fishes, and
gathers berries during the summer.  Her brother,
(I), is gradually assuming the operation of his
fatherÕs herd, and he and (E) get along relatively
well, although actual cooperation in the manage-
ment of their herds, which occupy adjacent ranges,
will not likely occur until the father—in—law (K) has
passed from the scene. Relations between (K) and
(E) are not smooth. (K) claims (E) still owes him re-
indeer which were loaned to him to start his herd,
and this charge is exacerbated by (K)Õs drinking. (F)
manages to keep tensions to a minimum and she and
her brother (I) serve to keep the two local families in
communication concerning affairs of mutual concern.
Since virtually every villager on Seward Penin-
sula can trace a real kinship (or a fictive augmenta-
tion of kinship) with other villagers, it is conceptu-
ally difficult to separate relatives from nonrelatives
in the Euro—American sense of these concepts. Many
young people do not know the Inupiat terms for all
of the cousin classifications, yet unhesitatingly call
distant relatives ÒcousinsÓ in English. In the emerg-
ing political area of pan—Eskimo identity, this
ÒcousinÓ concept is more akin to ÒbrotherhoodÓ than
actual affinal or consanguineal kinship. Herders hire
distant relatives for various herding tasks at vari-
ous times in addition to hiring them in connection
with their own entrepreneurial activities.
Few non—Natives are employed directly by the
herd owner in his operation. The non—Natives who
are employed are largely employed indirectly. For
example, the air—taxi operators who are hired to
scout for reindeer are directly employed by the herd
owner, whereas they may receive employment indi-
rectly when the antler buyer charters aircraft to fly
the antlers to Nome from the corralling sites. The
air taxi pilots give information on herd locations,
sizes, and movements freely to the herders. In re-
turn, they can expect to be called to work for the
herd owner either as spotters and drivers of the re-
indeer with their airplane, or when the herder is
shipping meat into one of the towns (Kotzebue or
Nome). In addition, individual herd owners have
friendly relations with one or more pilots and use
their air taxi service more or less exclusively when
they are traveling on nonreindeer—herding business
or pleasure trips. The commercial air carriers are
employed by the herd owners in the sense that they
often utilize the regularly scheduled cargo and/or
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passenger flights to ship meat or for travel.
The income which accrues to the herd owner
through his herding operations and other businesses
(if he has any) is disposed of directly in the form of
payments for labor costs, supplies and services, and
indirectly when it is spent on nonherding purchases
such as food, fuel, housing, clothing, and other items
involved in the operation of any family budget. In
summary, the herd owner is an employer by directly
engaging individuals, non—Natives and Eskimo
alike, in his herding operations. He also serves to
stimulate the village and regional economies by the
very presence of his herding operation and other
businesses by spending and investing his income
through the purchase of goods and services from
other businesses.
In some respects, the herd owner and the wealth
that his herd and businesses represent have a his-
toric analog in traditional Eskimo social organiza-
tion. The position and power of the village umialik
are reflected in some herd ownersÕ behavior. The
umialik was Òa good and honest man who looked
after the interests of his supporting crewÓ (Spencer,
1959). English glosses of umialik include hunt group
leader, chief, rich man (Spencer, 1959) and, depend-
ing on the context, boss, underwriter, creditor, em-
ployer, and boat captain (Burch, 1975). The umialik
recruited his crew by the strength of his moral char-
acter and resources. On the coast, this crew took
part in the whaling activities and associated ritu-
als. In the interior, the crew took part in caribou
drives and surrounds, and building and repairing
the caribou fences and stone cairns which were used
to drive the caribou into small lakes or narrow
passes. In these places, with their mobility re-
stricted, the caribou were killed. Small kayaks were
used to pursue them in lakes, where the caribou
would be speared with a lance; or they would be shot
with bow and arrows at surprise surrounds in the
case of land hunts at passes. Interior Seward Pen-
insula has many of these old caribou traps where
the animals were driven into the lakes. Several are
known in the Kuzitrin Lake and Imuruk Lake area
(Powers et al., 1975).
The resources which the umialik used to recruit
and keep a group of followers were the products of
the labor which he and his wife put into accumulat-
ing them. These included a boat, a store of food sup-
plies, and tools and weapons with which to outfit
the hunting group. Considerable energy is needed
in order to accumulate these. Paralleling this situa-
tion was the effort which the reindeer herd owner
today must expend in both herd management and
politicking. Most herd owners are active in local and
regional politics through the participation in the vil-
lage or regional corporation and other political insti-
tutions, such as the IRA Councils and the Reindeer
Herders Association. The herd owner uses the ma-
terial resources at his disposal (his herd, boat, snow
machine, etc.) as well as his group of followers (his
kindred and family) to achieve economic and politi-
cal success. Since herding is not in most cases the
sole source of income for the herd owner, he may be
able to afford to take a loss in one reaches a size
large enough to be considered economical (as the sec-
tion on production costs and revenues shows). On
the other hand, one yearÕs loss, or several in a row,
can lead to discouragement and abandonment of
herding as part of the household economic strategy.
Herd owner characterization
It is not possible to paint a picture of a Òtypical
reindeer herd ownerÓ for there is a great deal of
variation among them. This is particularly true in
terms of their education, age, skills, or other factors
which constitute their personality. Nonetheless, one
can and must make some generalizations about herd
owners. They do tend to fall into two age groups:
the younger men in their late 20s and 30s, and older
men in their 50s and 60s. The younger men have
accumulated experience with reindeer through their
fathers who were herders. The older men who are
herders became so with their families at a young
age, or entered the reindeer business by acquiring
herds, then developing their skills through trial and
error as they sought to build up their herds. Fig-
ures have been provided which indicate the accu-
mulated reindeer experience of many of the contem-
porary herd owners (cf Tables 12, 13, and 14).
Generally, herd owners have less than a high
school education, but there are a few exceptions.
Most are also skilled in other areas, such as heavy
equipment operation and repair, retail sales, min-
ing, or general labor. Some are accomplished politi-
cians in local village government, or within the vil-
lage or regional corporation. Some are even involved
at the inter—regional level. Cumulatively, they are
not atypical of other Eskimos of the region in their
assortment of job skills, experience, and upbring-
ing. The only exception lies in the fact that they are
reindeer herd owners.
The economic analysis of the reindeer herds will
indicate that many herd owners do not generate suf-
ficient income from reindeer herding to provide their
total yearly income or food supply (Chapter VIII).
This being the case, a question can be posed as to
why they bother to herd reindeer at all. When this
question is posed, answers vary. Some say that they
enjoy the opportunity to be out of doors, which tend-
ing to reindeer matters afford them. Others indi-
cate that the income and meat provided for their
families and their village motivates them to keep
on herding. Within the context of the mixed economic
strategies which most households must rely on in
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order to provide sufficient food, housing, and income,
reindeer herding must be understood as only one
aspect of the overall strategy employed by either
households or individuals. This means they must
have both inclination and the administrative abil-
ity to secure the necessary grazing permit from the
Bureau of Land Management and a sufficient num-
ber of reindeer to stock their assigned range. Once
these two prerequisites are fulfilled, the aspiring
herd owner must make do with low returns of meat
and income from his herd for several years before it
increases in size to the point where it is economi-
cally viable. The failure rate of herds which attempt
to reach this level, somewhat over 1,000 reindeer, is
high. Nevertheless, herd owners continue to aspire
to develop an economically viable herd. Other en-
trepreneurial activities of herd owners such as
storekeeping and housing rentals, as well as secur-
ing steady employment in the villages (through the
outside institutions) reflects this aspiration to eco-
nomic security, as well as representing the mixed
economic strategy typical of village households.
It is necessary to explore some of the different cul-
tural definitions of ÒsuccessÓ in this regard. Obvi-
ously, the management practices currently followed
do not conform with those necessary to a high—yield,
profit—maximizing plan of operations. Yet reindeer
herding operations have operated on a partial—sub-
sistence, partial cash income basis for the thirty—
odd years since reestablishing herds following World
War II. We suggest that this persistent pattern has
its roots in the expectations of the herders and their
collective experiences with reindeer herding. It has
been noted that a herd owner, ironically enough, may
be able to earn more income as a wage earner him-
self than in supplying more meat to a community
which would be accompanied by increased demands
on him. There are a few young men employed as
herders today. The few who have their own herds
are exceptions, since Olson (1969) notes a generation
gap between the older, experienced reindeer men, al-
most all of whom are over fifty, and the younger men
in their twenties and thirties. ÒSuccessÓ is taken to
mean a wage job by most young Eskimos. Subsis-
tence hunting takes on a recreational aspect since
it affords time away from the village, home, and the
tedium of a nine—to—five job. ÒFailureÓ is what hap-
pens to a person who does not take care of his fam-
ily, depends on welfare, drinks excessively, and
abuses his family physically.
Chapter VII
Marketing of reindeer
products
This chapter is concerned with the marketing of
reindeer products. Topics to be discussed include the
marketing of reindeer meat, the marketing of vel-
vet antler, and the combined value of all reindeer
products sold or used in the home by herd owners.
In our discussion of reindeer meat marketing, we
will consider the time of year and methods by which
reindeer are slaughtered and meat distributed, the
quantity and value of the reindeer meat produced
in Alaska and the Seward Peninsula from 1960 to
1977, the prices received by herd owners for carcass
reindeer meat, and the protein contribution of rein-
deer meat to residents of northwest Alaska. The
analysis of velvet—antler marketing will focus on
antler—harvesting procedures, a summary of prices
received by herd owners for this product over the
last several years, and the quantity and value of
velvet—antler production in Alaska for the years
1975—1977. The last major topic, value of reindeer
products, describes the quantity and value of all re-
indeer products produced from all Alaska reindeer
herds between 1972 and 1977 and gives the quan-
tity and value of reindeer product sales from the
Seward Peninsula for 1975—1977.
Marketing of reindeer meat
Through 1977, the main product from Alaska re-
indeer herds in terms of quantity and value of pro-
duction was carcass reindeer meat. In 1977, Alaska
reindeer herd owners produced 312,000 pounds of
dressed reindeer meat and sold 256,000 pounds
(Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service,
1978). The remaining 56,000 pounds were used by
herd owners in the home and as payment for labor
used during normal herd operations. The main
source of carcass reindeer meat is steers, although
some bulls, cows, and calves are included in any
yearÕs total production. The bulk of the slaughter-
ing activity occurs in October through February. A
variable number of reindeer can be slaughtered
throughout the year, however. Although a reindeer
carcass can weigh 150 pounds and more, the total
recent production figures for Alaska indicate an av-
erage of approximately 120 pounds per carcass. (This
average weight is based on field observation, individual
herd records, and the U.S. Department of the Interior,
BIA, Annual Land Operation Reports 1960—1971.)
Marketing methods
In 1977, all herd owners on the Seward Peninsula
butchered and marketed their own reindeer, with
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the exception of two who sold live reindeer and the
buyers butchered and marketed these reindeer. An
estimated 80 to 9O percent of the reindeer meat sold
in the past few years from Seward Peninsula herds
has been consumed within the region. The remain-
ing reindeer meat produced in recent years has gone
to Anchorage and the Òlower 48 states.Ó That por-
tion going to Anchorage has been used in the mak-
ing of sausage while the meat going to the Òlower
48Ó has been marketed as a specialty meat.
All slaughtering of reindeer on the Seward Penin-
sula is done in the field. Even those reindeer car-
casses that will leave northwest Alaska, and which
therefore must be government inspected, are killed
in the field and then brought to the Nome reindeer
slaughter plant for inspection. The majority of
slaughtering takes place during the winter months
when herders have a mobility advantage over the
reindeer. With the use of snow machines, herders
can move faster than reindeer over the snow—cov-
ered ground. Two other reasons account for the
slaughtering of reindeer during winter months.
First, if the slaughtering can be accomplished dur-
ing the first part of winter, the reindeer will be in
their best condition following summer weight gains.
Second, slaughtering in subfreezing temperatures
quickly freezes carcasses for delivery to buyers. For
these reasons, most of the reindeer slaughtering
takes place from October through February. Slaugh-
tering does occur at other times of the year on a lim-
ited basis, mainly for the ownerÕs home consump-
tion. The exact time when each herd butchers de-
pends on individual preference, the location of the
reindeer, weather, and availability of labor.
As has been noted before, the production from in-
dividual herds is distributed in a number of ways
(Olson, 1969). At the village level, reindeer meat is
distributed: 1) as wage—meat payments; 2) as sales
to village residents; and 3) as sales to village stores.
Owners of the larger herds also sell meat to the
regionÕs two largest population centers, Nome and
Kotzebue.
The first of the village distribution channels in-
volves wage—meat payments and herd owner home
use. Many village residents receive part of their
yearly meat supply by working for a herd owner at
handlings or butcherings and receiving reindeer
meat as payment in lieu of cash. Herd owners value
reindeer meat as wages at current market price. But
often herd owners will ÒoverpayÓ workers by pro-
viding them with more meat than they have earned
by their time actually worked. An explanation for
this behavior is herd owners acting as village
umialiks. (See Chapter VI).
Reindeer herds on the Seward Peninsula are based
at the villages of Shishmaref, Wales, Brevig Mis-
sion, Koyuk, Golovin, Teller, Deering, and Buckland,
and at the towns of Nome and Kotzebue. The popu-
lation of the villages is estimated to total 1,233
people. In 1976, approximately 400 reindeer car-
casses were used by herd owners in these villages
specifically for home consumption and labor pay-
ment. The per capita consumption from this method
of distribution amounted to approximately .32 rein-
deer carcass (39 pounds) per village resident.
A second method of village distribution is sales
directly to village residents. In one instance in the
summer of 1977, this took the form of a herd owner
taking orders for reindeer meat from the back of a
pickup truck as he was bringing the carcasses of four
or five reindeer into the village. Through August of
1977, herd owners were selling reindeer meat to vil-
lage residents for 85 cents per pound.
A final type of village distribution is the sale of
carcasses to village stores. These stores usually sell
reindeer meat as sides or quarters and ten cents per
pound is added to the price exacted by the herd
owner as a handling charge. In 1976 and the first
half of 1977, this produced a price at village stores
of 95 cents per pound. Villages stores generally have
reindeer meat only during the winter months since
they have little or no cold storage facilities. It is
doubtful if reindeer meat would be available in the
summer even if more storage were available. There
are basically two reasons for this. First, it is diffi-
cult to slaughter reindeer in the summer because of
the problems in getting close to them, and second,
reindeer are in the best condition for slaughter in
the first part of winter.
Herd owners with less than 1,000 reindeer gener-
ally distribute all their reindeer meat in the village
through either home consumption, wage—meat pay-
ments, sales to village stores, or sales to village resi-
dents. Larger herd owners, besides using these same
channels, also sell reindeer meat to the two popula-
tion centers of northwest Alaska: Nome and
Kotzebue, and at times also make sales out of the
region. In 1976, Nome stores sold approximately
100,000 pounds of reindeer meat, while stores in
Kotzebue sold approximately 54,000 pounds of re-
indeer meat. During the winter of 1976—1977, rein-
deer retail cuts sold for approximately $1.70 per
pound as stew meat, $1.90 per pound as shoulder
cuts, and $2.00 per pound as hind cuts in Nome and
Kotzebue. Prices for a competing source of protein
in Nome, Alaska, were given in the March 1977
Quarterly Food Price Index. They were $2.99 per
pound for beef round steak, $2.04 per pound for beef
chuck roast, and $1.79 per pound for beef hamburger
(Thomas, 1977). As with village stores, reindeer meat
is generally available only in Nome and Kotzebue
stores during winter months. These stores would like
to carry reindeer meat on a year—round basis; how-
ever, production is not large enough to meet this de-
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sire. Freezer facilities in the towns are sufficient to
hold a large supply of reindeer meat during the sum-
mer months. These towns are also not subjected to
the frequent power outages which the villages ex-
perience.
In the winter of 1976—1977, in contrast to other
owners, two herd owners marketed their excess re-
indeer as live reindeer, thus eliminating the prob-
lems of butchering and making marketing arrange-
ments. These two herd owners received $70 per head
for these live reindeer. If the reindeer averaged 120
pounds per carcass, these owners received 60 cents
per pound for the dressed meat. However, they did
not pay any costs of slaughter. This marketing op-
tion may be currently available only to these two
owners as they manage their herding operations on
the one area of the Seward Peninsula which has a
road system. This makes it relatively easy and in-
expensive for meat buyers to reach the reindeer.
Alaska reindeer meat production:
1960—1977
Total production, sales, and home and herd use of
reindeer slaughtered by Alaska reindeer herd own-
ers for the years 1960—1977 are provided in Table
18. This period was characterized by generally in-
creasing production until 1968, at which time a gen-
eral decline can be noted. From 1960 through 1968,
except for the years 1962 and 1967, total produc-
tion increased yearly. In 1968, total production
amounted to 754,000 pounds of dressed reindeer
meat, 608,000 pounds of sales, and 146,000 pounds
of reindeer meat used in home and herd operations.
During this same period, the value of production gen-
erally increased, with the value of production esti-
mated to be $324,000 in 1968.
From 1969 through 1977, production generally
declined with 1976 being the low point when only
286,000 pounds of production occurred: 234,000
pounds of sales and 52,000 pounds of home and herd
use. In 1977, production rebounded over the previ-
ous year as 312,000 pounds of production was ac-
complished. The value of production followed the
quantity of production through 1972. However, in
1973, although production was lower than the pre-
vious year, the value of this production was $16,000
greater. Again in 1974, production fell but the value
of the production increased over the previous year.
The largest slaughter since 1971 occurred in 1975.
This factor, combined with increased meet prices,
raised the value of reindeer meat produced in Alaska
to $308,000, a figure only exceeded by the value of
the 1968 production. The 1968 slaughter was
409,000 pounds greater than the quantity of rein-
deer meat produced in 1975. In both 1976 and 1977,
meat production was below the level of 1975 with
per pound carcass meat values remaining relatively
stable in these years.
As with total reindeer numbers in
Alaska, the overall decline in reindeer
meat production between 1960 and 1977
was caused largely by the decline of the
Nunivak Island reindeer herd, instead of
a general decline in reindeer numbers in
all areas of Alaska. In 1960, the Nunivak
herd totaled 16,000 reindeer, of which
1,625 were butchered. In 1964, this herd
totaled 13,200 reindeer, and of this num-
ber 2,826 were butchered; while in 1968
the herd totaled 10,200 and 1,749 reindeer
were butchered. However, in 1976, this
herd had decreased to 4,000 reindeer, of
which only 301 were butchered. The 1977
slaughter consisted of 187 reindeer. If these
carcasses averaged 120 pounds, Nunivak
accounted for 195,000 pounds of the rein-
deer meat slaughter in Alaska in 1960,
339,120 pounds in 1964, 209,880 pounds
in 1968, 36,120 pounds in 1976, but only
22,440 pounds in 1977.
Seward Peninsula reindeer
meat sales: 1960—1977
Reindeer meat sales by herds on the
Seward Peninsula for the years 1960—1977
are given in Table 19. This table does not
Table 18. Production and sale of reindeer meat
by Alaskan reindeer herders, 1960—1977.
Home and
Total production Sales  herd use
Pounds Value Pounds Value Pounds Value
Year dr. wt.a ($)b dr. wt.a ($)b dr. wt.a ($)b
1977 312 275 256 225 56 50
1976 286 243 234 199 52 44
1975 345 308 287 257 58 51
1974 300 205 220 150 80 55
1973 324 182 261 144 63 32
1972 328 166 239 121 89 45
1971 456 235 365 188 91 47
1970 615 300 479 241 136 59
1969 585 277 458 219 127 58
1968 754 324 608 260 146 64
1967 692 265 517 188 175 77
1966 701 249 546 190 155 59
1965 637 242 522 200 115 42
1964 660 254 504 195 156 59
1963 490 179 394 138 96 41
1962 482 182 372 139 110 43
1961 485 181 364 136 121 45
1960 450 180 330 132 120 48
adr. wt. = dress weight (in thousands of pounds).
b (in thousands of dollars).
Source: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service 1973—1978.
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include the reindeer meat used by herd owners in
home and herd operations. (Except for 1976, home
and herd operation information has not been avail-
able since 1971. In 1976, approximately 400 car-
casses [48,000 pounds were used for these purposes.)
The quantity of meat sales by Seward Peninsula
herds did not decline from beginning to end for the
period 1960—1977, although a decline was seen in
production by Alaska reindeer herds as a whole. This
occurred because reindeer numbers have remained
relatively constant on the Peninsula since 1960,
varying from a high of 22,168 in 1966, to a low of
16,369 in 1968. In 1976, the estimated number of
reindeer was 17,425; while in 1977, reindeer were
estimated at 17,800 animals.
The value of reindeer meat sales on the Seward
Peninsula showed an overall increase during this
period. In 1960, the value of reindeer meat sales to
herd owners on the Seward Peninsula amounted to
$38,064. In 1977, the value of reindeer meat sales
was estimated at $201,380, the highest value in all
the listed years.
Price received by herders: 1960—1977
The average price per pound received by Alaska
reindeer herd owners for reindeer meat for the years
1960—1977 is provided in Table 20. From 1960
through 1968, the price per pound remained rela-
tively stable, averaging 37 cents per pound. In 1969,
the price rose 6 cents over the 1968 price of 42 cents.
In the period 1970—1973, the price rose slowly, reach-
ing 55 cents in 1973. The period from 1974—1977
was one of rapid changes. The 1974 price rose 15
cents. In 1975 and 1976, the price rose 5 cents and
10 cents, respectively, over the preceding year. In
1976, herd owners received 85 cents per pound for
their reindeer meat. This price prevailed until the
end of August, 1977.
There are a number of reasons suggested in eco-
nomic theory for the increase in price received by
Alaska reindeer herd owners for carcass reindeer
meat (Burk, 1968). The following factors have
tended to increase the consumer demand in north-
west Alaska: population growth in the region, in-
creased earned incomes of region residents, in-
creased transfer payments such as food stamps, a
perceived preference for reindeer and caribou meat,
general price increases of substitutes for these
meats, and the demise of the Western Arctic Cari-
bou Herd. In 1974, the NANA Regional Corpora-
tion estimated that the regionÕs residents consumed
14,000 caribou annually (Mauneluk Association,
Inc., 1974). During the winter of 1976—1977, state—
imposed hunting restrictions limited the harvest to
3,000 caribou. On the supply side, supplies of rein-
deer in northwest Alaska, as evidenced by numbers
of animals annually slaughtered, although showing
some variation up and down,
have remained relatively stable
since 1969, averaging an annual
sale of 1,835 carcasses from
Seward Peninsula reindeer
herds. Increasing demand with
a comparatively stable reindeer
supply has put upward pressure
on prices.
Protein contribution
of reindeer
As noted earlier, the per
capita consumption of reindeer
meat on Seward Peninsula from
wage—meats (400 carcasses) in
1976 was .32 carcasses per vil-
lage resident per year (1,233
residents in the eight villages
with herds) or approximately 39
pounds of reindeer meat. Sales
to village residents and to vil-
lage and town stores totaled ap-
proximately 1,550 animals in
1976, which, at an average of
120 pounds each, would repre-
sent some 186,000 pounds of
meat. Combining the town
Table 19. Reindeer meat sales by Seward Peninsula reindeer herders,
1960—1977.
Est. no. reindeer Number Pounds Value
Year on Seward Pen. carcasses sold meat sold (dollars)
1977 17,800 1,974 236,920a 201,380
1976 17,425 1,820 218,400a 185,640
1975 20,600 1,766 211,920a 158,940
1974 n/ab 1,164 139,680a 97,776
1973 17,397  n/a n/a n/a
1972 19,828 n/a n/a n/a
1971 n/a 2,263 271,560 141,211
1970 20,292 2,168 260,160 130,080
1969 17,009 1,792 215,040 103,219
1968 16,369 3,505 420,600 176,652
1967 18,795 2,434 292,080 105,148
1966 22,168 2,790 334,800 113,832
1965 18,944 1,527 183,240 69,631
1964 20,449 1,266 147,120 51,492
1963 18,880 1,043 125,160 46,309
1962 17,940 1,339 160,680 59,229
1961 16,405 912 109,440 40,492
1960 18,529 688 82,560 38,064
aCarcasses assumed to average 120 pounds, actual figures not available.
bn/a= data not available.
Sources: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, BIA, Annual Land Operation Reports 1960—
1971, Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service 1973—1978, Reindeer Herd-
ers, BLM Case Files.
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(Nome and Kotzebue) population figures with those
of the villages (6,249 people, 1975 figures) and to-
taling all reindeer meat consumed regardless of by
what means it was obtained (approximately 234,000
pounds), yields a per capita consumption figure of
37 pounds for the Seward Peninsula. Thus, per
capita consumption of reindeer meat in the towns
and in the villages on Seward Peninsula from both
wage—meats and purchases was about equal.
The figures for the villages reflect the payment of
meat as wages to villagers. In the towns, there are
few people who earn reindeer meat in this manner.
Additionally, the figures for Nome and Kotzebue re-
flect a higher percentage of non—Natives in the popu-
lation than do the figures for the villages. The non—
Native buyers are probably following meat consump-
tion patterns developed in the Òlower 48,Ó so they
buy the customary meats rather than reindeer,
which is a novelty to them. This implies that the
per capita Native consumption of reindeer meat in
the towns may actually be higher than in the vil-
lages. Part of the reason may be that people living
in villages have a greater opportunity to obtain other
traditional foods.
Recent studies of the impacts of Eskimo accultura-
tion in terms of diet are reported by Draper (1977).
Although direct comparisons are not possible, there
exists the high probability that Seward Peninsula
villages are roughly comparable to Wainwright and
Point Hope, where data are available. At these vil-
lages, a study of diet in 1971 and 1972 concluded
that:
Wainwright adults obtained nearly half of
their calories from native sources and about
three—quarters of their protein. At Point
Hope, where dietary acculturation is more ex-
tensive, less than one—quarter of the calories
in the adult diet were obtained from indig-
enous foods, which nevertheless provided
over half of dietary protein. The proportion
of native foods in the diet of children, on the
average, was about half that in the diet of
adults. (Draper, 1977).
Since caribou were present near both of these vil-
lages in the two years studied, we assume that they
made up a portion of the diet. Caribou and reindeer
are virtually identical in composition and nutritive
value (University of Alaska, 1973). Granted these
assumptions and having already indicated that there
is a high per capita consumption of reindeer on
Seward Peninsula, it is suggested that reindeer rep-
resent a significant contribution to the protein in-
take and, consequently, the overall health of the
Seward Peninsula population.
Table 21 is presented to show comparative nutri-
tional data for reindeer and other meat products. A
comparison of the figures in Table 21 shows that
reindeer is a high—protein, red—meat source, low in
fat and high in calories. Its lower cost relative to
these other meats has been discussed. Coupled with
the fact that it is a locally desired product, one can
see the value of reindeer meat as a protein source
for northwest Alaska.
The study by Draper (1977) contains implications
for the health of the residents of this region.
While the primitive Eskimo was beset by
serious nutritional crises, these problems
arose not from deficiencies in the quality of
his native diet but from periodic breakdowns
in his food supply as a result of natural
forces.... He ate a balanced diet for one simple
reason: there was little else to eat. The mod-
ern Eskimo has for the first time the oppor-
tunity to make significant food choices. Pre-
sented with an array of exotic new foods
which he is not equipped by personal experi-
ence or education to evaluate, he tends to
choose badly. In general, the items he selects
are below the average quality of the U.S.
mixed diet and of the foods they replace in
his native diet. His nutritional status is de-
teriorating, in terms of both undernutrition
and overnutrition, in direct relation to the
proportion of processed foods in his diet.
(Draper, 1977).
On the basis of this and the data obtained in this
study, reindeer can be viewed as important to the
diet of Seward Peninsula peoples and if excluded
could accelerate the current undesirable decline in
the nutritional status of these people.
Conventional wisdom of modern nutritionists rec-
ommend a mixed diet consisting of foods from four
groups: cereals, fruits and vegetables, meat, and
dairy products. The precontact diet of most Eski-
mos consisted almost entirely of meat and fish. This
Table 20. Price per pound received by herd owners
for reindeer meat, 1960—1977.
Price per pound Price per pound
Year (cents) Year (cents)
1977 85a 1968 42
1976 85 1967 36
1975 75 1966 34
1974 70 1965 38
1973 55 1964 35
1972 51 1963 37
1971 52 1962 37
1970 50 1961 37
1969 48 1960 40
aJanuary—August.
Sources: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, BIA Annual Land Op-
eration Reports 1960—1971, Alaska Crop and Livestock
Reporting Service 1973—1976, Reindeer Herders.
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Table 21. Composition of foods, 100 grams, edible portion.
Moisture Food energy Protein Fat
Meat (percent) (calories) (grams) (grams)
Beef, good grade, raw, 100% leana 72.1 139 21.8 5.1
Chicken, light meat without skin, rawa 73.7 117 23.4 1.9
Pork, fresh, carcass, raw, fat class 33.4 553 9.1 57.0
(total edible 41% lean, 59% fat)a
Reindeer, raw fleshb 70.1 117 26.6 1.2
aData from Watt et al., 1963: Table 1.
bData from University of Alaska, 1973.
paradox suggests that Eskimos have made certain
metabolic adjustments in order to sustain life and
health in the rigorous arctic environment. Many of
these metabolic adjustments have been investigated
(Milan, 1962; Milan and Evonuk, 1967; Milan et al.,
1963), but the exact nature of the relationship be-
tween Eskimo diet and metabolism is still imper-
fectly understood.
Marketing of reindeer velvet antler
Reindeer velvet antler is sold for use in oriental
medicines. Although the supposed power of antlers
from several deer species, including reindeer, have
gained wide notoriety as aphrodisiacs, most antler
buyers insist that reindeer antlers are not sold as
aphrodisiacs. Rather, antlers are seen as having the
ability to restore and strengthen the body. To prac-
titioners of oriental medicine, antlers are useful in
treating, for example, convulsions, vaginal hemor-
rhage, and bladder stones. In this view, any sexual
enhancement results from better health, not from
the antler itself. Most of the reindeer velvet antler
harvested from Alaskan reindeer herds is destined
for final sale in the Orient, with South Korea being
the largest consuming country. It appears that deer
antlers are used by older people in these countries.
Buyers have expressed concern that the younger
members of these populations may not adopt the use
of antlers as have their parents. This can only be
viewed as speculation at this time because no de-
mand studies for antler have been undertaken.
Harvesting of reindeer antler
Velvet antler can be harvested only at summer
handlings. In order to overcome the traditional dif-
ficulties of summer herding, the herds are now
driven into the corrals for antler harvesting by a
helicopter swinging back and forth behind the rein-
deer. This is a faster method than the herding on
foot which was used until a few years ago. Once a
herd is corralled, the reindeer are pushed single file
through a chute at the end of the corral. As each
adult reindeer moves through the chute it is held by
four men and most of its antler is removed using a
hand—held cutter. A rubber band is twisted around
the remaining antler to prevent excessive bleeding.
The smaller calf antlers are left intact.
Antler is harvested at the end of June or during
the first part of July because it is during this period
that the antler is most desirable: it is the largest
size possible, but the inside of the antler still has a
spongy texture. If the antler is allowed to continue
to develop, it eventually becomes completely ossi-
fied. For this reason, antler buyers prefer not to pur-
chase antler after the middle of July.
Price history
The price per pound received by reindeer herd
owners for velvet antler has increased steadily in
recent years. In 1969, herd owners received $1.00
per pound. In 1972, the price rose to $3.50 per pound;
in 1975, to $4.32 per pound; and by 1976, the price
had risen to $5.58 per pound. These price increases
likely are a result of additional buyers attempting
to purchase reindeer antlers. In 1977, two different
prices were received. Except for one herd, all own-
ers on the Seward Peninsula were under a multi—
year contract and received $8.00 per pound. One
herd received $23.76 per pound for its velvet antler
production in 1977, the result of competitive bid-
ding.
The sale of reindeer velvet antler has become an
increasingly important source of income to Alaska
reindeer herd owners. Based on information supplied
by buyers and herd owners, the pounds and the value
of sales for all Alaska reindeer herds for the years
1975—1977 are presented in Table 22. During these
three years the quantity sold remained relatively
stable. Price received, however, increased yearly, to
where, in 1977, the value of sales more than doubled
the 1975 level. The Seward Peninsula (Table 23) ac-
counted for all sales of velvet antler from Alaska for
the years 1976 and 1977. In 1975, antler sales from
Nunivak Island accounted for $5,310 (8 per cent) of
total sales.
Value of reindeer  products
In 1977, the value of sales and home use of rein-
deer products from all Alaska reindeer herds was
estimated to total $471,000 (Alaska Crop and Live-
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stock Reporting Service, 1978). Of this total, 95 per-
cent ($446,673) was derived from reindeer meat and
velvet antler. Five percent ($24,327) came from the
production of hides, leggings (lower leg skins used
for making mukluks), and meat by—products. On the
Seward Peninsula, the value of the 1977 meat and
antler sales was estimated to total $373,053.
The value of all reindeer products produced in
Alaska for the years 1972—1977 is presented in Table
24. This production value includes reindeer meat
and meat by—products, velvet antler, and reindeer
hides and leggings. It includes meat and meat by—
products used in the home and/or for herd opera-
tions. For the years 1972—1977, with the exception
of 1977, the total value of all production increased
yearly. This increased value was due largely to in-
creased prices for reindeer meat and velvet antler.
Reindeer meat production from all Alaska herds
actually showed a downward trend in the years
1972—1977, as was discussed previously.
The value of reindeer meat sales and velvet ant-
ler sales on the Seward Peninsula for the years 1975
through 1977 is provided in Table 25. (This table
was constructed with data from interviews gathered
by interviewing herd owners and antler buyers, and
the examination of BLM case files.) The value of
hides and meat by—products is not available, but
likely accounted for only an additional four to five
per cent of total value. Sales in 1977 were $108,313
greater than in 1976, an increase of 41 per cent. Most
of the increase was due to higher antler prices be-
tween 1976 and 1977. Antler production increased
by approximately ten per cent while the value of
antler production rose by $92,573, a 117 per cent
increase.
Chapter VIII
Socioeconomics of
reindeer herding
The analysis of the socioeconomics of reindeer
herding presented in this chapter is based prima-
rily on research conducted in 1976 and 1977. In a
few instances, literature published after 1977 has
been included in an attempt to update the chapter.
Nevertheless, because it was impossible to cover all
the socioeconomic changes which occurred more re-
cently in the Alaskan reindeer industry, the picture
of reindeer herding which emerges from this chap-
ter is principally of the earlier period.
Production and herd management
Herd Sizes
In early 1977, thirteen individuals and one Na-
tive corporation had permits to graze reindeer on
the Seward Peninsula, not including the herd at
Shaktoolik. Based on the reindeer which overwin-
tered, total reindeer numbers were estimated at
17,800 animals. Herds could be divided into four size
classes: less than 1000 reindeer, between 1000 and
2000 reindeer, between 2000 and 3000 reindeer, and
over 4000 reindeer. Six herd owners had less than
1000 reindeer each, two of these herds numbered
less than 100 reindeer per herd. The remaining four
herds in this category averaged 600 animals. There
were five herd owners with between 1000 and 2000
reindeer, an average of 1300 reindeer per herd. Two
herd owners had between 2000 and 3000 reindeer
each. These herds averaged 2400 reindeer. One herd,
however, was estimated between 4000 and 4500 ani-
mals.
Herding
With the exception of one herd, reindeer herds on
the Seward Peninsula are not herded year—round
but are left untended for much of the year. The great-
est amount of herding occurs during the winter and
spring calving season, with little or no herding tak-
ing place during the summer. Even during the win-
ter, herding is generally limited to checking the herd
condition and location, as the reindeer, for the most
part, select their own range. This may take the form
of observing the reindeer daily, simply checking on
their whereabouts three or four times a week, or
only occasional observation of the reindeerÕs where-
abouts during the winter. The majority of herd own-
ers employ one or two herders from November to
May to help with this herding. Another function of
winter herding centers on attempts to return strays
to the main group. However, as herding is currently
practiced, it is almost impossible to keep bulls with
the main herd after the fall rut, as they tend to stay
away from the females. Other winter—herding chores
include determining the availability of forage where
the herd is grazing and watching for predators. If
little forage is available, the herd may be moved. If
predators are near the herd, attempts are made to
Table 22. Velvet antler salesÑAlaska, 1975—1977.
Year Pounds Sale Value
1977 15,037 $171,673
1976 13,661 79,085
1975 15,058 65,829
Table 23. Velvet antler salesÑ
Seward Peninsula, 1975—1977.
Year Pounds Sale Value
1977 15,037 $171,673
1976 13,661 79,085
1975 14,173 60,519
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eliminate them.
Although herding is not constant during the win-
ter and herders are not with the reindeer continu-
ously, it should not be assumed that herders do not
know the location of the reindeer most of the time.
The reindeer are checked often enough for owners
to know the general location of the herd. Herd own-
ers also receive reports of reindeer whereabouts from
pilots and villagers who see the reindeer in the
course of travel and subsistence activities away from
the village.
During the months of June through September,
reindeer move about as they please, seeking their
own range. They are not herded during this period
except for one handling in late June or early July
for velvet—antler harvesting. On the Seward Penin-
sula, reindeer tend to graze into the prevailing west-
erly winds during the summer in an attempt to stay
cool and avoid summer insects. Since they are not
herded, reindeer are free to move from one range to
another. Unless a herd owner has a barrier on the
western edge of his grazing permit, such as the coast
or mountains, some of his reindeer can and do drift
to his western neighborÕs range. Part of several own-
ersÕ success has come from receiving stray reindeer
from eastern neighbors. Although the adult reindeer
have been earmarked by their rightful owners, the
calves have not and will become additions to the
western neighborÕs herd. Failure to notify another
herder about strays or failure to return strays is a
sore point between some herd owners.
Herding is extremely difficult during the summer
because reindeer have greater mobility than herd-
ers. Reindeer move faster across the summer tun-
dra than men on foot. Herding reindeer on foot is
Table 24. Value of reindeer productionÑ
Alaska, 1972—1977.
Antler, hides and
Year Reindeer meat meat byproducts Total
1977 $275,000 $196,000 $471,000
1976 243,000 258,000a 501,000
1975 308,000 83,500 391,500
1974 205,000 60,000 265,000
1973 182,000 34,000 216,000
1972 166,000 49,000 215,000
aIncludes sale of live reindeer.
Source: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service
1973—1978.
Table 25. Value of reindeer product salesÑSeward
Peninsula, 1975—1977.
Year Reindeer meat sales Antler sales Total
1977 $201,380 $171,673 $373,053
1976 185,640 79,100 264,740
1975 158,940 60,500 219,440
the traditional method of summer herding. Even
when all—terrain vehicles are used, it is still diffi-
cult to keep up with reindeer as much of the terrain
is covered by water. Reindeer swim easily across the
many bodies of water on the Seward Peninsula while
all—terrain vehicles are less versatile. They do not
float and have questionable mechanical reliability.
Besides straying, several other problems arise
from allowing reindeer to move about untended. One
writer has observed the following :
A herd that is left untended for much of
the year is more wild than domestic; virtu-
ally impossible to locate in its entirety for
marking, castrating, and slaughtering; and
selects its own range. This makes it impos-
sible for a herder to attempt to achieve a bull—
to—cow ratio he may desire, or to slaughter
on the basis of complete knowledge of herd
composition. (Olson, 1969).
Allowing reindeer to select their own range causes
the overutilization of some ranges and the
underutilization of other ranges. Inefficient use of
range can reduce reindeer weights, calf crops, and
range carrying capacity.
One herd is handled differently on the Seward
Peninsula. Its reindeer are kept together using full—
time herders who stay with the reindeer virtually
year—round. Each day, during the winter, an attempt
is made to bunch the herd and return strays to the
main herd. During the summer, although herder
mobility is reduced and the herd cannot be kept as
close together as in winter, the herders still camp
near the herd, attempting to return strays to the
main herd and watching for predators.
Employee turnover appears to be high with full—
time herding. Generalizing from the experience of
the one herd using full—time herders, and from the
current cycle of seasonal activities which most vil-
lagers still practice on the Seward Peninsula, it may
be difficult to attract and retain herders. Even then,
the herders may prefer a less routinized cycle of ac-
tivities. Indeed, one of the complaints voiced about
full—time herding is that it is boring and not varied
enough to suit the challenges and changes which
Eskimos enjoy.
Slaughtering
Most commercial slaughtering takes place during
the months of October through February. As dis-
cussed in Chapter VII, this is the preferred time of
year for several reasons. First, during this period,
herders have a mobility advantage over reindeer
with the use of snow machines. Snow machines can
move faster over snow than reindeer, allowing the
reindeer to be approached. Second, reindeer are in
their best condition in the first part of winter. The
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green pastures and warm temperatures during the
summer have allowed the reindeer to add fat to their
bodies in preparation for the long, Arctic winter. In
addition, since the reindeer are field slaughtered and
field dressed (hides and internal organs removed),
there is little need for cold storage when transport-
ing carcasses. The carcasses freeze quickly in the
subzero temperatures and the danger of spoilage is
reduced.
Most commercial slaughtering takes place with-
out the herds being corralled. When slaughtering is
to take place, the usual procedure is for a work crew
to ride snow machines to within a short distance of
the herd. The reindeer are then shot and dressed. If
the carcasses are to go to the herd ownerÕs village
they will be transported normally by snow machine.
Shipments to stores in Nome and Kotzebue will most
often be sent by airplane with the meat buyers pay-
ing the transportation charge, 6 to 12 cents per
pound in 1977, according to the distance. Depend-
ing on the size of the slaughtering crew, the location
of the reindeer, and the Arctic weather, between 20
to 30 reindeer can be killed and dressed per day.
The slaughtering of reindeer in the field is not al-
ways the simple process it may first appear to be
and the actual quantity of meat obtained from the
slaughtering may result as much from circumstance
as plan. A herd owner may plan to butcher a certain
number of steers and old bulls during a winter
slaughtering. However, this may not be possible
since (1) inclement weather may interfere with
roundup activities, (2) the herd may be scattered
and difficult to locate, or (3) females may be located
more easily as they group together. These problems
may result in the slaughtering of fewer reindeer than
intended, or slaughtering reindeer of the wrong age,
size, or sex such as productive females.
Information from BLM case files, herd—owner
records, and BIA Annual Land Operation Reports
1960—1971 give approximations of slaughter num-
bers. Between 1970 and 1976, herd owners with less
than 1000 reindeer slaughtered an average of 10 per
cent of their herds yearly. Herd owners with between
1000 reindeer and 2000 reindeer slaughtered an av-
erage of 18 per cent of their herds annually, while
herd owners having between 2000 and 3000 rein-
deer slaughtered an average of 16 per cent of their
herds. For average herd sizes of 600 reindeer, 1300
reindeer, and 2400 reindeer, this results in an an-
nual slaughter of 60 reindeer, 234 reindeer, and 384
reindeer.
It is important to understand that these annual
slaughter percentages were not developed from com-
plete herd counts. It is rare that a herd owner can
bring together all of his animals at one time. This
means that herd slaughter estimates may be high
or low. We have no estimate of annual slaughter for
a herd of 4000 or more animals, the owners of the
only herd of this size on the Seward Peninsula dur-
ing our field investigations was attempting to in-
crease the herd number and in 1976 only
slaughtered 150 reindeer culls. However, with con-
stant herding it is likely that at least 20 to 25 per
cent could be slaughtered annually without decreas-
ing herd size (Palmer, 1934).
Corrallings
Many herds are corralled twice a year, in Febru-
ary or March, and again in late June or early July.
During the February or March handling, the rein-
deer are tallied, unmarked reindeer earmarked, and
nonbreeding bulls castrated. Some butchering may
also occur, but most of these carcasses are for wage—
meat payments, with few carcasses sold. From field
observations, it appears these handlings need ap-
proximately 15 workers to handle the reindeer.
Workers are needed to fill the corral pockets, to push
the reindeer from pocket to pocket, and to hold the
reindeer at the end of the chute for earmarking, cas-
trating, and counting. Wages for labor in 1977
ranged from $4 to $6 per hour, with the exact wage
varying from location to location. Wages may actu-
ally take the form of cash, meat, or skins. The ac-
tual handling takes from 1 to 2 days to complete,
but several days may be spent beforehand by the
herd owner and a small crew in clearing the corral
of snow that has accumulated in the preceding
months. Often the corral pockets have been com-
pletely filled with snow.
 The late June or early July handling is conducted
for one basic reason — the sale of velvet antler for
use in oriental medicines. In the past few years, the
reindeer have been herded into the corrals with the
use of a small helicopter provided by the antler
buyer. This has taken the place of the traditional
method of summer herding, with men on foot driv-
ing the reindeer into the corrals. Once in the cor-
rals, the reindeer have most of their antler removed
using a hand—held cutter. The amount of antler
which is removed depends on the degree of antler
development; the parts of the antler which have os-
sified are not taken. At this handling, calves will be
earmarked and the herd tallied as well. Some herd
owners also castrate nonbreeding bulls at this han-
dling and a few reindeer may be butchered.
Herds with less than 1000 reindeer produced an
average of 1.1 pounds of velvet antler per reindeer
in 1977. Herds with between 1000 and 2000 rein-
deer produced an average of .93 pound of velvet ant-
ler per reindeer, while herds of between 2000 and
3000 reindeer produced an average of .84 pound of
velvet antler per reindeer. The herd of 4000 rein-
deer produced an average of .81 pound of velvet ant-
ler per reindeer. These herd estimates include calves
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which were not dehorned and reindeer that were
not corralled. Luick (1979) found that in 1978 the
average antler harvest for reindeer actually having
antler removed was 1.82 pounds per reindeer. Indi-
vidual reindeer antlers can be of greater weight. Bull
antler weights of 2 to 10 pounds have been recorded
(Luick, 1978).
Calving
Reindeer calving season lasts from approximately
April 15 to May 31, with the peak period about May
1. This is one of the most important times of the
year for a herdÕs continued success. Herders are with
the reindeer as much as possible at this time of year
since the herds are especially vulnerable to preda-
tors. Based on BLM case files and herd owner
records, the percent of calves to adult females ob-
served at summer handlings on the Seward Penin-
sula averaged 57 to 64 per cent between 1970 and
1976. This calf—to—cow ratio averaged 64 per cent
for herds of less than 1000 reindeer; 57 per cent for
herds of 1000 to 2000 animals, and 58 per cent for
herds of between 2000 and 3000 head. Calf summer
survival for the herd of 4000 reindeer was 55 per
cent in 1975 and 85 per cent in 1977.
Although herders are generally with the herd dur-
ing the actual calving period, a recent study of the
Mackenzie Delta (Canada) herd suggests that calf
mortality is greater during the months of June and
July than during the actual calving period (Nowosad,
1975). If this study is applicable to Alaska, then the
percent of calves to adult females at summer han-
dlings (late June or early July) might be increased
with additional summer care of the herds. However,
labor may not be available even if herd owners
wished to do this, since herding wages may not be
sufficient to entice potential employees to forego sub-
sistence activities or other employment opportuni-
ties.
Reindeer enterprise budgets
 Costs
The major annual costs for reindeer—herding op-
erations are for labor, snow machines, gas and oil,
air charters, food, corrals, and cabins. Costs pre-
sented in Tables 26—29 are from 1976 and 1977 and
are basically from herd owners estimates and field
observations, since records are not generally avail-
able. With some exceptions, herd owners are poor
record keepers. These estimates of costs should,
therefore, be thought of as minimums because some
cost items may not have been identified.
Labor was the largest cost to most herd owners
whether they employed only part—time labor at han-
dlings and butcherings, or handling and butchering
labor plus one or two winter herders, or full—time
herders. Part—time labor at handlings and
butcherings received $4 to $6 per hour depending
on herd location. Wages were higher if the herds
were located near Nome and Kotzebue. These wages
were paid in the form of cash, meat, skins, or in com-
bination. Winter herders (November—May) received
approximately $250 per month plus food and sup-
plies, which was estimated to bring the total bill to
$500 per month. The one herd employing full—time
herders spent over $28,000 per herder per year on
salaries, taxes, and benefits.
No charge was included in the budgets for owner
labor. If owner—operators had foregone activities
which would have returned positive benefits during
the time they were engaged in reindeer herding, then
a charge should have been included to reflect these
lost opportunities, implying that labor costs may
have been underestimated in the budgets in Tables
26—29. The difficulty arises in allocating family in-
come from subsistence activities to one member or,
in this case, the reindeer herd owner. It can be ar-
gued that nonreindeer oriented family members are
at least capable of generating the subsistence por-
tion of household income.
A major change in herding in the last 12 years is
the replacement of dog teams and foot travel for
herding with snow machines. Depending on herd lo-
cation, these machines cost from $2,000 to $2,300
in 1977. The further from Nome or Kotzebue a ma-
chine is shipped, the greater the expense. Herd own-
ers purchase new machines annually as this is
cheaper than paying for repairs to a year—old ma-
chine. Given this practice, approximately $200 a
machine was spent annually in minor repairs and
maintenance. Herd owners estimated at least $3,000
per year was expended for gasoline and oil for snow
machines, pickup trucks, boats, etc. In northwest
Alaska, gasoline cost from $1 to $2 per gallon. Gaso-
line shipped to individuals in villages in 55—gallon
drums was the most expensive; bulk fuel purchased
from village stores was less expensive.
Herd owners provided food for workers at han-
dlings, in 1977 estimated at $600 to $1,000. This
figure does not include the value of reindeer meat
slaughtered and used for camp food, and conse-
quently lost as revenue.
With the limited herding that takes place with
most herds today, the use of airplanes to locate scat-
tered reindeer is important. If reindeer are scattered
and cannot be located by snow machine for handlings
and slaughterings, chartered aircraft are used to find
the reindeer. Once spotted, herders can then ride to
the reindeer on snow machines. Air charters cost
typically over $100 per hour in 1976 and 1977.
The majority of herd owners had one corral for
handling their reindeer and one range cabin. The
estimated costs of these corrals and cabins was be-
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tween $5000 and $10,000 each. Repairs to corrals
and cabins was estimated to average $200 each per
year.
There was one more major cost. Except for one
herd, herd owners were charged $2 by the antler
buyer for every pound of antler harvested as pay-
ment for providing a partial handling crew in the
summer, providing a helicopter to drive the reindeer
into the corral, and shipping the antler from the field
to Nome. One herd owner organized all these tasks
independent of any buyer.
Yearly costs for typical herds of 600, 1300, 2400
and 4000 reindeer (the average size herd within each
size class) are provided in Tables 26, 27, 28, and 29.
Again, these costs are for the winter of 1976—1977
and the summer of 1977. The value of wage—meat
payments are included in the costs. The straight—
line method of calculating depreciation was used for
corrals and range cabins. Additionally, an invest-
ment charge was included for each corral or cabin.
A 6 per cent interest rate was used in calculating
the investment cost. This rate was charged for in-
termediate—term and long—term loans from the
Alaska State Agricultural Revolving Loan Fund in
1977.
Annual costs for a herd of 600 reindeer included
only hired labor as part—time labor for handlings
and butcherings. One new snow machine was pur-
chased yearly. For 1300 reindeer, one winter herder
was employed from November through May and two
snow machines were purchased annually. For 2400
reindeer, two winter herders were employed and two
snow machines were purchased each year. Fulltime
herders were used only with the 4000—reindeer herd.
This herd in 1977 was managed for expansion and
limited slaughter to culls.
However, to show this herd at full production, an
annual slaughter of 800 reindeer was assumed.
Other differences in budget categories can be ob-
served. Food and fuel information are only avail-
able as a combined cost. This herd provided all labor,
herding, and shipping for its velvet—antler produc-
tion and there was no charge from the antler buyer
for these items. It was assumed that this herd pur-
chased three snow machines yearly. Two corrals were
used during handlings. A $1000 per year land rental
charge was also included.
Costs for a typical herd of 600 reindeer totaled
slightly less than $12,000. For the representative
herd of 1300 reindeer, costs were approximately
double. The major increases were from the addition
of one winter herder and the purchase of a second
snow machine. Costs for an average herd of 2400
reindeer increased to approximately $33,000. Costs
for the herd of 4000 reindeer were almost five times
greater than for a herd of 1300 reindeer. This dra-
matic increase is due to the use of full—time herd-
ers. It can be viewed as a different system of reindeer
production and the per—reindeer costs are not di-
rectly comparable to the smaller herds.
Revenues
Revenues for the four herd sizes used previously
are given in Table 30. The average annual meat pro-
duction and the 1977 velvet antler production for
different herd sizes as described earlier is used in
this analysis. Slaughter is comprised primarily of
steer carcasses weighing an average of 120 pounds
Table 26. Costs—600 reindeer.
Annual ownership costs
Item Original cost Life Depreciationa Investmentb Total
1. Corral $5,000.00 20 yrs. $250.00 $150.00 $400.00
2. Cabin 5,000.00 20 yrs. 250.00 150.00 400.00
Subtotal $800.00
Annual cash costs
Item Cost/year
1. Part—time labor for winter and summer handlings $1,500.00c
2. Food for handlings 600.00
3. Snow machine purchase — 1 @ $2,200 2,200.00
4. Gas and oil 3,000.00
5. Snow—machine repair 200.00
6. Corral repair 200.00
7. Cabin repair 200.00
8. Air charter 1,000.00
9. Labor to butcher 60 reindeer 600.00c
10. Charge by antler buyer for herding, labor, shipping 1,320.00
Subtotal $10,820.00
Total cost/year $11,620.00
aStraight line method: Original cost bOriginal cost
life 2
cValue of meat—wage payments included.
x 6%
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(U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs, 1960—1971). Reindeer carcasses are assumed
to sell for 85 cents per pound. Because of the varia-
tion in prices received for velvet antler in 1977, we
used three antler prices in developing Table 30: $8
per pound, $12 per pound, and $23.76 per pound.
Any revenues herd owners might gain through the
sale of reindeer skins, leggings, or meat byproducts
are not included. An optimistic prediction would be
that revenues could increase by 4 or 5 per cent
through the sale of these items. We have no esti-
mate of the additional costs incurred in obtaining
this additional income.
Net herder income
As one would expect, for herds of between 600 and
2400 reindeer, income increases as herd size in-
creases (Table 31). However, for the herd of 4000
reindeer, income was less than for a herd of 2,400
reindeer at all antler prices. Does this mean that a
herd of 4000 reindeer is economically less advanta-
geous? This is not likely for two reasons. The present
analysis did not taken into consideration the in-
creased efficiencies that are likely to come through
year—round herding. Second, our 4000 animal herd
is modeled after a herd that has only been in exist-
ence since 1975 and it is being expanded through
reduced herd harvest. In a recent study (Arobio et
al., 1980), firm net incomes were found to increase
as herd size expanded.
Regional Considerations
The reindeer industry is a small part of the total
economy of northwestern Alaska in terms of the
people it employs and the wages and salary pay-
ments the industry makes. Nonetheless, at the vil-
lage level, herding is an important part of the local
economy.
Regional Employment
In 1976, the average, monthly, nonagricultural
wage and salary employment in the Kobuk and
Nome labor market areas was estimated at 2952
persons (Alaska Statistical Quarterly, 1976). Accord-
ing to interviews with herd owners, between 25 and
30 individuals received a major portion of their em-
ployment from reindeer herding on the Seward Pen-
insula in 1976—1977. This figure is comprised of herd
owner—operators, full—time herders, and winter
herders. Employment within the region, with the
addition of the relatively full—time herding employ-
ment, totalled approximately 2979 workers in 1976.
Reindeer herding accounted for only 0.9 per cent of
the total employment within northwest Alaska.
In terms of part—time employment, a larger num-
ber of residents or the region are employed typically
during a year. Approximately 250 people are em-
ployed yearly on a part—time basis during handlings
and butcherings. For an individual this would pro-
vide normally from 2 to 12 days of annual employ-
ment. At the wage scale described earlier, $4 to $6
per hour, an individual working 2 days, 8 hours a
day, would earn from $64 to $96. An individual work-
ing 12 days a year, 8 hours per day, would earn from
$384 to $576. These wages would be paid in cash,
meat, or in combination.
Table 27. Costs—1300 reindeer.
Annual ownership costs
Item Original cost Life Depreciationa Investmentb Total
1. Corral $5,000.00 20 yrs. $250.00 $150.00 $400.00
2. Cabin 5,000.00 20 yrs. 250.00 150.00 400.00
Subtotal $800.00
Annual cash costs
Item Cost/year
1. Part—time labor for winter and summer handlings $2,250.00c
2. Food for handlings 750.00
3. One winter herder — $250/month/7 months 1,750.00c
4. Food and supplies for herder — $250/month/7 months 1,750.00
5. Snow—machine purchase — 2 at $2,200 4,400.00
6. Cas and oil 3,600.00
7. Snow machine repair — 2 at $200 400.00
8. Corral repair 200.00
9. Cabin repair 200.00
10. Air charter 3,000.00
11. Labor to butcher 234 reindeer 2,340.00
12. Charge by antler buyer for herding, labor, shipping 2,418.00
Subtotal $23,058.00
Total cost/year $23,858.00
aStraight line method: Original cost bOriginal cost
life 2
cValue of meat—wage payments included.
x 6%
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Regional personal income
According to data supplied by herd owners and
estimates based on Table 31, reindeer herding on
the Seward Peninsula generated an estimated (in-
cluding value of reindeer meat consumed by herd
owners and paid to labor) $309,000 of aggregate per-
sonal income to reindeer herd owners and labor
employed directly in herding operations in 1976.
This income is the combination of net income (gross
income of reindeer product sales minus production
costs) from individual herds plus the payments these
herds made to labor. The income can be disaggre-
gated into labor income of approximately $162,000
and herd—owner income of $147,000. Of the total,
Table 28. Costs—2400 reindeer.
Annual ownership costs
Item Original cost Life Depreciationa Investmentb Total
1. Corral $5,000.00 20 yrs. $250.00 $150.00 $400.00
2. Cabin 5,000.00 20 yrs. 250.00 150.00 400.00
Subtotal $800.00
Annual cash costs
Item Cost/year
1. Part—time labor for winter and summer handlings $3,000.00c
2. Food for handlings 1,000.00
3. Two winter herders — $250/month/7months 3,500.00c
4. Food and supplies for herders — $250/month/7 months 3,500.00
5. Snow—machine purchase — 2 at $2,200 4,400.00
6. Gas and oil 4,000.00
7. Snow—machine repair — 2 at $200 400.00
8. Corral repair 200.00
9. Cabin repair 200.00
10. Air charter 4,000.00
11. Labor to butcher 384 reindeer 3,840.00
12. Charge by antler buyer for herding, labor, shipping 4,032.00
Subtotal $32,372.00
Total cost/year $33,172.00
aStraight line method: Original cost b Original cost
life 2
cValue of meat—wage payments included.
x 6%
Table 29. Costs—4000 reindeer.
Annual ownership costs
Item Original cost Life Depreciationa Investmentb Total
1. 2 Corrals $20,000.00 20 yrs. $1,000.00 $600.00 $1,600.00
2. Cabin 5,000.00 20 yrs. 250.00 150.00 400.00
Subtotal $2,000.00
Annual cash costs
Item Cost/year
1. 3 full—time herders (including taxes and benefits) $85,000.00
2. Land rental 1,000.00
3. Snow—machine purchase — 3 at $2,000 6,000.00
4. Snow—machine repair — 3 at $200 600.00
5. Corral repair — 2 at $200 400.00
6. Cabin repair 200.00
7. Food and fuel 4,500.00
8. Shipping and freight 500.00
9. Air charter 8,000.00
10. Labor to slaughter 800 reindeer 8,000.00
Subtotal $114,200.00
Total cost/year $116,200.00
aStraight line method: Original cost bOriginal cost
life 2
cValue of meat—wage payments included.
x 6%
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$40,800 (13 per cent) came from wage—meat pay-
ments and herd owner home consumption. Approxi-
mately 400 reindeer carcasses were used in this
manner in 1976.
The above is not all of the personal income that
resulted from reindeer herding on the Seward Pen-
insula in 1976. It does not account for net income
which accrued to retailers from the sale of reindeer
meat or antler, nor does it account for the addition
to net incomes of firms which sold products or ser-
vices to reindeer—herd owners. In addition, the
wages these firms paid to labor that was needed to
conduct business with reindeer—herd owners were
not estimated.
Village considerations
Although reindeer herding is of relatively minor
importance to the regional economy of northwest
Alaska in terms of the wages and salaries it gener-
ates, the case is much different for an individual
village where a reindeer herd is located. The contri-
bution of reindeer herding to village employment,
wages, and salaries, and in meeting the village pro-
tein requirements is of greater relative importance
than its contribution to northwest Alaska as a whole.
As an example, a brief analysis of a representative
village located on the Seward Peninsula would be
informative. This village has a population of 87. A
reindeer herd of between 1000 and 2000 reindeer is
headquartered here. The herd is owned and oper-
ated by a local family.
The village has approximately 20 employed indi-
viduals. Seventeen of these residents are employed
on a full— or part—time basis in the following occu-
pations: construction, government services, educa-
tion, retail trade, and domestic services. Three
village residents (the herd owner, his son, and one
winter herder) receive a major share of their yearly
employment from reindeer herding. This amounts
to 15 per cent of the village employment, compared
with 0.9 per cent of regional employment in 1976.
At handlings and butcherings, up to an additional
15 of the village residents (17 per cent) are employed
on a part—time basis. Some of these people may only
work for 1 to 2 days, while others may receive up to
12 days of yearly employment. As described earlier,
this can result in yearly part—time income per indi-
vidual of from $64 to $576.
In 1976, this herd paid approximately $4590 (in-
cluding value of wage—meat payments) in wages to
part—time workers. In addition, the winter herder
received approximately $3500 in wages and supplies.
This herd provided a net income of approximately
$10,000 to the herd owner and his family in 1976.
The approximate, aggregate, personal income gen-
erated by this herd to village residents (including
Table 30. Reindeer herd revenues.
Reindeer meat revenuea Antler revenue
Herd size $8.00/lb. $12.00/lb $23.76/lb Total
600 60 carcasses x 120 lbs = 660 lbs. =
7,200 lbs x 85 cents/lb = $5,280.00 $ 11,400.00
$ 6,120.00 660 lbs =
$7,920.00 14,040.00
660 lbs =
$15,681.60 21,801.60
1,300 234 carcasses x 120 lbs = 1,209 lbs =
28,080 lbs x 85 cents/lb = $ 9,672.00 33,540.00
$23,868.00 1,209 lbs=
$14,508.00 38,376.00
1,209 lbs =
$28,725.84 52,593.84
2,400 384 carcasses x 120 lbs = 2,016 lbs =
46,080 lbs x 85 cents/lb = $16,128.00 55,296.00
$39,168.00 2,016 lbs =
$24,192.00 63,360.00
2,016 lbs =
$47,900.16 87,068.16
4,000 800 carcasses x 120 lbs = 3,240 lbs =
96,000 lbs x 85 cents/lb = $25,920.00 107,520.00
$81,600.00 3,240 lbs =
$38,880.00 120,480.00
3,240 lbs =
$76,982.40 158,582.40
aValue of home meat consumption included.
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the two owner—operators) totaled $18,000. Not in-
cluded was income received by regional commercial
airlines and air—taxi operators for herding and
freighting services or others who provided products
or services to the reindeer herd.
In 1976, 64 reindeer carcasses were used by the
herd owner as payment to labor or for home con-
sumption. These carcasses had an approximate
value of $6530. Most villagers receive a combina-
tion of meat and cash for part—time work. A villager
is likely to receive reindeer meat as payment when
working at winter butcherings and cash when work-
ing at a spring or summer handling. For example,
in the fall of 1976, 10 villagers were hired to help at
a butchering. Wages were $4 per hour; however, all
the workers desired to be paid in meat. For this work,
they received 1.5 reindeer carcasses each. Later, in
March of 1977, 15 village residents were hired to
help with the handling. At this handling, everyone
was paid in cash. Each received $68 for two days
work.
In 1976, approximately 100 reindeer carcasses
were sold by the herd owner to village residents
through a store run by another of his sons. This meat
sold for 95 cents per pound. In meeting the protein
requirements of the village residents, 164 reindeer
carcasses were consumed in 1976. This is a per—
capita consumption of 1.9 reindeer carcasses per vil-
lager. The village herd provided approximately 229
pounds of meat per resident.
Reindeer industry potential
Reindeer herding as traditionally practiced in
Alaska has been a part of both the subsistence and
cash economies because most herd owners operate
on a partial subsistence basis generating minimum
profits. Generally, herds have been smaller than al-
lowed by grazing permits. Herd owners have not
specialized in the herding of reindeer. Other activi-
ties in which they participate include subsistence
hunting, fishing, gathering, wage labor (fire—fight-
ing is of importance), and entrepreneurial enter-
prises such as owning small stores or renting houses.
Nevertheless, it appears that meat and antler pro-
duction and firm incomes have the potential to in-
crease with more intensive herd management. This
could result through 1) expanded herd numbers, 2)
improved management practices, or 3) changes in
production orientation.
In 1976, the Fairbanks Office of the Bureau of
Land Management permitted the grazing of 32,000
reindeer on the Seward Peninsula. This figure does
not include the herd at Shaktoolik, on the edge of
the peninsula, which had a permit for 1200 animals.
In 1977, it was estimated that only 17,800 reindeer
grazed on the Seward Peninsula. This was 55  per
cent of the permitted number. By doubling the 1977
production of reindeer meat and velvet antler, an
approximation can be made of potential production
from herds at their maximum permitted level. Of
course, this assumes no increase or decrease in pro-
duction on a percentage basis for individual herds.
Regional meat production under this scenario would
amount to approximately 473,840 pounds and ant-
ler production 30,074 pounds. At the prices received
by the majority of herd owners in 1977, gross meat
revenues would equal $402,764, and antler revenues
would total $240,592. At $23.76 per pound, antler
revenues would be $714,558. These figures are gross
revenues, not net returns; still, the aggregate per-
sonnel income to the region would increase sharply
above the levels reported earlier.
Even without expanded herd numbers, individual
herds may well have the ability to increase produc-
tion and incomes through improved management
practices. The practices described below assume that
the current emphasis of steer production for meat
continues. If herders shift their production orienta-
tion from emphasizing meat to antler production,
then some of these management changes may not
be applicable.
Production could increase in individual herds with
improvements in animal husbandry practices, in the
short run by decreasing the slaughter of productive
females, increasing calf survival; and in the long run
with improved selection of breeding stock, improved
sex composition of herds, and more efficient range
use. For an individual herd these improvements
Table 31. Net herder income.a
Antler and meat revenue Income
Production
Herd Size $8.00/lb $12.00/lb $23.76/lb Costs $8.00/lb  $12.00/lb $23.76/lb
600  $11,400.00 $14,040.00 $21,801.60 $11,620.00 ($220.00) $ 2,420.00 $10,181.60
1,300 33,540.00 38,376.00 52,593.84 23,858.00 9,682.00  14,518.00 28,735.84
2,400 55,296.00 65,360.00 87,068.16 33,172.00 22,124.00  30,188.00 53,896.16
4,000 107,520.00 120,480.00 158,582.40  116,200.00 (8.680.00)  4.280.00 42.382.40
aThree estimates of revenue and three estimates of income for each herd size are provided. In all estimates, meat
sells for 85 cents per pound. Meat revenues are combined with antler revenue using three antler prices: $8.00, $12.00,
and $23.76 per pound; to give the estimates of total revenue for each herd size. Income estimates are total revenues
minus production costs.
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would be shown in increased carcass weights and
an increased percentage of the herd which could be
slaughtered annually.
Increased carcass weights could come from a num-
ber of sources. This could happen immediately by
only butchering steers, old bulls, and old cows, in-
stead of butchering any group of reindeer which can
be located and may include productive females.
 Herders sometimes slaughter females when
steers and bulls are difficult to locate. According to
Palmer (1934), there are significant differences in
weights between male and female reindeer. During
field work for this research, differences in weights
were also observed. For example, in one instance
during the winter of 1976—1977, 18 reindeer car-
casses, most of which were female, were observed
being shipped. They had an average carcass weight
of 115 pounds. In another instance, the slaughter of
8 bulls was observed. These reindeer averaged 145
pounds per carcass.
Herders prefer not to slaughter females, but in
some instances it is easier to locate females than
steers and bulls. During the course of the field work,
one researcher was present at the slaughtering of
15 reindeer. All reindeer butchered were pregnant
females, since these were the most easily located
reindeer. A change in production techniques that
would help to increase the percent of steers and bulls
in the yearly slaughter is to butcher at a corralling
conducted in the early winter, instead of slaughter-
ing without corralling the herd, which is the present
practice. At the same time, the herd could be tal-
lied, bulls castrated, and reindeer earmarked, thus
eliminating the need for a spring corralling. This
may be a wise decision in any case, since corralling
in the early winter would remove much of the prob-
lem of snow—filled corrals which are prevalent in
the spring. With the reindeer in a corral, the herder
would have an opportunity to select the reindeer he
wanted to butcher. In addition, since rifles would
not be needed to kill the reindeer, inadvertent kill-
ing of reindeer through poor marksmanship would
be eliminated.
Some herders have argued that reindeer acquire
a gamey taste after being corralled for several hours.
If this is a problem, a method to overcome this diffi-
culty might be to slaughter after the reindeer have
been released from the corral for a few days. Ani-
mals scheduled for slaughter could still be selected
while the herd was corralled. These reindeer could
then be kept together until slaughter.
In the long run, carcass weight could be increased
through the selection of the superior reindeer for
breeding and eliminating inferior bulls and cows.
According to a 1946 reindeer management guide,
adult carcasses at that time averaged 125 pounds,
while ten years previously they had averaged 150
pounds (U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of
Indian Affairs, 1946). Poor sire selection was cited
as the major reason for the decline. At present, the
only sire selection criterion appears to be for coat
color, not size. Spotted reindeer are preferred for
their hides in making parkas and mukluks, while
almost completely white reindeer are desired for the
help this color gives the herder in spotting reindeer
from a distance during the summer when the ground
cover is predominantly green. Sires should be se-
lected on the basis of size (U.S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, 1946).
More efficient range use could have a major affect
on reindeer weights. Klein (1967) has shown the de-
creases in weights, as well as productive ability of
herds, when reindeer overgraze their range. The
most efficient use of range would require more herd-
ing than is currently employed. Pegau (1968) has
applied Siberian studies to Alaska and has suggested
that only the top 1/4 to 1/3 of the lichen podetium be
grazed and then the herd moved. Although he ap-
plied this to increasing per acre carrying capacities,
it seems that better use of range could increase
weights of existing reindeer, if herd sizes were not
increased.
For the production alternative examined here,
herds would also benefit in the long—run from im-
proved sex composition. Currently, bull—to—cow ra-
tios range from 1 to 5, to 1 to 10 with the majority of
herds near 1 to 5. Herds would benefit from elimi-
nating some of these bulls and replacing them with
females. Bull—to—cow ratios are recommended to be
between 1 to 10 and 1 to 15 (Department of the In-
terior, 1946; Zhigunov, 1968). The ideal number of
bulls may even be lower since Skuncke (1969) sug-
gests that a virile bull can serve 30 to 40 cows.
A second source of increased meat production could
result from increasing the percent of a herd which
could be slaughtered annually. Herd owners in the
period 1970—1976 slaughtered 10 to 18 per cent of
their herds yearly. It is possible that this could be
increased to between 20 and 25 per cent with better
management. It has been show that herds in Alaska
can increase yearly by 25 to 33 percent in better—
managed herds (Palmer, 1934).
A technique to increase slaughter is to emphasize
calf survival. If calf mortality in Alaska follows the
same pattern as reported for Canada (Nowosad,
1975) and is significant immediately following the
time herds leave the calving grounds, it would ben-
efit herd owners to stay with the herds themselves
or to hire a herder to stay with the herd during the
month of June. Difficulties in implementing this
improvement include scheduling conflict with sub-
sistence activities in the spring, wage—labor oppor-
tunities, and traveling over the terrain during spring
break—up which overlaps the calving season and the
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critical period for calves during June.
Another method to increase slaughtering percent
is to make sure reindeer which have drifted to an-
other reindeer ownerÕs range are returned. This
would require attending neighboring herder han-
dlings and returning reindeer to their proper range.
This is not an unknown practice, as it is occasion-
ally done now, but not consistently.
It is difficult to determine accurately how much
production and net incomes could increase with the
implementation of improved management practices.
However, if slaughter could be increased to 20 per
cent of the overwintering herds in 1977 and carcass
weights increased to an average of 125 pounds, meat
production would equal 445,000 pounds. For 32,000
reindeer, meat production would total 800,000
pounds. At 1977 prices, this meat would provide
gross revenues to herders of between $378,250
(17,800 reindeer) and $680,000 (32,000 reindeer). A
summary of potential meat production resulting
from increased reindeer numbers on the Seward
Peninsula or improved management practices is
presented in Table 32. We have little basis on which
to determine whether per—animal antler production
would increase under these practices.
Again, the above are estimates of added gross rev-
enues, not net gains, and for these herd manage-
ment practices to be of benefit to herders, the
additional costs of these improvements must be less
than the added revenues. Additionally, the imple-
mentation of these procedures may require full—time
herding and thus may only be practical for large
herds.
Two recent studies have examined the economic
potential of the reindeer industry under alternative
production orientations. Luick (1978) estimated the
gross revenues for four alternative herd manage-
ment options for a herd of 2,000 reindeer and finds
that structuring a herd to maximize the production
of wet—velvet antler provides the largest gross rev-
enues. On a herd basis, potential gross revenues are
estimated at $327,935 if antler sells at $10/pound
and $471,875 with antler selling for $20/pound.
These are significantly above the revenues received
currently by herders.
In a second study, Arobio et al. (1980) examined
optimum herd structure using a mathematical pro-
gramming technique. Again, maximizing wet—vel-
vet antler production was found to be the
management option that provides the largest re-
turns. Using the most  commonly received meat and
antler prices for 1977, potential net returns for herds
of 1000, 2000, and 3000 reindeer are estimated at
$30,000, $62,000, and $106,500 respectively. In this
analysis estimated variable production costs were
deducted from gross revenues in an attempt to esti-
mate potential firm incomes. Although problems
were noted with the data used in this analysis, and
thus some level of error is likely associated with es-
timated net returns, the conclusion drawn from this
study is that reindeer herds have the highest po-
tential to increase incomes through alternative herd
organization.
At this point, it is useful to summarize some of
the general conclusions that can be drawn from the
preceding analysis. First, it seems that per—herd
meat and antler production and firm incomes can
increase through changes in production practices or
changes in herd orientations. Exact increases in in-
come are difficult to determine at this time because
better data on carcass and antler weight, reindeer
mortality, calving percentage, production costs, for-
age requirements, etc. are needed. Next, a herd
structured to maximize antler production will de-
crease its meat—producing capability. This could
have a serious effect on regional meat supplies if all
herds adopted this option without an increase in
herd size. If herds expanded, meat production could
be enhanced even under this management alterna-
tive. Finally, expanded numbers of reindeer on the
Seward Peninsula have the potential to provide ad-
ditional fulltime employment, increased hours of
part—time employment, and regional incomes.
We have already indicated that herd owners are
often considered ÒrichÓ by village standards. In-
creased production and its attendant increase in in-
come may exacerbate this perception. In all
likelihood, however, the network of generalized reci-
procity among kin in the village probably will serve
to see that some portion of the increased income is
distributed throughout the village. This probably
would not take the form of direct cash gifts, but gifts
of new material items or food, or gifts of reindeer
meat and byproducts are likely, just as such things
are given today.
The previous discussion has been based upon con-
stant and increased herd sizes. Under conditions of
decreases in herd size, reduced income from herd-
ing operations can be expected. It is shown earlier
in this chapter that herds with less than 1,000 ani-
mals have difficulty in producing returns above to-
tal annual costs. When interest in tending a small
herd declines, the herd is usually lost to caribou,
other reindeer herds, or becomes feral. Thus, herd
owners strive to at least keep a minimum herd size,
and, under favorable circumstances, to increase their
herd size. Factors which lead to herd decreases have
been discussed in the historical section. Predation,
disease, losses to caribou, poaching, adverse weather
conditions, losses in available range land, and range
quality are just some of these factors. To these rea-
sons, we might add the possibility of straying caused
by National Preserve visitors or hikers who disturb
the animals. In the worst of all possible worlds, or
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what is sometimes referred to as the maximum cred-
ible event by disaster planners, all of the reindeer
on Seward Peninsula could be lost. For the owners,
this would mean that an important source of income
and meat would be unavailable to them. The meat
would be lost to the people of the region. Wages paid
to labor by the reindeer industry would disappear.
More realistically, one can predict that, under
present conditions and management, certain herds
are going to increase for periods of time while oth-
ers will decline. This suggests the possibility, in light
of relatively steady numbers of animals on the
Seward Peninsula over the last 20 years, that un-
der current management practices the region has
reached an equilibrium in reindeer numbers rela-
tive to the range and its carrying capacity. More in-
tensive herd management, however, could increase
the number of reindeer on the Peninsula.
Chapter IX
Reindeer herding
and land
Alaska land issues
The passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act (P.L. 92—203, 85 Stat. 688) in 1971 has
forced the reindeer herders increasingly to come to
grips with political issues and the often divergent
interests of other groups, Native and non—Native
alike. This settlement act, or ANCSA as it is com-
monly abbreviated, is the culmination of years of
struggle on the part of Alaskan Natives to secure
their land claims and rights to traditional ways of
life. It is beyond the scope of this study to describe
all the provisions of ANCSA or the political and cul-
tural struggle which went on to secure its passage
without running the risk of oversimplifying some
aspects or omitting others. Several excellent ac-
counts have already undertaken this task, and the
interested reader is referred to those sources
(Arnold, 1978; Case, 1978; Hanrahan and
Gruenstein, 1977). Consequently, only those portions
most relevant to reindeer herding will be reviewed.
The Alaska Statehood Act (72 Stat. 399) passed
Congress on July 7, 1958, and was signed into law
by President Eisenhower on January 3, 1959. The
act entitled the 49th state to select and receive title
to some 104 million acres of Òvacant, unappropri-
ated and unreservedÓ Federal lands in Alaska. Ad-
ditional millions of acres of tidal and nontidal
Òsubmerged landsÓ vested in the state, many of
which have still to be identified. Since nearly 99 per
cent of AlaskaÕs 375 million acres was in Federal
stewardship at that time, selection of the land en-
titlement seemed a straightforward task. Soon af-
ter state officials made their initial selections of land
and received tentative approval to them, protests
by Natives surfaced. While the state had made its
selections based on the potential of recreational gas,
oil, and other natural resources, Natives were con-
cerned about the impacts of the state selections on
their hunting, fishing, and trapping grounds. The
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) was asked to
turn down the state selections.
Faced with Native protests over state land selec-
tions, most authorities agreed that only Congress
could adequately address the Alaskan Native land
claims. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall in-
voked a Òland freezeÓ in 1966. The freeze stopped
the tentative approval and patent of state—selected
Federal lands to the State of Alaska until Congress
could act upon the Native land claims issue.
Starting in 1967, a Land Claims Task Force com-
prised of state representatives, Native leaders, the
year—old Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN), and
DOI representatives was formed and prepared a bill.
Introduced by Senator Ernest Gruening (D—Alaska)
in 1968, it was supported generally by then Gover-
nor Walter J. Hickel. One of Secretary UdallÕs last
acts as Secretary of the Interior was to formalize
the land freeze by Secretarial Order before leaving
office after Richard NixonÕs election in 1968.
Alaska Governor Walter Hickel was nominated by
Table 32. Potential meat production for sale from
Seward Peninsula reindeer herds.
Actual production for 1977:
Total Herd — 17,800 head
Meat for sale — 296,920 lbs.
Potential production for 1977, assuming herd numbers
equal to BLM limit, with 1977 management practices:
Total herd — 32,000 head
Meat for sale — 473,840 lbs.
Potential production for 1977, assuming actual 1977
herd number, with improved herd—management
practicesa
Total herd — 17,800 head
Meat for sale — 445,000 lbs.
Potential production for 1977, assuming herd numbers
equal to BLM limit, with improved herd—management
practicesa:
Total herd — 32,000 head
Meat for sale — 800,000 lbs.
aImproved herd—management practices:
1. Improved Selection of Breeding Stock
2. Decreased Female Slaughter
3. Rotational Grazing
4. Increased Herding
5. Return of Strays from Neighboring Herds
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the newly elected President to serve as Interior Sec-
retary. In trouble with environmental groups at his
confirmation hearings because of his
prodevelopment orientation as governor, he wooed
Alaskan Native interests to support his nomination
in return for a continuation of the land freeze until
December of 1970. The continued land freeze bought
time with which to prepare further legislation to
settle the land claims. A major point of dispute was
the issue of revenue sharing of mineral estates.
While the principles that the settlement would in-
clude land and cash were settled, the exact provi-
sions remained open. The state oil lease sales at
Prudhoe Bay in 1969 showed dramatically how rela-
tively small tracts of land could be worth large sums
of money. Various oil companies paid over $900 mil-
lion to the state for the right to develop the Prudhoe
Bay oil and natural gas deposits on AlaskaÕs North
Slope. The publication of the massive volume, Alaska
Natives and the Land by the Federal Field Commit-
tee for Development Planning in Alaska, under-
scored the bleak economic, health, and social
conditions in most of AlaskaÕs Native villages
(Fitzgerald et al., 1968). The validity of Native land
claims was thus reasserted at the same time that
the political and economic climates favored passage
of a bill.
The AFNÕs proposal in May of 1969 provided a 40—
million acre land settlement, a $500 million appro-
priation for disbursement, a share in perpetuity from
revenues produced on state lands relinquished by
the Natives, and the creation of corporations to
handle the settlement at village, regional, and state
levels. The continuing land freeze was delaying the
construction of a pipeline to transport crude oil from
Prudhoe Bay to the ice—free, southern terminus at
Valdez. The interested oil companies, contractors,
the state, AFN, and DOI all recognized that the con-
struction of the trans—Alaska pipeline would not
begin until legislation settling the land claims had
been passed. By late 1971, both the House and Sen-
ate had passed slightly differing bills; the differences
between the two bills had to be resolved in one ac-
ceptable to both bodies. A joint conference commit-
tee undertook the task of producing a compromise
bill; and a 29—page bill, largely favorable to the AFN
position emerged. The settlement was accepted; and
on December 18, 1971, President Nixon signed the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688
as amended) into law.
The major provisions of ANCSA must be under-
stood in order to make sense of the current political
and economic happenings in Alaska. Basically, the
act provides for a cash and land settlement. Some
215 Native Village Corporations are entitled to se-
lect 22 million acres of land, in addition to the selec-
tion by 12 Regional Corporations of some 16 million
acres under a complex land—loss formula. The exact
acreage entitlements are determined by the num-
bers of Natives enrolled in a village and region. Com-
pensation for the enrollees amounts to $962.5 million
dollars paid over a number of years by funds from
the Federal treasury, with an initial payment of some
$462.5 million dollars. The remainder of the cash
settlement comes from a 2 per cent royalty charge
paid into the Alaska Native Fund (of the Federal
treasury) from mineral development on state and
Federal lands until the full $500 million remainder
is paid into the fund. Village Corporations receive
fee simple title to the surface estate of selected lands,
while the regional corporation receives title to the
subsurface estate of both village and regional se-
lected lands, as well as the surface estate of the re-
gional lands. Some exceptions exist: villages in
southeastern Alaska receive title to only one town-
ship (23,040 acres) regardless of their enrollment.
The 1959 award of the Tlingit—Haida claims settle-
ment justified this smaller land award. ÒSection 19
reservationsÓ could opt to receive title to the sur-
face and subsurface estates regardless of enrollment.
Native land selections made within certain Fed-
eral reserves, such as the National Petroleum Re-
serve—Alaska (KPR—A, formerly the Naval
Petroleum Reserve No. 4, or Pet 4) on the North
Slope, and existing wildlife refuges administered by
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (U.S. DOI) were
subject to certain limitations. Special Native Cor-
porations organized in the non—Native cities of Ju-
neau, Kenai, Kodiak, and Sitka were entitled to
lands, as were Native ÒgroupsÓ of less than 25 per-
sons. The Alaska Native Allotment Act of 1906,
which allowed for up to 160 acres in four parcels to
any bona fide Native, was  repealed. Cemetery and
historic sites could be selected by the Regional Cor-
porations and fee title received. Title to the surface
estate of a Òreindeer—husbandry headquartersÓ can
be acquired by herders from village corporations
lands (Section 14(c)(l)). The total land settlement is
some 44 million acres, none of which is subject to
taxation until 1991. In the meantime, nearly three
times that amount of land remains withdrawn by
the Federal government, subject to valid existing
rights, from all forms of appropriation under the
public land laws, including the mining and mineral—
leasing laws, and from selection under the provi-
sions of the Alaska Statehood Act.
In a fashion, ANCSA has continued the land freeze
of the 1960s by prohibiting most economic develop-
ments in the state until the Native lands were se-
lected and conveyed. Although the act was meant to
Òbe accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in confor-
mity with the real economic and social needs of Na-
tives, without litigation, with maximum
participation by Natives in decisions affecting theirÕ
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rights and property, without establishing any per-
manent racially defined institutions, rights, privi-
leges or obligations...Ó (Section 2(b)), the
implementation of the act under these terms has
been slow. Litigation has delayed many aspects of
the implementation process.
Finally, but not least in significance, Section 17d(2)
of ANCSA directed the Secretary of the Interior to
withdraw up to 80 million acres of unreserved pub-
lic lands for study Òfor addition to or creation as units
of the National Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge, and
Wild and Scenic River SystemsÓ provided that the
state and Native Corporations could continue to
make selections and obtain patents on such with-
drawn lands. The 95th Congress of 1978—1979 failed
to act on a d(2) lands bill prior to the expiration of
the d(2) withdrawals on December 18, 1978. With
the expiration of the d(2) withdrawals, pressure was
mounted by Native groups and environmental or-
ganizations and prodevelopment interests alike to
keep these lands in some type of planning and non-
development status. On November 16, 1978, Secre-
tary Andrus withdrew over 98 million acres of land
under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976 and placed them into three—year study ar-
eas under Section 204(e) of the act. In a further ac-
tion, President Carter on December 1, 1978, used
the authority granted him under the 1906 Federal
Antiquities Act to place 56 million acres of land with-
drawn under Section 204(e) into National Monu-
ments. Thirteen new units and additions to the
National Monument system administered by the
National Park Service, two new monuments, admin-
istered by the National Forest Service and two new
National Monuments administered by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service were created on
December 1, 1978 (Federal Register, 1979).
The first session of the 96th Congress failed to pass
an Alaska national interest lands bill and in early
1980 most of the land withdrawn under Section
204(e) and not designated as National Monuments
became 20—year withdrawals under Section 204(e)
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976. The Selawik Wildlife Refuge in Northwest
Alaska was created from this withdrawal.
As 1980 neared an end, Congress finally passed
d(2) legislation as the second session of the 96th
Congress neared adjournment and the bill was
signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on De-
cember 2, 1980. Except for one change, the four d(2)
proposals described in Chapter I and which formed
the basis for this study remained essentially the
same under the passed legislation. The one signifi-
cant change was that the area on the Seward Pen-
insula originally proposed in 1977 as the
Chuckchi—Imuruk National Monument became the
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Bering Land Bridge National Preserve (from Decem-
ber 1978 until passage of the d(2) legislation, this
area was one of the thirteen National Monuments
in Alaska created by President Carter and was des-
ignated the Bering Land Bridge National Monu-
ment). Figure 12 is presented to show the land status
on the Seward Peninsula as of late 1980.
Focusing now more closely on the Seward Penin-
sula, an examination of the administrative and po-
litical boundaries reveals the following. The
northern portion of the Seward Peninsula is part of
NANA Regional Corporation Inc.Õs domain, while the
southern two—thirds is part of the Bering Straits
Native CorporationÕs (BSNC) area. Both of these in-
stitutions are regional profit—making corporations
incorporated and organized under ANCSA. The re-
gional corporations were mandated to be for profit,
while the Village Corporations could opt for either
profit, or non—profit status under ANCSA.
Both regional corporations have nonprofit arms
which are involved with health, welfare, social, cul-
tural, and recreational activities for their respective
regions. Mauneluk, Inc. represents the NANA area
for these matters, while Kawerak, Inc., is the BSNC
counterpart. The Reindeer Herders Association Inc.
operates through grants and contracts based at
KawerakÕs headquarters in Nome.
In the NANA region, 10 of the 11 village corpora-
tions which originally organized under ANCSA
merged with NANA Regional Corporation in 1976.
This action left Kikiktagruk Inupiat Inc., the
Kotzebue village corporation, as the sole village cor-
poration in the region. Kotzebue is the largest vil-
lage in the region, and serves as a regional service
and distribution center. Accordingly, business oppor-
tunities are greater; and the financial success of the
village corporation is already established. NANA
Regional Corporation has done well financially since
the passage of ANCSA, especially when compared
to most of the other regionals. By investing in di-
verse businesses such as oilfield catering, pipeline
security, waste—disposal systems, banking, lumber,
hardware, fuel supply and distribution, as well as
reindeer herding, NANA has achieved an enviable
portfolio, at the same time largely avoiding the bick-
ering which early after ANCSAÕs passage character-
ized relations between the village corporations and
their regional big brothers.
The Bering Straits Regional Corporation (BSNC)
on the other hand, has not fared as well. Faced with
widespread, numerous (20 as opposed to NANAÕs 11),
small villages, agreements on land selections have
been slow. At the same time, poor investments and
management resulted in multimillion—dollar losses
to the corporation over its first few years. Recent
changes in the board of directors and president
coupled with sounder financial strategies appear to
have placed the corporation on a firmer economic
footing. NomeÕs village corporation, Sitnasuak Na-
tive Corporation, has acquired the grazing permit
for the former BIA Model Herd permit area just out-
side of Nome, and intends to establish a herd in the
area.
As described above, the NANA villages merged
with the regional corporation. However, the indi-
vidual herders based at Buckland and Deering did
not surrender any of their autonomy in the merger.
Mergers, or joint ventures, are being considered as
are joint management schemes between NANA and
adjacent herders. Because NANAÕs herd is increas-
ing, it is seeking additional winter grazing lands.
Each of the individual, or subsistence herders are
faced with a potential conflict with their regional
corporation over herding territory. While joint herd-
ing ventures are economically sound, they may not
be completely socially acceptable to family— and vil-
lage oriented herders.
In the BSNC portion of the Seward Peninsula, the
member villages are not yet in the position of com-
peting for range resources. Herders report that there
is a great deal of interest in joint ventures using
village lands and privately owned reindeer to forge
a viable economic alliance where land ownership or
management patterns require it. Every village will
eventually gain title to a large block of land sur-
rounding the village itself. Elim village chose to ac-
quire its entire former reserve, and could utilize it
to graze reindeer if they so choose. Interim convey-
ance of the Norton Bay Native Reservation (Elim)
lands was completed by the U.S. DOIÕs Bureau of
Land Management in summer 1979.
Rather than waiting for Congress to act on the
Alaska national interest lands issue, the Alaska Fed-
eration of Natives approached the State of Alaska
and the U.S. Department of Interior and Agricul-
ture in 1978 to establish a cooperative planning body.
The resulting Alaska Land Managers Cooperative
Task Force was brought together by a Memorandum
of Agreement among these four groups. A number of
subcommittees were established including one on
reindeer herding. The Land Managers Task Force
provides a forum for dialogue among the affected
groups. The subcommittee chairmen report to the
members of the Task Force directly. To date, the Re-
indeer Subcommittee has been able to help fund and
coordinate range surveys undertaken by the Soil
Conservation Service (U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture) similar to the one done in 1977 (Preston, 1977).
Permit regulations and procedures for grazing on
U.S. DOI lands once administered by BLM, but now
under NPS and USF&WS jurisdiction, are being
standardized.
State of Alaska concerns are being anticipated
through the subcommittee, as the state will eventu-
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ally receive title to several million acres of land on
the Seward Peninsula. Updates on the land status
of national interest lands legislation are presented
at subcommittee meetings. Because representatives
of the Reindeer Herders Association are on the sub-
committee, this information gets disseminated rap-
idly among the herders for their consideration. In
addition to pragmatic concerns such as range sur-
veys, a major product of the Reindeer Subcommit-
tee is policy recommendations for reindeer grazing
on differing land jurisdictions. While no members
are bound by these policies, they form working guide-
lines for internal policy development within the vari-
ous agencies.
Significant amounts of real estate on the Seward
Peninsula are claimed by or patented to individuals
and corporations under mineral entries, especially
placer gold mining. The state has selected several
large blocks of land for their mineral and grazing
potential. These state land selections lie south of
Deering and Candle, to the east of Wales, and north
of Teller and Brevig Mission. A major Federal hold-
ing is the 2,590,000—acre Bering Land Bridge Na-
tional Preserve. The Preserve is administered by the
National Park Service and lies in the northcentral
portion of the Seward Peninsula. The changing land
ownership and management patterns on the Seward
Peninsula have major implications for the reindeer
herding industry.
Policy considerations and mitigating
measures
We will conclude this chapter with a brief analy-
sis of several policy areas because the future of re-
indeer herding will depend upon the policies of
various land owners and managers in addition to
the desires of the reindeer herders themselves. These
policies are not presented as being comprehensive
and inflexible, but rather to identify key issues which
must be resolved for the future well—being of the
reindeer industry. While no individual or organiza-
tion is likely to agree completely with this section,
it reflects the different agency mandates, institu-
tional directions, and personal preferences of the
affected parties, rather than (we hope) shortcom-
ings in the analyses themselves. We have chosen
not to address issues that are clearly peripheral to
herding, but which can and, ultimately do have an
impact on the herding industry.
Fitzsimmons (1976) writes that at least three vari-
ables contribute significantly to development in Na-
tional Park Service areas: Ò(1) the financial, in terms
of obtaining funds for park projects; (2) the esthetic,
in terms of containing development below some
threshold of excessive scenic depreciation; and, (3)
the social, in terms of striking a balance among di-
vergent visitor expectations and opinions.Ó It is not
impossible for the National Park Service or the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service to function as required by
their Congressional mandate while at the same time
maintaining reindeer herding within park, preserve,
refuge, or monument lands. Since Òreserve designa-
tion would allow existing grazing to continue to the
extent that it could fill the niche of the extirpated
caribouÓ (U.S. DOI, 1974), ways and means should
be explored to see that the activities of the Federal
agencies and the reindeer herders continue to be co-
ordinated. For example, shelter cabins that might
be erected for National Preserve visitors and agency
personnel could also double as range cabins. Visitor
expectations and opinions regarding reindeer herd-
ing and Native life in general could be positively
emphasized with information and promotional lit-
erature which describe the role and significance of
reindeer herding in the village economy and in
peopleÕs lives. It remains to be seen whether prom-
ises made to continue to permit reindeer herding on
national— interest lands will be kept.
The socioeconomic impacts of increased, constant,
or even declining herd sizes on the herders, the vil-
lages, the range, and the region do not take place
independently of other biological, social, and eco-
nomic factors. Prominent among these factors are
the changing land—ownership and land—manage-
ment jurisdictions on Federal lands in northwest
Alaska, and the policies and management regula-
tions being developed for these lands. Additional
factors relating directly to management policies on
public lands include: subsistence and wildlife man-
agement, fire control policy, aircraft use, and all ter-
rain—vehicle (atv) use, to mention but a few. We will
comment briefly on these.
Changing land ownership
Changing land—ownership and management pat-
terns over northwestern Alaska is a major problem
which reindeer herd operators currently face. The
emerging checkerboard pattern of ownership and
management is viewed by some as the foremost prob-
lem facing herding for it means that some form of
cooperative agreement must be secured by the rein-
deer herders with adjacent private, corporate, state,
and Federal land owners and managers. Since all of
these parties have somewhat different and often con-
flicting attitudes, policies, and regulations for herd-
ing, the individual owner is often in a quandary
about how to resolve the conflict. The Reindeer Herd-
ers Association successfully sought assurances that
reindeer herding would continue to be allowed by
permit on Federal lands on the Seward Peninsula
in the legislative language of the recently passed
d(2) bill.
The Alaska Department of Natural Resources
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(DNR) is responsible for the management of rein-
deer herding on state lands, among its other myriad
functions. Responsibilities toward reindeer herding
have only recently been recognized and, directed ac-
tion is only beginning. A threefold breakdown of state
responsibilities is now in effect. The Division of For-
est, Land, and Water Management is responsible for
the management of the range resource which the
herders use, the granting of reindeer permits or
leases, and the establishment of permit (or lease)
sizes and locations. This latter function will be car-
ried out in conjunction with the Division of Agricul-
ture which will also work with the herders on
marketing techniques and extension and education
services. Coordination of the education and devel-
opment activities will take place with members of
the University of Alaska who are involved in rein-
deer—related research. Last, the Division of Research
and Development, DNR, will formulate general state
reindeer policy, evaluate and recommend which state
lands should be set aside for reindeer grazing, and
coordinate state participation with the reindeer
herders.
Subsistence and wildlife management
policy
Policy regarding subsistence and wildlife manage-
ment will affect reindeer herding. If subsistence uti-
lization of resources is restricted or prohibited,
reindeer may have to provide a greater portion of
the village nutritional requirements. This could pro-
vide increased revenues for herd owners since prices
received would be expected to increase under condi-
tions of increased demand and stable supplies.
It currently appears to be the intent of the De-
partment of the Interior to permit subsistence ac-
tivities to continue on National Preserve lands. If
these activities are allowed to continue at current
levels, the effect on reindeer herding will be to per-
petuate the status quo of the reindeer industry which
is located on those Federal lands. A situation some-
where between complete curtailment of subsistence
activities and the continuation of current harvest
levels seems most likely to develop. Demand for re-
indeer meat and byproducts will increase regard-
less of the restrictions placed on subsistence
utilization of public lands on the Seward Peninsula.
The increased demand will come with increasing hu-
man population in the region, increasing costs for
other meat products, and a preference among most
residents of the region for reindeer over other red—
meat products.
Under wildlife management considerations, two
major areas of concern emerge. First, some preda-
tor control is necessary to protect the reindeer herds.
Until recently, herd owners were aided by the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs and the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service in their predator control efforts. Wolves
can scatter a herd far and wide, in addition to kill-
ing the reindeer. Bears, ravens, and other preda-
tors, including man, also kill or harass reindeer. If
all predator control is eliminated on Federal lands
on the Seward Peninsula, reindeer herding will be
adversely impacted. During the fall and early win-
ter of 1977, more wolves were reported on the east-
ern Seward Peninsula than in recent years. Herders
also reported wolf kills, in addition to scattered and
lost reindeer.
Predator control in general, and of the wolf in par-
ticular, is a highly emotional topic. Wolves are not
an endangered species in Alaska. The decline in the
Western Arctic Caribou Herd has been attributed
to some extent to predation by wolves (Greiner,
1976). It would appear at this time that limited,
uniform predator control will be necessary on the
Seward Peninsula in order to allow reindeer herd-
ing to continue at all. This may develop into a po-
litical compromise whereby predator control to
protect reindeer herds would be allowed on one unit
of national—interest lands, for example the Bering
Land Bridge National Preserve where reindeer are
grazed, and not allowed on another where caribou
are present. Thus, potential prey and habitat for
wolves would be available, but not at the expense of
the reindeer herds.
Another alternative has been suggested to resolve
the conflict between reindeer and bear predation.
Under this proposal, herders would notify Alaska
Department of Fish and Game officials in Nome or
Kotzebue whenever they are experiencing bear pre-
dation. Since bear predation takes place largely in
the spring when there is a legal open season, ADF&G
officers could instruct registered guides to take a
client to the area, and allow the client to shoot the
problem bear. While this arrangement has yet to be
completely considered and implemented, the herd-
ers see several difficulties such as the slow response
time of the ADF&G/guide/client link; no resolution
of the immediate problem of the predacious bear;
and logistical difficulties in contacting ADF&G from
field or village locations and directing the guide/cli-
ent to the precise location of the problem. Nonethe-
less, this is a positive approach by ADF&G to a very
real problem faced by the herders. This in itself is
encouraging given the long history of less—than—
amiable relations between the Native subsistence
users and the state agency charged with preserva-
tion of game and enforcement of the fish and game
laws.
Another area of concern for wildlife management
is the interaction of reindeer with birds during their
nesting season. This coincides more or less in both
time and space with the summer antler harvesting,
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roundup activities. Research funded by the National
Park Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
over several years has provided data on the nesting
birds and their habitat, abundance and distribution,
reindeer foraging and foot placement, and reindeer
and nesting bird interactions (Wright, 1978). Dur-
ing the research, Òfew direct interactions between
reindeer and nesting birds were observedÓ although
probably many interactions were not observed due
to distance of the observers from the herds (1978). A
literature review did not find that eggs were a sig-
nificant part of reindeer or caribou diets. The effect
of indirect impacts caused by reindeer grazing such
as foliage depletion or range deterioration was not
found to be significant on the bird populations. To
minimize impacts of reindeer grazing on bird life,
Wright suggests that the timing of herding and cor-
ralling and the routes used during the summer op-
erations should take nesting—bird distributions and
activities into account (1978).
Management or grazing permits could stipulate
that reindeer be kept away from nesting areas such
as salt grass meadows, coastal tundra, and low—me-
dium willows. Research should be continued to de-
termine the long—range effect of reindeer
interactions with birds and other wildlife for opti-
mum management of these public resources.
Fire—control policy
Fire—control policy will affect reindeer operations,
but because the role of fire in the tundra ecosystem
is still imperfectly understood, one cannot accurately
predict the impacts other than in a most general
way. NANA Regional Corporation sponsored a two—
day meeting in November 1977 to discuss the im-
pacts on the region of the severe tundra fires in the
summer of 1977. At these meetings, some experts
suggested that fire may have beneficial effects in
both the short and the long run by releasing nutri-
ents and promoting succession in the plant commu-
nities which reindeer and caribou graze. If the
biologists are correct, then a policy of allowing natu-
rally caused tundra fires to burn themselves out may
have advantages over suppression efforts by increas-
ing the amount of available forage.
On the other hand, adverse effects of large tundra
fires may outweigh this benefit. Distribution of ex-
isting reindeer ranges, increased stream siltation,
with resultant loss of fish habitat or damage to prop-
erty, unaesthetic appearance of the environment,
and hazardous flying conditions all may occur. In-
come from fire fighting would be foregone to the resi-
dents of the region if fires were allowed to burn
without suppression efforts. Policy regarding fire
suppression should be made on the biological, so-
cial, and economic merits of alternatives.
Aircraft policy
Restrictions on aircraft use have potential for ad-
versely affecting herding operations. Aircraft are
currently used extensively by herd owners. Meat is
shipped to markets by air, although most of these
flights utilize the village landing strips. During the
antler harvest season, aircraft are used to haul the
antler buyers, his crew, and the velvet antler. At this
time of year, landings are made by wheel—equipped
planes on beaches and gravel bars. During the win-
ter, wheel— and ski—equipped planes are used to lo-
cate the herds and to keep track of herd movements.
Landings are made often on snow covered, frozen
lakes. Only two herders have airplanes themselves,
but others express interest in learning to fly. All herd
owners utilize chartered aircraft in their herding
operations to some extent throughout the year. The
major antler purchaser used a two—man helicopter
to locate reindeer in the summer and drive them
into the corral for antler harvesting until a crash
during a 1978 roundup resulted in the loss of the
aircraft and pilot. Another model helicopter has been
used in subsequent roundups. The elimination or
restriction of use of a helicopter on Federal lands
would substantially increase the difficulty, and the
cost of antler harvesting could probably not be re-
covered. Since antler sales are a major portion of
herd ownersÕ income, this would have an undesir-
able effect on herd owners.
All—terrain vehicle (ATV) policy
Changes in current herd—management practices
could result from various Federal and state regula-
tions affecting Seward Peninsula lands. For ex-
ample, the total ban on the use of snow machines on
public lands would probably have the effect of put-
ting the herd owners out of business. The snow ma-
chine has been adopted by Eskimos because it is a
practical and efficient alternative to dog teams un-
der current conditions (Hall, 1971). A return to dog
teams may be held by some people as a romantic
ideal. To force such a return by regulation or law
would impose the need for procuring, raising, train-
ing, feeding, and maintaining the teams upon people
who have changed to a more economical alternative.
These same observations also hold true for draft re-
indeer under current conditions. Partial restrictions
on snow machine use, such as limiting them to snow—
covered ground and to the winter season, would prob-
ably not adversely affect herd operations.
One herd owner uses a small tracked vehicle to
move to his summer range and a corral that was
used for summer handlings up to 1976. The tracks
from this activity run through national interest
lands from the Deering—Utica road, west along the
divide between the Immachuk and Goodhope River.
This corral is still used for winter handlings, but
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snow machines are used to travel to it in the winter.
Other herders own various all—terrain vehicles
besides the ubiquitous snow machines. High pur-
chase and operating costs combined with mechani-
cal problems have led to their infrequent use in
recent years. Concern over the possible adverse im-
pacts to vegetation led the National Park Service to
sponsor research on this question. Results reported
by Racine (1979) indicate that natural revegetation
rates vary with the degree of disturbance to the tun-
dra. The use of light—weight atvÕs was found to cause
little or no severe tundra disturbance under most
conditions. Mitigation of the impacts could be un-
dertaken by 1) selecting the most environmentally
safe atvÕs available; 2) selecting certain travel routes
which minimize tundra disturbances; and 3) using
modified or alternative roundup methods during the
summer (Racine, 1979).
Summary
This chapter has brought the reader to the present
in the ongoing evolution of the reindeer industry and
its role in the lives of the people of northwestern
Alaska. The emphasis has been on the contempo-
rary situation, one which owes most of its problems
as well as its potential to the passage of the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act. The institutional ve-
hicle used in ANCSA to deliver the money, lands,
and services of the settlement has been the Native
corporation. Because the corporate and not the tribal
concept was used, the experience of Alaskan Natives
with the Federal government has been both pro-
foundly different from the experiences of other
American Indian groups, and distressingly familiar
in other ways. Areas of similarity are found in the
unreasonably long time it has taken for the Federal
government to respond to the pressing social, eco-
nomic, and political needs of Natives under the trust
relationship which the Federal government holds
with Native Americans. Another area is in the ex-
emptions in various pieces of legislation for Natives
to protect their subsistence needs. The Reindeer Act
for example, was passed in part to provide a Òmeans
of subsistence for the Eskimos and other Natives of
AlaskaÓ (25 USC 250 et seq 1970). Last, Alaskan
Natives have been considered United States citizens
since 1924; they were extended the right to acquire
title to lands which they utilized under the 1906
Alaska Native Allotment Act, to acquire townsite lots
in 1926, and to acquire the lands, economic develop-
ment, and local government powers provided by the
1934 Indian Reorganization Act provided by the IRA
Alaska amendments passed in 1936.
Differences in the relationship can be traced to the
historical treatment of Alaskan Natives by the
courts, the different sociocultural integration of most
Native groups compared to the tribes of the conti-
nental United States, and the legal construction of
ANCSA as ÒNativeÓ legislation which only termi-
nated those titles and claims base on aboriginal title
or use and occupancy. The various reports on ANCSA
prior to its passage and other sections of the act in-
dicate that it was CongressÕ intent to protect Native
subsistence in other ways. ANCSAÕs passage did not
and was never intended to terminate NativeÕs rights
and privileges under other applicable state and Fed-
eral statutes, a point frequently disregarded in the
often emotional debates concerning access to and
the allocation of ever—diminishing resources. The re-
lationship of the Federal government to Natives will
continue in four major areas, portions of which have
been touched upon in other parts of this volume.
These are: 1) the settlement of Native land claims
and the subsequent protection of those lands; 2) the
provision of various human services (health, educa-
tion, welfare); 3) the protection of subsistence ac-
tivities under applicable Federal (and state) laws;
and, 4) the promotion of Native government (cf. Case,
1978).
A final point concerning contemporay reindeer
herding will be made. The geopolitical map of Alaska
today is crisscrossed with state, Federal, Native,
borough, private, and military holdings in a check-
erboard fashion that is underscored by the fact that,
in 1959, at statehood, some 99 percent of the land
was in Federal stewardship. Reindeer, birds, and
other animals, including humans have traveled over
the lands without regard for the location of town-
ship and section lines on status plats. Each land
owner and manager has a different philosophy about
the highest and best uses of the land. Inevitably,
pressure on the resources, renewable and non—re-
newable alike, is going to increase. The political and
economic maneuverings to control larger land hold-
ings, crucial ranges, and greater numbers of rein-
deer for the commercial market pose a dilemma for
traditionally family— and village—oriented herders
whose subsistence lifestyle is already assaulted by
forces beyond their comprehension and control. Al-
ready burdened with the twin problems of access to
the lands and waters for subsistence purposes, and
the regulation of species types, numbers, and man-
ner and time of taking, subsistence—oriented Alas-
kans and the reindeer herders alike will have to
become more intensively involved in the political
arena to continue being permitted to derive their
living from the resources and lands of their ances-
tors.
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Appendix 1
MEMORANDUM
Juneau, Alaska
October 3, 1930
For Governor Parks:
Suppose 5,000 Native deer go over to a Lomen range in January, 1930, and their increase is 1,500.
Suppose they join a Lomen herd of 20,000. The Lomen increase, if taken at 30 per cent, would be 6,000.
The total deer on the range are now 32,500.
A roundup occurs September 1, 1930, and 8,000 adults are brought in.
These 8,000 would have with them 2,400 fawns.
If both the Native and Lomen deer had been fully marked, then the Natives should be entitled to 20 per
cent of the 2,400 fawns, or 480.
This roundup of 8,000 out of 25,000 would be a 32 per cent roundup.
Sixty—eight per cent of the Native deer would still be on the range.
Sixty—eight per cent of the Native fawn increase would in 1931 be mavericks which Lomens would claim
under the existing custom.
Now suppose there is no roundup in the spring of 1931, and a roundup occurs in July, 1931.
The Native has 5,000 marked adults
1,500 unmarked yearlings
1,950 fawns unmarked
Total Native 8,450
Lomens should have 20,000 marked adults
6,000 unmarked yearlings
7,800 unmarked fawns
Total Lomen 33,800
There is now on July 1, 1931, a total of 42,250 deer on the range.
If a complete roundup would occur July 1, 1931:
Lomen would get 20,000 marked
7,500 yearlings (mavericks)
and a percentage of fawns, as follows: 80 per cent of 9,750, or 7,800.
The Lomen total is, on July 2nd, 35,300 and the Native total is 6,950.
The Native percentage of ownership has been reduced from 20 per cent to 16.4 per cent in one year, and
the Native not only has lost 1,500 deer but his future percentage is 18 per cent less than it should be.
What usually happens is something like this:
5,000 of the Native deer join a Lomen herd in January, 1930.
The Native deer are perhaps 20 per cent marked and the Lomen deer are perhaps 75 percent marked.
4,000 unmarked Native deer
1,000 marked Native deer (including 500 females)
The 20,000 Lomen deed would be:
15,000 marked (7,500 female)
5,000 unmarked
The increase is over 30 per cent, or 7,500 fawns for the herd.
LomenÕs tally would show they now own 20/21 of 32,500 and the Natives now own 1120/21,280 or 5 per
cent of the herd instead of 20 per cent. The co—owners with Lomen would profit by this transaction, but
Lomens have bought out many of their big co—owners until they own the big percentage of their herds.
Ernest Walker Sawyer
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Appendix 2
Comparison of Reindeer Council Range Rules and Lomen Corporation Range Rules(1931)
Reindeer Council Range Rules.
Ò(1) Marking Notification. The herd manager shall notify, in writing, the owners or agents of all border-
ing herds, as designated by the General Reindeer Superintendent, as to the time and place of the marking
of a herd, at least two weeks in advance of such marking, so that representatives of such bordering herds
may be present at the marking. The Reindeer Service will have a representative at every roundup when
such a representative is available.Ó
Lomen Reindeer Corporation Range Rules.
ÒMarking, Notification. We will notify, in writing, the owners or agents of our neighbouring herds, as to
the time, and place of the marking of our herds, at least two weeks in advance of such marking so that
representatives of such neighboring herds may be present at the marking of our herds, and they are
invited to be present at such markings.Ó
Lomen Reindeer Corporation Range Rules.
ÒMarking Fawns to Stray Owners. ÔStrayÕ owners in company herds will receive ten per cent less than
the percentage of fawn increase for the year, with a maximum percentage of 50 on two or more females,
including yearling females, and increase will be given only on even numbers of such stray females. The
odd number will not receive increase when based on a 50% fawn increase.
ÒAny owner of stray deer, when such number exceeds one hundred females not satisfied with the fawn
increase on females, may, by written request to our Nome office, and by payment of pro rata of herd
expenses for the year, share in pro rata division of fawns.Ó
Reindeer Council Range Rules and Regulations.
Ò(4) Marking Fawns to Stray Owners. Stray owners in a herd shall not pay herding fees, but will receive
a smaller percentage of increase than co—owners of a herd figured as follows: When the percentage of
increase in the total herd, based on adult females, runs 60 or more per cent, the stray owners will receive
50 per cent increase. Whenever the total fawn increase in a herd runs less than 60 per cent, based on adult
females, the percentage of fawn due such stray owners shall be computed as follows: Take the per cent of
fawn increase of the herd for the year, based on adult females, and subtract therefrom the figure ten. The
result will be the per cent of fawn due stray owners for that year. Percentages for stray owners will be
based on two or more adult females, and increases will be given only on even numbers of such stray
females. The first fawn marked shall be a male. The odd number will not receive fawn increase. Mavericks
shall be the property of the herd in which they are found.
ÒOvers and Shorts: When fawns or mavericks, either male or female, are marked to an owner, in excess
of the number his percentage calls for, said owner is Ôover.Õ When a smaller number of fawns or mavericks,
either male or female, is marked to an owner than his percentage calls for said owner is Ôshort.Õ Correc-
tions of such Ôovers and shortsÕ are to be made in kind, male or female mavericks, at the next marking
season and females of such co—owner debited or credited prior to the establishment of new percentages in
said herd, and Òovers and shortsÓ must balance in number and kind in order to be correct on the annual
marking return for said year.Ó
Lomen Reindeer Corporation Range Rules.
ÒHerd Expenses by Co—Owners. Expenses may be paid co—owners, in cash, in labor,Ñwhen on company
payrollÑ or in reindeer on the hoof when ranging with a company herd. Hereafter, whenever a co—owner
desires to pay herd expenses in reindeer, the Lomen Reindeer Corporation will accept same on the follow-
ing basis and at the follwing value:
ÒWhen said deer range with our herd, we will credit any owner for reindeer re—marked to us or butch-
ered, with $3.00 per head.Ó
Reindeer Council Rules and Regulations.
Ò(21) The Standard Herding Fee per head per year for each adult female will be based on the coast of
herding prorated against the coowners on the basis of ownership of adult female deer in the herd as
counted during the current marking season except when a written agreement has been entered into.Ó
Ò(22) Herding Fees may include chief herderÕs salary, wages and subsistence to herders, cost of marking
roundup, cost of maintenance and wages of marking crew during marking, construction and maintenance
of marking equipment.
ÒA detailed cost account including all items constituting the herding fee for the past fiscal year ending
June 30 must be sent to the General Reindeer Superintendent on or before September 1, and a copy kept
on file for inspection by any owner or owners.Ó
